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General introduction 
 
From 2010 to 2012, about 870 million people are estimated to have been undernourished 
representing 12.5 percent of the global population and 14.9 percent of the developing world 
(FAO et al., 2012). The rate of progress in the reduction of undernourishment has been higher 
in Asia and in Latin America than in Africa where 22.9 percent of the population still suffers 
from undernourishment. Most of the progress in reducing hunger has been achieved before 
the 2007-2008 global food price crisis. If the consequences of the food and economic crises 
on hunger have been less important than initially expected, Sub-Saharan Africa has been 
strongly affected by the global recession and achieving food security continues to be a 
challenge. 
This doctoral thesis is in line with the renewed interest in research on agriculture and food 
security following the 2008 global food crisis. This doctoral thesis aims to contribute to a 
better understanding of the complex issues surrounding food security. 
The general background of the dissertation 
Food security is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
Hunger can take many forms, from chronic under-nutrition to famine. Famine has been 
eradicated in several historically famine-prone countries such as Bangladesh, Russia, China 
and India. With almost 234 million people chronically undernourished in 2010-2012 (FAO et 
al., 2012), Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world in which threats of famine 
persist. 
The most recent famine on the African continent hit Somalia in 2011 and is a good example 
of the complex dynamics underlying the global problem of food insecurity. In 2011 the Horn 
of Africa faced a severe food security crisis that threatened the lives and livelihood of over 
twelve million people (FAO, 2011a). Somalia has been hit worst of all countries in the region 
with more than 40 percent of the country’s population in crisis. Out of the four million of 
Somalis suffering from the food crisis, 750,000 were officially declared as experiencing 
famine in September 2011. 
A food crisis results from a combination of various factors. The severe drought that affected 
the Horn of Africa between July 2011 and mid-2012 emerges as the major trigger of the 
famine. The drought was characterized by the lowest levels of rainfall recorded in 50 years in 
2 
 
some of the affected areas (Maxwell and Fitzpatrick, 2012). Although the food crisis was 
largely a result of the drought, rising food prices have also contributed to a large extent to the 
crisis. High cereal prices (both imported and local) coupled with reduced incomes as a result 
of limited labour opportunities and low livestock sales decreased households’ ability to access 
food (WFP, 2011). In addition to the production and access failures, the longstanding conflict 
in Somalia played an important role in people’s vulnerability. The prolonged conflict led to 
large scale displacements of civilians and often prevented people from cultivating their land 
and moving their herds (Jaspars and Maxwell, 2008). Finally, the conflict reduced the ability 
of aid organizations to provide assistance to affected households. Access to people in need 
was significantly restricted by the Al-Shabaab1 islamist group, as the group controls much of 
the south of the country. In February 2010, Al-Shabaab banned World Food Program (WFP) 
operations in Somalia and 16 additional aid groups were banned from operating in the country 
in November 2011.  
The 2011 famine and the prevailing level of food insecurity in the region are the result of 
recurrent droughts as well as socio-economic factors. As described by Sen (1981), famines 
are not necessarily caused by a reduction in the availability of food. Sen (1981) developed a 
new approach to famines which focuses on people's ability to command food. Before Sen, 
famines were seen as the inevitable consequence of sudden food shortages resulting from 
unavoidable exogenous shocks such as persistent droughts, floods and other natural disasters 
(Plümper and Neumayer, 2011). By introducing the 'entitlement approach', Sen shows that 
famines happen when people are no longer able to have access to sufficient amounts of food. 
Following Sen’s work, Ravallion (1997) emphasizes the role played by market and 
institutional failures to explain famines. He showed that the 1974 famine in Bangladesh was 
partly caused by speculative hoarding by farmers and traders as well as a general mistrust of 
the people with regards to the government’s ability to provide a suitable response to the crisis. 
De Waal (1990) argues that Sen’s approach neglects the role played by social disruption in 
explaining famine. He argues that natural disasters or economic crisis can cause social 
disruption that in turns leads to health crises which cause excess deaths. He lays stress on the 
effects of wars, unhygienic living conditions and diseases on morbidity and mortality. 
Although there is some disagreement about what actually causes famine, this debate has led to 
the recognition that food availability does not ensure households’ access to food: food 
security is “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
                                                 
1 Al-Shabaab is the largest militant organization fighting the transitional government in Somalia. The group 
controls much of the south of the country. 
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sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). At the World Summit of Food Security in 2009, the 
concept was extended by adding that the “four pillars of food security are availability, access, 
utilization, and stability” and stated that “the nutritional dimension is integral to the concept” 
(FAO, 2009). 
High food prices may threaten food security 
Access to food may be threatened by the current high level of global food prices. Between 
2006 and 2008, world food prices increased dramatically, raising concerns about food access 
for poor households in developing countries. International prices of several commodities such 
as maize, rice and wheat increased significantly, reaching their highest levels in nearly thirty 
years. The world prices of wheat, soybean and maize more than doubled, while the price of 
rice tripled. As the majority of smallholders are net buyers of the food crops they produce 
(Barrett, 2008), large price increases can cause temporary reductions in disposable income. 
Food represents a large share of the budget of poor consumers in developing countries and a 
reduction in purchasing power due to price shocks can force poor households to cut back on 
the quantity or quality of their food. Poor households may also sell assets in order to cope 
with sharp changes in prices, which can trap them into poverty. In addition, poor households 
are less able to take advantage of high prices due to their limited access to productive assets 
and credit and their remoteness from markets.  
The jump in global food prices can have adverse effects at the national level too, through a 
rise in the food import bill. The 2008 sharp rise in world prices put an end to a downward 
trend that lasted more than 30 years (Figure 1). After peaking in 1974, prices of most basic 
grains decreased continuously to reach historically low levels in the early 2000s. The long-
term downward trend in agricultural commodity prices discouraged countries to invest in 
agriculture. According to the FAO, the agricultural trade balance of African countries has 
deteriorated massively since 1980. In 1980, the African agricultural trade was almost 
balanced whereas in 2010 its agricultural imports exceeded agricultural exports by about USD 
35 billion (FAOSTAT, 2013). The trade deficit is much larger for food trade. Africa’s food 
trade deficit started in 1974 with the rise in food prices and has not stopped growing until 
2008 when it reached a peak at USD 31 billion (FAOSTAT, 2013).  
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Figure 1: Trend in real international prices of key cereals in US$ per metric ton (January 1960 – March 2013)  
 
Source: IFS for the nominal prices of maize, soybeans and wheat and for the Unit Value of Exports; UNCTAD for the nominal price of rice. Note: Prices are adjusted for 
inflation using the World Export Unit Values. Maize is US No. 2 Yellow, wheat is US No. 2 Hard Red Winter, soybeans are US No. 1 Yellow, and rice is White Thai 5% 
broken. 
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The increase in food imports is driven by basic food staple such as dairy products, vegetable 
oils, sugar and especially cereals (FAO, 2011b), implying that food imports have been 
increasingly important in ensuring food security. Food imports dependency does not threaten 
food security in periods of low prices but it becomes problematic in a context of high world 
prices. The situation is especially worrying in countries with no stable source of foreign 
currency. According to the FAO (2011b), only 19 African countries out of 53 had enough 
agricultural export revenues in 2007 to pay for their food import bill.  
Enhancing food security in Africa will require an increase in agricultural productivity  
Rising food imports reflects that growth in domestic food supply has been unable to match the 
rise in demand. Although Africa’s total cereal production has increased over the past twenty 
years, the production per capita has stagnated. Over the period 1990-2011, Africa’s total 
cereal production increased on average by 3.1 percent per year but its per capita cereal 
production rose only by about 0.7 percent per year (FAOSTAT, 2013). Production growth 
was based almost entirely on extending the area under cultivation (Evenson and Gollin, 
2003a). On average in Africa, the level of cereal produced on a per capita basis is about 156 
kg in 2011, compared with 306 kg per capita in Asia and 371 kg per capita in the world 
(FAOSTAT, 2013). This low and stagnated level of cereal production per capita can be 
attributed to slow productivity growth. 
Figure 2 compares cereal yield levels and shows the huge productivity gap between Africa 
and the rest of the world. Between 1961 and 2011, Asia’s cereal yields tripled from 1.2 to 
more than three tons per hectare, while Africa’s yields stayed at less than 1.6 tons per hectare 
(FAOSTAT, 2013). When considering the agricultural value added per worker as a measure 
of agricultural productivity, it appears that the agricultural value added per worker remains 
low in most African countries. According to Gollin et al. (2012), the value added per worker 
is approximately four times higher in non-agriculture than in agriculture in developing 
countries. Africa’s low and stagnating agricultural productivity has many causes including 
among other things land degradation, limited access to inputs, slow adoption of technology 
and improved practices and low access to agricultural credit.  
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Figure 2: Cereal yield in kilogram per hectare 
 
Source: FAOSTAT 
Although large areas of fertile land in Sub-Saharan Africa remain idle, per capita arable land 
and farm sizes are declining over time in the face of the high population growth (IFPRI, 2011; 
Jayne et al., 2003). Population pressure may also force people to move from high agricultural 
potential areas with fertile soils to marginal or fragile lands (Muchena, 2005). The 
relationship between population density and land degradation is not clear; the debate over 
whether population density leads to land improvement or to land degradation continues today 
(Von Braun et al., 2012). It is nevertheless true that Sub-Saharan Africa is impacted by land 
degradation, especially Africa south of the Equator (Bai et al., 2008). Land degradation as 
well as poor land quality (Wiebe, 2003) are major constraints to higher agricultural 
productivity (Pender, 2009). Some differences in land quality and some forms of land 
degradation such as soil nutrient depletion can be mitigated through the use of organic and 
inorganic fertilizers. On the other hand, soil erosion or salinization are more costly to reverse 
but can be slowed through appropriate management practices.  
The literature on agricultural stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa draws attention to the slow 
adoption of technology including fertilizer usage, mechanical inputs, and high-yielding seed 
varieties (O'Gorman, 2012). The intensity of fertilizer use remains low in Africa compared to 
the rest of the world. In 2002, the average intensity of fertilizer use was height kilograms per 
hectare in Sub-Saharan Africa compared with 78 kg per ha in Latin America and 101 kg in 
South Asia (Morris et al., 2007). Fertilizer use must increase in Africa as fertilizer use is 
critical to restore soil fertility and can contribute to closing the gap between actual and 
potential crop yields that is very high in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011




7 
 
Agricultural mechanization is an important part of the modernization of agriculture. In Africa, 
the use of mechanical implements lags far behind other regions of the world due to the high 
cost of energy and the high price of equipment. In addition, the average African farm is often 
too small and fragmented to make the use of tractors economically viable. 
Agricultural sectors in many countries have widely benefited from crop genetic improvement. 
Over the period from 1960 to 1980, modern varieties contributed substantially to food 
production growth in Asia and Latin America. In contrast, high yielding crop varieties 
contribution to productivity growth was extremely low before the 1990’s in Sub Saharan 
Africa (Evenson and Gollin, 2003a). The differences between regions in the impact of modern 
varieties to yield may reflect the disparities in the availability of suitable varieties across 
different agroecological zones. At the global scale, most of the yield gains were achieved by 
using crop varieties that performed well under irrigation and intensive use of fertilizers. By 
contrast, varietal improvement was more limited in other growing environments; there was 
indeed very limited research on crops such as sorghum, millet and cassava until the 1970’s or 
even on rice in West Africa until the 1980’s (Evenson and Gollin, 2003b). 
Adoption of modern inputs is constrained by supply-side factors but also by demand-side 
factors such as lack of access to credit. The literature on rural credit markets in developing 
countries emphasizes limited access to credit as a major constraint to higher levels of 
productivity (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Kochar, 1997). Low access to credit may affect 
farmers in different ways. First, credit constraints may prevent smallholders from making 
investments in a new technology. Second, credit constrained households may engage in low 
risk–low return activity portfolios (Dercon, 2005). Third, household are likely to hold high 
levels of stocks to protect against shocks. For Ethiopia, Ali and Deiniger (2012) found that 
eliminating credit constraints would increase productivity by roughly eleven percent in 
surplus producing areas. By contrast, credit rationing does not have any impact on agricultural 
productivity in drought prone areas where loans are rarely used to buy agricultural inputs.  
Given that many smallholders market their produce right after the harvest (when prices are at 
their lowest) and buy food from the market when their stock are depleted (when prices reach 
their peaks), a reduction in food losses could have a significant impact on their livelihoods. 
Food losses are difficult to estimate due to limited data. In a recent study, Gustavsson et al. 
(2011) estimate that one-third of the edible parts of food produced for human consumption is 
wasted globally each year. On a per-capita basis, the food waste by consumers in Europe and 
North-America is 95-115 kg per year compared with only 6 kg per year in Sub-Saharan 
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Africa and 11 kg in South/Southeast Asia. In developing countries food is mostly lost during 
the production to processing stages of the food supply chain whereas in high-income 
countries food losses occur mostly at retail and consumer levels (Gustavsson et al., 2011). In 
developing regions, agricultural production and postharvest handling and storage are stages in 
the food supply chain with the highest food losses. Improving the efficiency of the food 
supply chain would require large scale investment in harvesting, transport, storage facilities 
and packaging equipment. For decades, research has focuses on boosting agricultural 
production and productivity. It is time to address the tensions between production and access 
to food by increasing research and funding on postharvest activities in order to decrease the 
cost of food to the consumer and thus increase access. 
After decades of neglect, the food price crisis of 2008 has put agriculture and food security 
back on the African development agenda. 
Both domestic and international policy makers failed to predict the 2008 food price crisis 
which suggests that that no lessons have been learned from the 1974 food crisis. In response 
to the 1974 crisis, new institutions were created such as the World Food Program for food aid, 
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural (CGIAR) for Research, the Global 
Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) for preventing food crises. Although the 
1974 food crisis raised policy interest in predicting and preventing future crises, subsequent 
responses have not been adequate to address and prevent them.  
Over the last 30 years, public spending in the agricultural sector (including foreign aid) have 
been extremely low (Bezemer and Headey, 2006). African governments spend on average 
much less on the agricultural sector than Asian and Latin American countries (O’Gorman, 
2012). African public investment in the agricultural sector fell from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 4.5 
percent in 2002 (Somma, 2008). The share of development assistance devoted to agricultural 
investments has followed the same trend; it decreased from 26 percent in the late 1980’s to 4 
percent in 2007 (Somma, 2008).  
In 2003, African heads of state ratified an initiative called the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). All member states of the African Union 
committed to invest at least ten percent of their national budgets in the agricultural sector by 
2008. Only height out of 53 African countries met their ten percent target of agricultural 
spending as a share of the national budget and nine countries invested about five percent 
(NEPAD, 2011). That ten percent commitment, also known as the Maputo Declaration 
Target, was designed to stimulate agricultural growth, reduce poverty, and achieve food 
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security. Although the numbers may vary depending on how agricultural spending is defined, 
many experts agree to recognize that some progress have been made towards meeting the ten 
percent target but there is more to be done. 
After decades of neglect of the agricultural sector in developing countries, African policy 
makers and the international community show a renewed interest in agriculture for 
development. In 2012, the G8 launched a New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition that 
is a joint initiative between African leaders, the private sector and development partners to 
mobilize national and international private investment in African agriculture. The 
stakeholders committed to specific policy reforms and investments that will accelerate the 
implementation of country food security strategies under the CAADP. These commitments 
are captured in New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks for each country. To date, ten 
countries have agreed New Alliance Cooperation Frameworks. In 2012, over 80 companies 
made investment commitments covering 6 out of those 10 countries. The New Alliance has 
already leveraged more than $3.7 billion in private investment in African agriculture. 
At a sub-regional level, West African regional organizations and their global partners have 
launched the Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative–Sahel (AGIR) in December 2012. The 
Sahel region has faced three food and nutritional crisis over the past decade and is 
characterized by high acute malnutrition rates. The purpose of this initiative is to help build 
resilience of vulnerable communities through social safety nets, emergency food reserves, and 
enhancement of the households’ production capacity (IFPRI, 2012). 
Ministers of food and agriculture from the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) member states as well as Chad and Mauritania adopted a charter on food crisis 
prevention and management in 2011 that aims to improve the effectiveness and the efficiency 
of food crises prevention and response mechanisms in West Africa. The charter recognizes 
the need to promote dialogue and coordination between the stakeholders and to increase the 
information quality and analysis of the food and nutrition situation. 
One of the key elements of the food crisis prevention system is the creation of a regional 
emergency food reserve that is the third defense line in addition to the local stocks managed at 
community or village level and the national food security stocks. The reserves will involve an 
intervention capability of 410,000 tons: 140,000 tons of physical stocks and a financial 
reserve equivalent to 270,000 tons. Funding of the regional food security reserve will be 
provided by governments, regional institutions and financial partners including the G20 
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members. The governments and the regional institutions are expected to provide two-thirds of 
the funding ensuring the regional sovereignty over the reserve. 
If we must applaud the recent efforts made by some countries and their global partners to 
invest in agriculture and to reform the food crisis prevention system, we have to ensure that 
these efforts will be translated into tangible results.  
Thesis outline and main results 
The thesis does not aim to cover all aspects of food security. This research focuses mainly on 
the role of food prices and rainfall shocks. The dissertation is divided in four chapters that 
intend to: 
- Understand how price signals are transmitted from the world market to domestic 
markets (Chapter 1) 
- Analyze the nature of the hurdles to food commodities trade in Western and Central 
Africa (Chapter 2) 
- Improve the food crisis alert and prevention systems in the Sahel region (Chapter 3) 
- Assess how households are affected by and cope with climate shocks in rural areas of 
Burkina Faso (Chapter 4) 
The first chapter investigates whether changes in the international price of rice are transmitted 
to the domestic prices of imported and local rice in Senegal, Mali and Chad. The 2008 sharp 
rise in world food prices raised great concerns about the food situation of poor people in 
developing countries. If the surge in world food prices has a direct impact at the national level 
on the food import bill of countries relying massively on import to meet their food needs, the 
effects at the household level are less obvious. Measuring the degree of price transmission 
helps us assess the actual impact of the increase in world prices for households. A common 
concern of both policy makers and consumers is asymmetry in price transmission; this chapter 
aims at testing whether domestic prices of imported and local rice respond faster to an 
increase or to a decrease of the international price of rice. Results indicate that the rice 
markets considered in the analysis are integrated with the world market in the long run, apart 
from the market of local rice in Dakar. This result is not surprising considering that the local 
rice market is essentially a thin residual market in Dakar. Results indicate that the domestic 
prices of imported rice in Dakar and of local rice in Bamako react differently to changes in the 
world price depending on whether the world price is rising or falling. The price of imported 
rice in Dakar is more responsive to a world price increase than to a decrease that may reflect a 
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situation of market power in the distribution chain. On the other hand, the government 
interventions in rice market in Mali are found to result in asymmetric adjustment to 
international price changes; the price of local rice in Bamako adjusts more rapidly to a world 
price decline than to a world price rise. 
Chapter 2 analyses the incidence of the different impediments to trade of food staples in 
Western and Central Africa. Although a large number of African countries committed to a 
process of regional integration, uneven application of the rules and poor road conditions 
continue to hinder regional trade. The chapter aims at identifying the impact of road 
infrastructure and country borders on the regional integration of food staples markets using a 
unique dataset of food commodity prices on 173 markets located in 14 countries and covering 
the period January 2007 to January 2013. Results highlight the role played by borders in 
explaining price deviations between markets. However, borders appear as a smaller 
impediment to trade for countries members of the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU) or ECOWAS. Our results argue in favour of deepening regional integration 
within Western and Central African countries. Additionally, our research stresses the 
importance of providing adequate hard infrastructure in order to reduce the role played by the 
distance. 
The third chapter aims at providing new early warning indicators based on food prices. In the 
1980s, market information systems have been implemented in many African countries to 
collect and disseminate food prices. Until recently, food prices were not analysed extensively 
and early warning systems relied heavily on crop harvest monitoring. This chapter aims at 
exploiting grain price data to detect the warning signs of looming food crises in Mali, Burkina 
Faso and Niger using millet prices from 44 markets. We first identify markets which play a 
leading role at the national and regional level and then analyze price movements preceding a 
price crisis. Our analysis provides evidence that price crises can be predicted about 6 months 
in advance through the observation of past price movements. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of children’s vulnerability to climate shocks in Burkina 
Faso. If climate shocks are inevitable, human vulnerability to these shocks is not. To reduce 
people’s vulnerability, we first need to strengthen our knowledge of vulnerability. By 
combining health data originating from a 2008 household survey with meteorological data, 
we identify the critical period in a child’s life during which deprivation has the most severe 
consequences. Results show a strong relationship between rainfall shocks during the prenatal 
period and child health. The period in utero to twelve months is a critical period during which 
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exposure to nutritional shortfall will have long lasting effects. Results provide evidence that 
neither rich nor poor households manage to smooth consumption in case of large negative 
rainfall shocks. Lastly, rainfall shocks have no significant impact on acute malnutrition 
suggesting that even low endowed households are able to set-up survival strategies to protect 
the more vulnerable children.   
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1.1. Introduction 
The 2008 food crisis raises the question of the implications of West Africa’s dependency on 
global food markets. The international price of nearly every food commodity sharply 
increased in 2007 and 2008, raising concerns about the food situation of poor people in 
developing countries. The international prices of traditional staple foods such as maize, rice 
and wheat increased significantly, reaching their highest levels in nearly thirty years (FAO, 
2009). Dairy products and palm oil also experienced sharp price hikes. 
Countries with high food import dependency are highly vulnerable to rising international food 
prices. The large majority of West African countries are net food importers (FAO, 2011a). 
Cereals imports in West Africa are dominated by rice and wheat (FAOSTAT, 2013). Over the 
last two decades, there has been a shift in consumption from traditional cereals to rice, partly 
because people prefer its cooking qualities and minimal preparation time (Balasubramanian et 
al., 2007). In coastal countries like Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone, 
rice is the major source of calories (FAOSTAT, 2013). As domestic rice consumption 
increased faster than local rice production, West African countries became increasingly 
dependent on imports to meet their domestic needs. It does not threaten food security in 
periods of low prices of imported rice but it becomes problematic in a context of high world 
prices of rice. Global rice prices rose to record highs in the spring of 2008, with trading prices 
tripling from November 2007 to May 2008. The causes of this price spike are complex and 
the price increase of rice was not due to crop failure or a particularly tight global rice supply 
situation (FAO, 2011b). The rise in rice prices is the result of the combined effects of trade 
restrictions by major suppliers (India), panic buying by several large importers, a weak dollar, 
and high oil prices. 
The effects of the food crisis have varied between developing countries according to their 
food import dependency and the degree to which prices on world markets were passed 
through to domestic prices. Indeed, the magnitude of the impact of increasing world food 
prices depends directly on the extent to which world prices are transmitted to domestic 
markets. The purchasing power of households depends on the level of domestic food prices, 
not on the level of international food prices. The degree to which prices on world markets are 
passed through to domestic prices is a crucial issue as it influences the behaviour of producers 
and consumers. Prices serve at signals about what should be produced and consumed and they 
provide incentives to people to alter their production and consumption. The transmission of 
world prices to domestic markets may provide strong incentives for African smallholders to 
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increase production or may lead to the substitution of imported grains with locally produced 
cereals.  
Price transmission between the world prices and the domestic prices has been widely analyzed 
in the literature (see Baffes and Gardner, 2003; Conforti, 2004; Gilbert, 2010). A recent FAO 
study (Rapsomanikis, 2011) analyses the relationship between the world market and the 
domestic markets in six developing countries including two in sub-Saharan Africa. The study 
shows that domestic markets are integrated with the world market in the long run but the 
degree of adjustment of domestic food prices to world market changes is slow. In most of the 
food importing countries included in the study, domestic prices fully adjust to changes in the 
international prices after a period of nine to ten months. Meuriot (2012) studies the 
transmission of the fluctuations in the world price of rice to the domestic prices of imported 
rice in Dakar and Mpal and to the domestic price of local and imported rice in Bamako. She 
finds that the prices of imported rice in Dakar and Mpal are integrated in the long-term with 
the world price of rice whereas she provides evidence of the absence of integration between 
the Malian markets and the international market of rice. 
The current paper investigates price transmission between the international price of rice and 
the domestic prices of imported rice and local rice in three West African markets in an 
attempt to determine the impact of increasing world rice prices on West African markets. In 
this paper, we restrict our attention to three countries: Senegal, Mali and Chad. These three 
countries are characterized by different consumption and production profiles and by different 
market structures. Hence, studying the price transmission between the world price of rice and 
the domestic prices of rice in these three distinct contexts can be instructive. It can help us to 
understand how the production profile and the market structure influence the degree of price 
transmission. We focus our analysis on the price of rice in the capital cities: Dakar, Bamako 
and N’Djamena. Besides the issue of the quality of rice, two types of rice are available on 
these three markets: the imported rice and the local rice. We thus examine the relationship 
between the international price of rice and the domestic prices of imported and local rice. 
After the 2008 sharp rise in the international price of rice, the West African domestic prices of 
rice increased strongly after a delay of a few months varying with the policies implemented 
by the countries, the grain supply level and the exchange rate. It took 12 and 8 months 
respectively to the imported rice prices in N’Djamena and Dakar to go down. These delays 
are consistent with the general consumers feeling that retail food prices respond faster to an 
increase in global food prices than to a decrease. If the domestic prices of imported and local 
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rice respond more fully or rapidly to an increase in the international price of rice than to a 
decrease, the asymmetry is said positive whereas in the opposite case the asymmetry is said 
negative. This issue of asymmetric adjustment has been widely discussed in economic 
literature (see Balke and Fomby, 1997; Enders and Siklos, 2001) but only few studies have 
analyzed asymmetric price transmission of agricultural commodities. Among these articles, a 
few analyze asymmetric vertical price transmission (see Goodwin and Harper, 2000; Stigler 
and Tortora, 2011; Araujo-Bonjean and Brun, 2010; Badolo, 2012) but none of them focus on 
the behaviour of grain prices in several West African countries.  
The purpose of this research is twofold. Firstly, we investigate whether the international price 
of rice is transmitted domestically in three West African countries: Senegal, Chad and Mali. 
Secondly we investigate whether domestic prices of imported and local rice respond faster to 
an increase or to a decrease in the international price of rice.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
characteristics of rice markets in Senegal, Mali and Chad. Section 3 details the econometric 
approach used in the empirical analysis. The results of the empirical analysis are shown in 
section 4 and the last section concludes.  
1.2. Characteristics of rice markets in Senegal, Mali and Chad 
1.2.1. Rice 
Rice has become a commodity of strategic significance across much of Africa. Driven by 
changing food preferences in the urban and rural areas, by the rapid urbanization and 
population growth, rice consumption in sub-Saharan Africa increased steadily over the last 
decade. Grain consumption profiles vary a lot between Senegal, Mali and Chad. Rice provides 
more than one third of cereal calorie intake in Senegal, 22 percent in Mali and 5 percent in 
Chad (FAOSTAT, 2013). Even if rice plays a relatively minor role in the diet in Chad, its 
consumption is rising (see Table A1 in appendix). It is worth noting that 88 percent of the 
domestic supply of rice is consumed in urban centres in Chad (Bricas et al., 2009) suggesting 
that rice plays an important role in urban food security. 
West Africa’s rice production has not been able to match growth in demand resulting in a 
significant increase in imports. With regional rice imports totalling almost 19 percent of world 
rice imports (FAOSTAT, 2013), West Africa has become a significant player in world rice 
markets. Senegal is the third largest West African importers of rice representing 12 percent of 
regional rice imports and 2.3 percent of world rice imports (FAOSTAT, 2013). The increase 
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in rice imports results from changing food preferences as well as from trade liberalization. At 
the end of the eighties there was a shift from state-led development to a gradual liberalization 
of the rice economy making imported rice cheaper and leading to increased imports.  
Senegal relies mainly on imported rice to cover its needs. In Senegal, only 30 percent of 
domestic rice is sold in urban centers (USAID, 2009a). Local rice enters commercial market 
channels through large transactions following each harvest and through smaller and irregular 
transactions throughout the year when farmers are short of cash (USAID, 2009c). Farmers 
produce rice primarily for subsistence and most of them are not commercially oriented. Such 
a marketing scheme results in a fragmented and informal rice value chain characterized by a 
high degree of uncertainty. It is unclear whether the strong preference for imported rice is due 
to the poor quality of local rice, to a lack of communication promoting local rice or to the lack 
of availability of local rice on the market. 
Conversely, Mali and Chad are among the few West African countries which meet close to 90 
percent of domestic needs in rice through national production (Table A1). In Mali large 
volumes of local rice reach urban markets through collectors, semi-wholesalers and retailers.  
In spite of the process of liberalization, the rice market is not an integrated market. The West 
African rice market is segmented on the basis of the rice quality. This segmentation has 
important implications in terms of price transmission. In many countries, local rice is 
considered to be of lower quality than imported rice. Hence, rice producers have to set their 
price below the price of imported rice to make their product attractive. The price of imported 
rice puts a cap on the price of locally produced rice. Local rice has to compete with imported 
rice and the price of local rice may be affected by changes in the world price of rice. 
However, local rice is an imperfect substitute for imported rice and in some rare cases 
consumers perceive local rice as a product with specific attributes that cannot be found in 
imported rice. These qualities allow farmers to sell their rice at a higher price. In those rare 
cases, local rice does not directly compete with imported rice and then the price of these types 
of local rice may be less affected by the volatility of the world price of rice. In Mali, both 
urban and rural consumers strongly prefer local rice for its freshness and taste (USAID, 
2009a). The market for local rice is divided into two distinct segments: a segment where a rice 
of high quality is sold, consisting exclusively of local rice that has been polished and cleaned, 
and a mass market segment consisting of imported rice and un-cleaned and heterogeneous 
local rice (USAID, 2009b). 
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1.2.2. The domestic rice markets characteristics explaining asymmetric price 
transmission 
To date, the literature (see Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004, for a review) has 
examined a variety of factors that can explain the existence of asymmetric price transmission 
from world prices to domestic markets. We restrict here the potential causes of weak price 
transmission and asymmetric adjustment to the factors that seem plausible in the context of 
West African rice markets. 
The relationships linking importers, wholesalers and retailers may be characterized by high 
transactions costs that may prevent agents from adjusting prices continuously (Blake and 
Fomby, 1997). If adjustment is costly, traders may respond to small changes in world prices 
by increasing or reducing their margins, leading to a zero pass through of small movements in 
world prices to domestic markets. In Dakar, importers typically maintain a one to three month 
stock of rice (USAID, 2009a).This reflects not only the relatively long order-cycle (one month 
or more) but also the need to deal with demand variations. This may imply that small 
transitory changes in the world price of rice are not transmitted to the domestic price of 
imported rice. Additionally, retail prices may not adjust fully due to menu costs such as costs 
of informing market partners as well as the risk to the retailer’s reputation if its price changes 
are too frequent.  Finally, sellers may be reluctant to adjust their prices if they ignore whether 
the price change is permanent or transitory.  
Different costs of adjustment, depending on whether prices rise or fall, might be a cause of 
price asymmetries. For example, the 2008 rise in the international price of rice and the 
uncertainty about the ability of Asian markets to export sufficient quantities of rice led the 
West African countries to look for other sources of rice supply. It entails search costs for 
importers and these costs do not exist in periods of low world price of rice.  
Imperfect competition in the processing/distribution chain is frequently reported as a major 
source of asymmetric price transmission. If some agents have the ability to influence directly 
or indirectly market prices, they may respond more quickly to shocks that reduce their 
marketing margins than to shocks that raise them. Imperfect competition may refer to the 
exercise of market power by a small group of middlemen. In Mali and Senegal, rice imports 
are highly concentrated among few actors. Two or three main importers make up two-third of 
all imports in Mali (Baris et al., 2005) while 66 percent of all rice imports flow through only 4 
importers in Senegal (USAID, 2009c). The high concentration in rice imports may result in 
non-competitive situations and asymmetric price transmission. At the wholesale level, 
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margins are the result of what could be described as competitive collusion: wholesalers agree 
to a standard mark-up that is small and driven by a high turnover strategy. As pointed out by 
Meyer and Von Cramon-Taubadel (2004), market power can lead to positive or negative 
asymmetry. 
Lastly, asymmetric price adjustment may be caused by political intervention in the form of 
price support or marketing quotas. Although most West African countries have officially 
stopped intervening in rice production and marketing following the structural adjustment 
reforms of the eighties and nineties, governments continue to intervene. In response to the 
2008 crisis, the Senegalese government removed temporarily custom duties on rice imports 
while the Government of Mali grants a temporary VAT exemption for imported rice (Mendez 
del Villar et al., 2010). In addition, a price control has been imposed over imported rice both 
in Mali and Senegal in 2008. 
1.3. Model for measuring price transmission 
1.3.1. Cointegration analysis 
The first step of the analysis consists in determining whether price series are cointegrated. The 
Johansen cointegration test is applied to examine whether long-run equilibrium exists between 
the world price of rice and the domestic prices of local and imported rice. 
The long run relationship is given as: 
PDt = 0+ 1 P
W
t + t   (1) 
where PDt is the price in domestic market and P
w
t the world price of rice. P
D
t may either be the 
domestic price of imported rice or the domestic price of local rice. If t is stationary, then 
market prices are said to be cointegrated. Co-integration implies that prices move together in 
the long run, although in the short run they may drift apart.  
If PDt and P
wt are co-integrated we can estimate the following error correction model: 
Dt  0  1t-1   i Wt-i   iDt-i  t   (2) 
t-1 is the lagged value of the residual derived from equation (1) and t is a white noise. The 
error correction coefficient (1) measures the speed of adjustment. 
In the standard model of cointegration, the autoregressive process follows a linear AR model. 
An implicit assumption is that the adjustment to equilibrium is a constant proportion of the 
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error regardless of the size of this deviation. Recent research has recognized that the speed of 
adjustment may depend on the magnitude of the deviation. Large shocks may imply a 
different response than small shocks. The autoregressive process may be non-linear due to the 
presence of asymmetric costs of adjustment, transactions costs, and other forms of rigidities. 
Then the adjustment process can be represented through threshold autoregressive (TAR) 
model in which the speed of adjustment to equilibrium switches depending on the magnitude 
of the deviation. 
1.3.2. Estimating a TAR model 
Threshold autoregressive models (TAR) consist of m, AR(p) parts where one process changes 
to another according to the value of an observed variable, a threshold. TAR models are 
usually referred to as TAR (m,p) where p is the autoregressive order in each regime. The 
simplest class of TAR models is the Self Exciting Threshold Autoregressive (SETAR) models 
of order p introduced by Tong (1983) and speciﬁed by the following equations: 
t =  
    if   t-d  m-1 
(3) 
… if   m-1  t-d  m-2 
   if    …  t-d   … 
 +      if   1  t-d 
where m is the number of regimes separated by m-1 thresholds: 1 to m-1. 
1 … m are the 
intercepts in each regime. d is the delay of the transition variable and t-d is the transition 
variable. 
The SETAR model is a special case of the TAR model where the threshold variable is a 
certain lagged value of the series itself, an endogenous variable. The main problems in 
estimating SETAR models are the selection of the correct order of the model and the 
identiﬁcation of threshold values and delay parameters. The lag order is selected prior to 
building a nonlinear model, using suitable information criterion. The Akaike information 
criterion is used here. The estimation procedure of the delay parameter is done for each 
potential value of the delay with d  p (Ben Salem and Perraudin, 2001). The model that 
yields the smallest residual sum of squares gives the most consistent estimate of the delay 
parameter. 
Chapter 1: Price transmission and asymmetric adjustment: the case of three West African rice markets 
24 
 
SETAR models with one or two thresholds: 
We estimate a SETAR model with one or two thresholds. The SETAR (2, p) model posits that 
the cointegration dynamics are different for deviations below or above the threshold .  
The SETAR (2, p) model takes the form: 
t = 
  +   t-i +  if   t-d >  
(4)  +    t-i +  if   t-d   
 
The corresponding error correction model is given by: 
 
PDt = 
  t-1    Wt-i   Dt-i     if   t-d >  
 (5) 
 t-1    Wt-i   Dt-i    if   t-d   
The SETAR (3, p) model is easier to interpret as the outer regime correspond to large 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The inner regime can be interpreted as containing 
the small deviations from the long-term equilibrium that are not leading to a price adjustment. 
Goodwin and Piggott (2001) call this interval the ‘neutral band’. This neutral band may result 
from the existence of transaction costs. Trade may be profitable only outside the band when 
the transaction costs are lower than the price difference. 
The SETAR(3,p) takes the form: 
 
t = 
  +   t-i +  if   t-d > 2 
(6)  +   t-i +   if   1 < t-d  2  
 +   t-i +  if   t-d  1 
 
The corresponding error correction model can be written as: 
 
PDt = 
  t-1    Wt-i   Dt-i     if    t-d > 2 
  (7)  t-1    Wt-i   Dt-i     if   1 < t-d  2    
 t-1    Wt-i   Dt-i     if   t-d  1 
1.3.3. Testing for threshold cointegration 
Before estimating a SETAR model, we test for the existence of threshold-type non linearity 
first following Hansen’s procedure (1997). The advantage of Hansen’s procedure is that the 
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thresholds can be estimated together with other model parameters and valid conﬁdence 
intervals can be constructed for the estimated thresholds.  
To test the null hypothesis of SETAR (1, p) against the alternative hypothesis of SETAR (2, 
p), the likelihood ratio test assuming normally distributed errors can be used: 
F(12) = n   
where  is the residual sum of squares from SETAR(1,p) and  is the residual sum of 
squares from SETAR(2,p) given the threshold . 
Since the threshold  is usually unknown, Hansen (1997) suggests to compute the following 
sup-LR test: Fs = sup F() ;   by searching over all the possible values of the threshold 
variable. In practice, to ensure the model is well identified, a certain percentage of  at both 
ends are trimmed and not used.2 If t is not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), the 
F test needs to be replaced by heteroskedasticity consistent Wald or Lagrange multiplier test.  
As the transition and threshold parameters appear only under the alternative hypothesis, 
testing for threshold nonlinearity is a complicated issue. This problem is known as the 
nuisance parameters problem (Davies, 1987). To deal with the nuisance parameter problem, 
Hansen shows that the asymptotic distribution may be approximated by a bootstrap procedure. 
In the remainder of the paper, we test the null hypothesis of one regime against two, then the 
null of one regime against three and finally the null of two regimes against three. This strategy 
allows to determinate the number of thresholds. 
1.4. Data and estimation 
1.4.1. Data and stationary tests 
The empirical analysis utilizes monthly retail prices of local and imported rice in three West 
African countries namely: Senegal, Mali and Chad. Thailand is the major world rice exporter 
and Senegal and Mali are principally buyers of 100 percent broken rice (USAID, 2009a), so 
we use the export price of the 100% broken rice in Bangkok as an estimate of the relevant 
world price. The period of study differs according to the data availability (see Table 1.1). 
                                                 
2 In the following estimations, 15% of extreme values are excluded. 
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Domestic price data are coming from the World Food Program3 and the international price of 
rice is coming from the Osiriz Infoarroz database4. 
Since the three countries considered are small in terms of rice supply and demand, we make 
the hypothesis that the prices of rice in these countries have no effect on the price of rice in 
land and we examine exclusively the transmission of the international price of rice to 
domestic prices. 
Table 1.1: Prices characteristics 
Country Market Price type Period of study No Obs. Max Min Mean 
Senegal Dakar 
Imported rice 2000.01 - 2010.12 132 450 163 245 
Local rice 2000.01 - 2010.04 124 377 146 205 
Mali Bamako 
Imported rice 1993.02 - 2011.11 216 400 167 277 
Local rice 1993.02 - 2009.01 192 406 151 264 
Chad N'Djamena 
Imported rice 2003.10 - 2011.11 98 618 350 434 
Local rice 2003.10 - 2011.11 98 588 259 388 
Thailand Bangkok FOB price 1993.01 - 2012.02 230 432 54 175 
Prices are expressed in CFA Francs /Kg 
For each market, the time series of the domestic retail prices and the international price of rice 
are displayed in Figure 1.1. For each country, domestic prices of local and imported rice are 
well above the level of the international price of rice excepted in early 2008 when the 
international price of rice sharply increased. The difference between the price of the Thai 
export price and the domestic price of imported rice can be attributed to the costs of freight 
transport and insurance, importers and retailers margins, custom duties and handling charges. 
Domestic prices of local rice are on average below the domestic prices of imported rice. The 
price discount between imported and local rice is higher in Dakar and N’Djamena than in 
Bamako. Local rice has to overcome a quality image problem in most West African markets 
(except in Mali), and in such cases, a price discount may be needed to entice consumers. The 
situation is different in Mali where consumers prefer local rice making the price difference 
between local and imported rice lower than in Senegal and Chad. Considering that rice 
consumption in Mali is mainly supplied by local rice, the strong preference for local rice 
results in larger seasonal variation in the price of local rice in Mali compared to the other 
countries. Occasionally, the government of Mali grants temporary VAT exemption on rice 
                                                 
3 See VAM Food and Commodity Prices Data Store : http://foodprices.vam.wfp.org/Default.aspx 
4 See : http://www.infoarroz.org 
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imports to stabilize the price of local rice during the hunger season through increased imports 
of rice. 
Figure 1.1: Prices in CFA Francs per kilogram 
 
The world price refers to the Thai export price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The world price refers to the Thai export price 
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Figure 1.1 continued 
 
The world price refers to the Thai export price 
 
The hypothesis that the price series are non-stationary is tested using the augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test. ADF tests confirm the presence of a unit root in all price series. Stationarity 
cannot be rejected for all the differenced series indicating that the price series are I(1) (Table 
1.2).  
Table 1.2: Results of ADF unit root tests 
Dakar Bamako N'Djamena World price 
ADF Prob ADF Prob ADF Prob ADF Prob 
IR 
Level [3] -2.57 0.30 [3] -3.25 0.08 [3] -3.04 0.13 [2] -1.94 0.31 
First diff, [1] -9.08 0.00 [1] -6.79 0.00 [1] -9.63 0.00 [1] -7.49 0.00 
LR 
Level [3] -2.71 0.24 [3] -3.15 0.10 [2] -2.43 0.14 
First diff, [1] -6.00 0.00 [1] -3.71 0.00 [1] -13.65 0.00 
IR: Imported rice; LR: Local rice; 
[1]: Model without constant nor determinist trend, critical value = - 1.95; [2]: Model with constant without 
determinist trend, critical value = -2.89; [3]: Model with constant and determinist trend, critical value = -3.45 
1.4.2. Cointegration tests  
Johansen cointegration tests indicate the existence of a cointegration relationship among all 
pairs of prices at 10% level of confidence (Table 1.3). It indicates that there exists a long-run 
relationship between the domestic prices of local and imported rice and the world price of 
rice. In the short run, the domestic prices may drift apart, as shocks affecting the world price 
of rice may not be instantaneously transmitted to domestic prices. However these divergences 
are transitory and the world price of rice and the domestic prices of rice move together in the 
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long-run. The null hypothesis of no-cointegration is not rejected in two cases at 5% level. As 
the test statistics are close to the 5% critical values, we still proceed to the threshold 
cointegration tests for all the market pairs. Lag orders for cointegration tests are selected using 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The long term relationship is then estimated using 
ordinary least squares (Table A2). 
Table 1.3: Johansen cointegration tests 
 
  
Hyp Trace statistic Critical value 5% 
Maximum Eigen 
Value 
Critical value 5% 
Dakar 
Imported 
rice 
None 68.18*** 15.49 67.26*** 14.26 
At most 1 0.92 3.84 0.92 3.84 
Local rice 
None 24.03* 25.87 17.72* 19.39 
At most 1 6.31 12.52 6.31 12.52 
Bamako 
Imported 
rice 
None 25.49* 25.87 18.99* 19.39 
At most 1 6.49 12.52 6.49 12.52 
Local rice 
None 50.64*** 25.87 45.68*** 19.39 
At most 1 4.97 12.52 4.96 12.52 
N'Djamena 
Imported 
rice 
None 19.93** 15.49 16.94** 14.26 
At most 1 2.99 3.84 2.99 3.84 
Local rice 
None  31.22*** 25.87 25.96*** 19.39 
At most 1 5.26 12.52 5.26 12.52 
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence. 
1.4.3. Testing for linearity 
Hansen’s tests are conducted for assessing the presence of regime-speciﬁc nonlinearities 
within the cointegration relationships of the market pairs. We follow Hansen’s methodology 
(Hansen, 1999) by testing successively the null hypothesis of linearity against one threshold, 
the null of linearity against two thresholds and finally the null of one threshold against two. 
The first two tests are testing for linearity whereas the last one can be considered as a 
specification test. As discussed above, the tests reject H0 for large values of Fij. Hansen’s 
procedure estimates the thresholds  and selects the delay parameter d. The results are 
presented in Table 1.4 and reject the null hypothesis of linearity for all pairs of prices. There 
are only two pairs for which the null of one threshold is rejected in favour of the two 
thresholds hypothesis. In those two cases, the two thresholds values are displayed.  
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Table 1.4: Hansen’s tests of linearity 
Testing SETAR(1) against 
SETAR(2) a 
Testing SETAR(1) against 
SETAR(3) a 
Testing SETAR(2) against 
SETAR(3) a 
p d F12 P.Value b  F13 P.Value b 1 2 F23 P.Value
 b 1 2 
Dakar 
IR 4 3 30.92 0.00 18.68 73.70 0.00 -15.98 18.68 34.46 0.00 -15.98 18.68 
LR 6 4 36.81 0.00 5.39 67.85 0.00 -7.93 5.39 23.66 0.18 
Bamako 
IR 3 1 22.19 0.01 9.80 26.38 0.16 -18.11 9.80 3.79 0.96 
LR 3 3 34.05 0.00 10.55 76.75 0.00 -14.53 10.55 36.18 0.00 -14.53 10.55 
N'Djamena 
IR 3 2 22.14 0.03 -10.66 37.60 0.09 -23.03 -0.82 12.53 0.35 
LR 3 3 29.34 0.01 12.24 52.45 0.02 12.24 33.74 17.66 0.13 
IR: Imported rice ; LR: Local rice 
a Testing SETAR(1) against SETAR(2) H0 : Linearity HA: One threshold 
  Testing SETAR(1) against SETAR(3) H0 : Linearity HA: Two threshold 
  Testing SETAR(2) against SETAR(3) H0 : One threshold HA: Two threshold 
b Bootstrapped P-value for 1000 replications. 
p : number of lags (the same number of lags is included in each regime) 
d: delay of the transition variable 
 : the threshold value 
Table 1.5 reports the results of the estimation of the SETAR models. The pairs imported 
rice/Dakar versus the Thai export price and local rice/Bamako versus the Thai export price are 
the only two pairs characterized by three regimes autoregressive processes. Regime 3 
corresponds to large positive deviations that exceed the higher threshold while regime 1 
corresponds to large negative errors that are below the lower threshold. In the two cases with 
three regimes, the thresholds are not symmetric around zero. In Dakar, the positive deviations 
from the long term equilibrium have to reach a higher level than the negative deviations 
before leading to a change in the domestic price of imported rice. The opposite is true in 
Bamako where the negative threshold is larger than the positive one. In the case of Bamako, 
the higher and the lower regimes contain approximately the same number of observations 
while in the Dakar case, the lower regime includes a larger number of observations than the 
higher regime. 
Positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium are due to the decrease of the international 
price whereas negative deviations from the long-run equilibrium result from the world rice 
price increase.  
The Figures A1 and A2 in appendix illustrate the timing of jumps among the regimes for 
respectively the imported rice in Dakar and the local rice of Bamako. In the case of Dakar, 
one third of the observations included in the upper regime take place between December 2008 
and June 2009 corresponding to the decline in the international price of rice that followed the 
2008 price spike. Even if the regime 2 is dominant, jumps between regimes are very common 
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reflecting the high degree of instability of the imported price of rice in Dakar. Similarly jumps 
between regimes occur very often in the case of Bamako suggesting that large 
negative/positive deviations from the long run equilibrium are quickly corrected. 
Table 1.5: Estimates of the SETAR models 
Dakar - Imported rice 
 
Dakar - Local rice 
t-3  - 15.98  
-15.98 < t-3  18.68  
t-3 > 18.68  
t-4  5.39  
t-4 > 5.39 
3 s.e  
2 s.e  
1 s.e  
2 s.e  
1 s.e 
Const. -7.76* (4.65) 
 
-1.48 (1.78) 
 
-23.91*** (6.44) 
 
-1.78 (1.86) 
 
-11.82*** (3.21) 
t-1 0.54*** (0.14)  
1.21*** (0.12) 
 
0.57*** (0.14) 
 
0.64*** (0.13) 
 
0.91*** (0.13) 
t-2 -0.03 (0.20)  
-0.04 (0.16) 
 
-0.15 (0.15) 
 
0.12 (0.20) 
 
-0.15 (0.14) 
t-3 0.13 (0.20)  
-0.11 (0.22) 
 
0.85*** (0.19) 
 
0.19 (0.16) 
 
-0.15 (0.16) 
t-4 -0.61*** -0,14  
-0.11 (0.11) 
 
-0.33* (0.14) 
 
-0.57*** (0.18) 
 
0.79*** (0.20) 
t-5          
-0.06 (0.14) 
 
-0.73*** (0.17) 
t-6          
0.03 (0.12) 
 
0.62*** (0.15) 
Nb of obs 29 
 
82 
 
21 
 
77 
 
47 
Standard error in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% 
level of confidence. 
 
Bamako - Imported rice 
 
Bamako - Local rice 
 
t-1  9.80  
t-1 > 9.80  
t-3  - 14.53  
-14.53 < t-3  10.55  
t-3 > 10.55 
 
2 s.e  
1 s.e  
3 s.e  
2 s.e  
1 s.e 
Const. -1.90 (1.20) 
 
13.18*** (3.11) 
 
2.17 (3.46) 
 
0.52 (1.21) 
 
0.18 (3.356) 
t-1 0.91*** (0.09)  
0.61*** (0.15) 
 
0.94*** (0.12) 
 
1.79*** (0.14) 
 
0.67*** (0.10) 
t-2 -0.24* (0.12)  
-0.22 (0.15) 
 
-0.17 (0.17) 
 
-0.90*** (0.24) 
 
-0.03 (0.13) 
t-3 0.11 (0.09)  
-0.06 (0.11) 
 
-0.04 (0.15) 
 
0.25 (0.23) 
 
-0.14 (0.11) 
Nb of obs 135 
 
81 
 
50 
 
93 
 
49 
 
Standard error in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% 
level of confidence. 
  N'Djamena - Imported price  
N'Djamena - Local rice 
t-2  - 10.66  
t-2 > -10.66  
t-3  12.24  
t-3 > 12.24 
  2 s.e  
1 s.e  
2 s.e  
1 s.e 
Const. -16.82 (10.28)   13.92 (8.45)   -8.08 (5.98)   18.79 (12.04) 
t-1 1.06*** (0.26) 0.09 (0.11) 0.77*** (0.12) -0.08 (0.16) 
t-2 -0.73* (0.31) 0.04 (0.12) -0.03 (0.12) 0.78*** (0.22) 
t-3 -0.04 (0.16) 0.13 (0.14) -0.26 (0.15) -0.24 (0.17) 
Nb of obs 50   48   64   34 
 
Standard error in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% 
level of confidence. 
1.4.4. Threshold error correction models  
As Hansen’s tests suggest that the market pairs follow a nonlinear relationship, we use 
threshold error correction models to estimate the speed at which domestic prices returns to 
equilibrium after a deviation has occurred. The estimated values of the error correction terms 
of each regime and the Wald tests of equality of the coefficients are presented in Table 1.6.  
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Model (5) and (7) allow all the parameters of the model to switch between regimes. We could 
as well use a more parsimonious specification where only the error correction terms vary with 
the regimes. Hence, we test the equality of the error correction terms across regimes (Table 
1.6) as well as the equality of the short and long-run parameters across regimes (not reported 
here). According to these results, we estimated models that allow asymmetries of every 
parameter or of only the error correction term. The estimated model including the imported 
rice in Dakar is the only one for which the Wald tests reject by a majority the equality of the 
short and long-run parameters across regimes. Hence, only the model of the imported rice in 
Dakar allows asymmetries for all the parameters to be captured. 
Table 1.6: Results of asymmetric error correction models 
  Error correction terms   Wald tests of equality of the error correction terms a 
 
1 2 3 

1 = 2 (=3) = 0 1 = 2 (= 3) 1 = 3 
 
(1) (2) (3) 

(4) (5) (6) 
Dakar 
Imported 
rice 
-0.90*** -0.05 -0.16** 

16.94 13.26 23.71 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.07) 

[0.00] [0.00] (0.00] 
Local rice 
-0.18) -0.36* 
 
1.7 1.71 

(0.13) (0.2) 
 
[0.18] [0.19] 

Bamako 
Imported 
rice 
-0.11** -0.14 
 
6.4 0.07 

(0.05) (0.1) 
 
[0.00] [0.79] 

Local rice 
-0.19*** 0.07 -0.54*** 

13.95 11.91 8.76 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.1) 

[0.00] [0.00] (0.00] 
N'Djamena 
Imported 
rice 
-0.39*** -0.29 
 
4.28 0.49 

(0.13) (0.18) 
 
[0.02] [0.49] 

Local rice -0.21 -0.56*** 
 
8.08 1.82 

 
(0.13) (0.19)   [0.00] [0.18] 
White Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error in parentheses. 
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence.  
a: Entries in the last three columns are the sample F statistics for the null hypothesis of equality of the 
coefficients. Significance levels are in square bracket below.  
The Wald tests of equality of the error correction terms (Table 1.6, columns 4 to 6) do not 
reject the null hypothesis of linear adjustment in four cases out of six: Dakar (local rice), 
Bamako (imported rice) and N’Djamena (imported and local rice).  
In the case of the local rice in Dakar, the Wald test even rejects the hypothesis of 
cointegration. This result is not surprising considering that the Johansen’s test was not 
significant at 5% level. The price of local rice in Dakar is not linked with the world price of 
rice by a long run relationship. This can be attributed to the small quantities of local rice 
marketed in Dakar and to the low awareness of urban consumers that quality local rice even 
exists (Rizotto and Demont, 2010). Many Senegalese still consider local rice as inferior in 
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quality to imported rice suggesting that there is very little substitutability between imported 
and local rice. In addition, local rice may be available only seasonally; local rice is rarely 
available in domestic markets from November to January (USAID, 2009c). 
In the cases of Bamako (imported rice) and N’Djamena (imported and local rice), the 
adjustment process between the domestics prices and the world market appears to be linear 
(Table 1.6, column 5). It means that a constant proportion of the error is corrected each month 
regardless of the size of this deviation. Positive and negative deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium are transmitted to the same extent and at the same speed. Table 1.7 provides the 
estimation of the error correction terms in the three cases in which threshold cointegration is 
rejected. The estimated error correction models suggest that the adjustment processes are 
relatively fast in N’Djamena with about 33 percent of divergence from the long run 
equilibrium being corrected each month in the case of the imported rice and 42 percent in the 
case of the local rice. The adjustment is slower in Mali; the price of imported rice in Bamako 
will fully adjust to changes in the international price in a period equal to almost 8 months. 
Such a low rate of adjustment can be attributed to policies including temporary VAT/customs 
tariff exemptions on rice imports and national security stock of rice management implemented 
by the government to ensure food security. 
Table 1.7: Transmission of world price of rice to domestic markets in Mali, Senegal and Chad 
        Speed of adjustment 
    
Linear adjustment Non-linear adjustment 
Location Commodity 
Long term 
relationship? 
Asymmetric 
transmission? 
  Down Middle Up 
                
Senegal - Dakar Imported rice Yes Yes 
 
-0.90*** -0.05 -0.16*** 
Senegal - Dakar Local rice No No 
    
Mali - Bamako Imported rice Yes Yes -0.13*** 
   
Mali - Bamako Local rice Yes No 
 
-0.19*** 0.07 -0.54*** 
Chad - N'Djamena Imported rice Yes No -0.33*** 
   
Chad - N'Djamena Local rice Yes No -0.42***       
* indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence. 
Asymmetry is not rejected for the pairs of markets characterized by three regimes of 
adjustment. The Wald tests reject the hypotheses of linear and symmetric adjustment in two 
cases: Dakar (imported rice) and Bamako (local rice). The imported rice and the local rice are 
the main staple food respectively in Senegal and Mali. The prices of these two staple cereals 
appear to be affected by large fixed transactions costs. Price deviations contained in the 
interval [1, 2] are too small compared to the adjustment costs that they will not lead to a 
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price adjustment. Indeed the coefficients of the error correction terms are not significant in 
regime 2 in both cases.  
In the case of Bamako, there appears to be adjustment both in periods of large positive and 
negative change from the long term equilibrium. The speed of adjustment is larger in the 
upper regime. The price of local rice is Bamako will return more quickly to the value 
consistent with the long-run relationship to the world price in case of positive deviations than 
in case of negative deviations from the long term equilibrium. The positive deviations from 
the long term equilibrium have to reach a level of 10.55 CFA Francs per kilo before leading to 
a change in the domestic price of local rice.  
Positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium are caused by a decrease in the world price 
of rice. Hence, the adjustment occurs more rapidly when the domestic price of local rice drift 
too far away from the long term equilibrium following a drop in the world price of rice. 
Conversely, the domestic price of local rice increased slowly in response to a world price 
spike suggesting that price of local rice in Bamako cannot increase excessively. Indeed, the 
Government of Mali intervenes regularly on the market to prevent high increase in the 
domestic prices of local rice through temporary exemption on customs tariffs and VAT. The 
government of Mali exempted 40 000 metric tons (MT) of rice from VAT in 2002, 201,194 
MT in 2005, 5,504 MT in 2007 and 105,789 MT in 2008 (USAID, 2009b). These exemptions 
may discourage private actors to invest in the domestic market channel as they provide 
regular opportunities for wholesalers to have access to large quantities of cheap imported rice. 
In this way, exemptions have a strong effect on the prices of local rice. This is worth noting 
that the surges in domestic prices of local rice are not necessarily related to increase in the 
world price. Indeed in 1998 and 2005, the price of local rice increased due to a tight supply 
situation at the regional level rather than following the world price trend. Whatever the causes 
may be, government interventions allowing massive imports of cheap rice prevent the price of 
local rice to increase excessively compared to the world price of rice.  
For Dakar, error correction terms are significant in the outer regimes but the coefficient is 
larger in the lower regime. Negative deviations from the long term equilibrium have to reach 
almost 16 CFA Francs per kilo before leading to a change in the domestic price of imported 
rice. Large negative deviations result from large increases in the world price of rice. It 
suggests that the price of imported rice in Dakar adjust very well to changes in the 
international price when the world price increases. This result is consistent with the high 
degree of dependency on rice imports in Dakar. The domestic price of imported rice adjusts 
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well to an increase in the world price of rice as consumers are reticent to substitute rice with 
other grains. The asymmetric adjustment may also reflect a situation of market power in the 
distribution chain or high fixed costs in the distribution industry. 
1.5. Conclusion 
Our results indicate that the world price of rice and the domestic prices of imported and local 
rice in Senegal, Mali and Chad are integrated in the long-run, with the exception of the local 
rice in Dakar. The changes affecting the world price of rice do not have any impact on the 
price of local rice in Dakar. This may be due to the low quality of local rice in comparison to 
the imported rice. Structurally, the market for local rice is essentially a thin residual market. 
Consumers may be unwilling to substitute from imported rice to local rice. Since 2008, the 
Senegalese government has launched national programs to boost local rice production in order 
to achieve complete food self-sufficiency by 2015. Achieving rice self-sufficiency requires 
greater recognition that the rice market is not driven exclusively by price. Local rice must 
improve its awareness among consumers and make significant efforts in improving 
appearance, packaging and cleanliness in order to compete more effectively with imported 
rice. 
We find that the domestic price of imported rice in Bamako and the domestic prices of 
imported and local rice in N’Djamena are integrated with the world price of rice. In those 
three cases, domestic prices are affected in similar ways by changes in the world price 
regardless of the size of the deviation. For the Chadian rice markets, the adjustment process is 
fast; rice prices in Ndjamena adjust fully to price changes in the international market in two or 
three months. Conversely, it would take about height months for prices of imported rice in 
Bamako to fully adjust to a change in the international rice price, reflecting the policies 
implemented by the government to ensure food security. 
The price of local rice in Bamako responds asymmetrically to large changes from the long 
term equilibrium. Our results provide evidence that increases in the world price are 
incompletely and slowly passed-through to the domestic market, as compared to decreases. 
The negative asymmetric price transmission can be attributed to governmental interventions 
intended to protect consumers. The government intervenes regularly through tax exemptions 
and food security stock management as to prevent local price to increase excessively. If this 
policy favors consumers, it may discourage private actors to invest in the domestic market 
channel. The relationship between the world price of rice and the domestic price of local rice 
in Bamako may change in the coming years under the influence of the Rice Initiative 
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launched in 2008 by the Malian Government. This initiative aims at boosting rice production 
through various means including subsidies for rice production so as to make the country a net 
exporter of rice. 
The price of imported rice in Dakar is not affected by small changes in the world price of rice. 
High transaction costs of importing rice and moving it from the port to consumption centers 
are likely to exist. Price deviations have to exceed a certain threshold before leading to a 
change in the domestic price of imported rice. The price of imported rice in Dakar is more 
responsive to the world price of rice spike than to the world price drop. This positive 
asymmetric price transmission is likely to reflect a situation of market power in the 
distribution industry.  
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Appendix A: 
Table A1: Area Harvested, Production, Imports and Consumption 
 
Area Harvested (1000 
HA) 
Milled Production          
(1000 MT) 
Imports (1000 MT) Consumption (1000 MT) 
Chad Mali Senegal Chad Mali Senegal Chad Mali Senegal Chad Mali Senegal 
2001 51 350 95 47 492 140 2 39 735 49 531 850 
2002 90 365 88 87 637 159 0 76 916 87 713 890 
2003 105 370 76 92 462 112 0 175 875 92 637 930 
2004 95 385 87 86 620 150 0 156 825 86 776 980 
2005 95 370 83 62 475 151 19 130 750 81 605 982 
2006 110 390 95 90 624 181 14 125 660 104 749 981 
2007 80 414 97 70 684 144 15 105 675 85 789 950 
2008 80 377 99 67 703 118 15 100 820 82 803 940 
2009 111 433 125 104 860 277 16 100 683 120 945 980 
2010 133 580 131 79 1027 345 20 120 690 99 1 075 1055 
2011 154 686 147 125 1500 408 10 80 775 135 1400 1130 
2012 165 500 110 103 1132 299 20 150 1150 123 1420 1250 
Source : USDA statistics (http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/)  
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Estimation of the long-term relationship  
  
0 1 2 Adj R² SBC AIC 
Dakar 
IR 
108.44 0.77*** 
 0.70 9.86 9.82 
(13.1) (17.5) 
 
LR 
64.8 0.50*** 0.37*** 
0.84 8.78 8.74 
(9.21) (13.24) (5.55) 
Bamako 
IR 
177.05 0.37*** 0.30*** 
0.74 9.08 9.03 
(38.72) (12.15) (10.65) 
LR 
157.76 0.37*** 0.49*** 
0.71 9.28 9.23 
(26.72) (10.21) (14.7) 
N'Djamena 
IR 
308 0.61*** 
 0.53 10.25 10.20 
(24.33) (10.46) 
 
LR 
304.85 1.02*** -0.72*** 
0.52 10.88 10.8 
(8.20) (8.31) (-2.43) 
The estimated long run relationship can be written as: PDt = 0 + 1P
W
t + 2Tt + t where T is the time 
trend and is included only when the variable is significant;  
IR: Imported rice; LR: Local rice; AIC: Akaike criterion; SBC: Schwartz criterion; t-Statistic between 
parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level of 
confidence. 
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Figure A1: Timing of regime switching - Dakar imported rice 
 
The period corresponding to regime 3 are shaded in dark grey whereas the periods corresponding to regime 1 are 
in light grey. 
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Figure A2: Timing of regime switching - Bamako local rice 
 
The period corresponding to regime 3 are shaded in dark grey whereas the periods corresponding to regime 1 are 
in light grey. 
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† This chapter is a version of a paper co-authored with Alberto Portugal-Perez within the context of the project 
‘Integrating Regional Markets in Food Staples in West Africa: An Agenda for Evidence Based Policy Analysis’ 
initiated by the World Bank. 
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2.1. Introduction 
African countries have become increasingly dependent upon imports from the global market 
to meet their food needs. Since 1974, food imports have grown consistently faster than food 
exports and in 2008 reached a record high of USD 51 billion (FAOSTAT, 2013), yielding a 
deficit of about USD 31 billion. In the actual context of high world food prices, Africa’s food 
import dependency is a matter of great concern. However, as the World Bank (2012) shows in 
its report, ‘Africa Can Help Feed Africa’, Africa has an enormous potential for boosting 
agricultural production. The production of food staples for growing urban markets represents 
the largest growth opportunity for Africa’s farmers. Facilitating expansion of these markets 
will therefore be critical to provide the appropriate incentives to smallholders to increase 
investments and hence agricultural productivity. 
Intra-African trade remains low in comparison with the total African trade volume. Total 
intra-African trade represented 11.3 percent of African trade with the world in 2011 
(UNCTAD, 2013). Intra-African trade of food products has been dominated by cereals (22%) 
and vegetable and fruits (15%) over the period 2004-2007 (FAO, 2011). According to the 
World Bank, only 5% of Africa’s imports of cereals come from other African countries. 
Although cereals are staple foods for the majority of African households, smallholders face 
significant challenges that hinder their participation in new marketing opportunities. Markets 
in the developing world are characterized by pervasive imperfections such as high transport 
costs between the household’s village and the relevant market, lack of information on prices, 
non-competitive behaviour among local traders and lack of competition in the trucking sector. 
Additional barriers are present in the case of international trade, such as tariffs, quotas, 
seasonal export bans, documentary requirements, borders procedures, and other non-tariff 
barriers, etc. Those trade barriers reduce the incentive for farmers to invest more in improved 
seeds and fertilizer that would enable them to produce more.  
Although West African leaders recognized the importance of improving regional integration, 
progress has been slow since the creation of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)5 in 1975. The creation of the customs union within the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU)6 in 2000 was an important step toward greater regional 
integration in western Africa. Agricultural products can circulate freely within ECOWAS and 
                                                 
5 Today ECOWAS is a group of fifteen countries including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
6 WAEMU is an organization of height countries : Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo 
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WAEMU country members and a common external tariff is applied to imports from other 
countries. Government of Central African countries also committed themselves to the process 
of integration through the creation of a custom and monetary union, the Communauté 
Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)7.  
Although the majority of instruments of trade policy have been harmonized within WAEMU 
and CEMAC, the implementation may vary by country. According to trade policy reviews 
conducted by the World Trade Organization (2010), countries like Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali do not implement the community customs code in the same way. Implementation of the 
unions’ current trade regime remains a challenge, especially the implementation of rule of 
origin (Goretti and Weisfeld, 2008). In addition to the uneven application of the rules, 
roadblocks, customs or police checkpoints along trade corridors continue to hinder regional 
trade. Data collected by the West Africa Trade Hub (WATH) indicates for example that the 
route between Ouagadougou to Bamako has the highest density of checkpoints (around 30 
stops along the 790 kilometers of the entire route) while inspections at the border between 
Ghana and Burkina-Faso (corridor Tema-Ouagadougou) are taking a long time: around four 
hours in Burkina Faso and seven hours in Ghana (West Africa Trade Hub, 2010). 
Trade barriers are difficult to measure as they take many forms. This paper aims at identifying 
the nature of the hurdles to trade in food staples. Specifically, we analyze the impact of road 
infrastructure and country borders on the regional integration of food staples markets across 
different towns and countries in West and Central Africa. As most trade goes unrecorded by 
customs, we focus on relative prices and use a highly detailed database of monthly food prices 
at the town level. Since the seminal work of Ravallion (1986), most research studies the 
relationship between prices in spatially distant markets. Here, we use monthly prices on 173 
markets located in 14 West African countries and 6 commodities (millet, sorghum, maize, 
cassava, local rice and imported rice).  
Following the seminal paper of Engel and Roger (1996), a large body of literature has 
investigated the extent to which national borders hinder trade among industrialized countries. 
Most articles studying the importance of distance and of borders find a significant impact of 
both on price dispersion. Engel and Rogers (1996) and then Parsley and Wei (2001) find an 
incredibly high impact of borders on respectively the US-Canada and the US-Japan borders. 
Broda and Weistein (2008) explain those results by the fact that price indices rather than 
                                                 
7 CEMAC is made up of six member states: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
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actual prices are being used. They argue that using aggregated prices mechanically increase 
the border effect on prices.  
Very few studies examine the impact of borders in developing countries. Brenton et al. (2013) 
and Versailles (2012) find substantial distance and border effects in explaining price 
dispersion between East African cities. Research by Aker et al. (2012) on the Niger-Nigeria 
border suggests that a common ethnicity is associated with lower price dispersion across 
countries and that ethnic diversity creates an internal border within Niger.  
Araujo and Brunelin (2013)’s work is the first studying the existence of a border effect within 
a large number of West African countries. Their results suggest that crossing the border in 
West Africa is costly but that the size of the border effect decreased since 2000. The paper 
also evidences the positive impact of belonging to an economic union on the trade of grains in 
West Africa. Our paper extends the work done by Araujo and Brunelin (2013) in three ways. 
First, we use more accurate data for distance. The road network data have been compiled by 
the World Bank and they provide a measure of the distance between towns in kilometers 
instead of relying on great circle distances8 generated using GIS software. Second, the price 
dataset has extended with 30 additional markets and three commodities. Third, we estimate 
the effects of national borders and distance on the dispersion of price levels as well as on price 
volatility.   
Our paper examines the price differences of agricultural products across market pairs located 
in the same country, as well as market pairs located in different countries. We estimate the 
impact of borders and road distance between markets on relative prices. After controlling for 
the distance as well as for market and product specific characteristics, we find that crossing a 
border increases food prices differences by 6 or 7 percent on average. The estimated average 
border effect is smaller for countries belonging to the West African Economic and Monetary 
Union. On average, borders increase price differences between countries within WAEMU by 
5 percent, and by 8 to 10 percent when any of the countries sharing a border is not part of the 
WAEMU. Distance between markets also lead to large deviations from the Law of One Price 
(LOP); the average distance between towns in our sample (1079 km) increases price 
differentials by 25 percent. We estimate borders effects specific to the 24 pairs of contiguous 
countries in our sample. Bilateral borders leading to the largest price increase between 
countries are Ghana-Togo, Guinea-Senegal, Mali-Mauritania and Mauritania-Senegal. 
                                                 
8 The great circle distances are computed by using the latitude and longitude of each town in a market-pair. 
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Countries such as Ghana, Mauritania, Chad and Togo also exhibit high price differentials 
between national markets that may reflect the role of distance.  
Then, we test the robustness of our results by regressing two additional dependent variables, 
the standard deviation of the relative prices as a measure of price volatility and the half-life of 
shocks as a measure of shock persistence between markets, on distance, border, and market 
product fixed effects. Estimates confirm the positive role played by borders and distance in 
explaining cross-country price volatility and persistence in cross-country price differences. 
When estimating specific border effects in this cross-section setting, we find that Mauritania-
Senegal, Mali-Mauritania and Guinea-Senegal have the largest borders, which is consistent 
with the panel data estimates. Conversely, the Ghana-Togo border is much smaller when 
using estimates in cross-section than in the panel data setting. The two estimation techniques 
evidence the high cost of crossing the Mauritanian, Guinean and Ghanaian borders.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides the context of our study by 
discussing some relevant characteristics of the region, including the main zones of grain 
production, agricultural trade patterns, grains marketing channels and the major constraints to 
trade. Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. While section 5 
estimates the border effect on relative prices, section 6 describes results of the border effect 
on the volatility of relative prices. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2.2. Regional trade in food staples in West Africa 
Cereals are heavily traded within West Africa. However, the official trade statistics are likely 
to understate the magnitude of regional trade as significant volumes of regional trade are 
unrecorded in official statistics considering the informal nature of much of the agricultural 
trade.  
2.2.1. Main crop producing areas 
The diversity of ecosystems in West Africa enables the cultivation of a wide variety of crops, 
which stimulate regional cross-border trade. 
The Sahel zone extends from the extreme north of the region bordering the Sahara Desert and 
is delimited to the south by the semi-arid Sudan Savanna. Given that much of smallholder 
agriculture is rainfed, the arid zone of the Sahel is used primarily for livestock herding. 
The semiarid zone, covering most of Chad, Niger, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania and to a 
lesser extent Nigeria, northern Cameroon and Burkina Faso, is characterized by low erratic 
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rainfall that is a major limitation for crop production. The crops cultivated in the semiarid 
areas include millet, sorghum, cowpeas and groundnuts.  
Maize and rice are grown primarily in the semihumid zones. Semihumid zones include the 
coastal countries as well as the southern part of Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Senegal. In the 
semihumid zones, the dominant crops include cassava, maize, pulses, coarse grains, and cash 
crops such as cotton. In addition to the food crops grown in the sub humid agro-ecosystem, 
tree crops are grown in humid areas including cocoa, coffee, kola, oil palm and rubber which 
are the region’s primary agricultural exports. Tree crops are integrated with food crops such 
as roots and tubers. 
Nigeria is by far the largest producer of cereals in West Africa. It contributes to 51% of the 
West African cereals supply over the period 2005-2010, followed by Mali (10%), Niger (8%) 
and Burkina Faso (7.5%) according to FAO statistics (2013). Nigeria is the Western Africa’s 
leading producer of maize accounting for as much as 54% of total West Africa’s maize 
production, followed by Ghana (10.6%) and Cameroon (10.3%). West Africa’s maize imports 
from the rest of the world are relatively low, accounting for only 2.5% of total cereals imports 
of the region.  
Rice imports, on the other hand, account for almost 50% of total West Africa’s grains 
imports. West Africa has become a significant player in world rice markets because of its 
significant share of world rice imports, which stands now at almost 19% (FAOSTAT, 2013). 
Africa’s emergence as a big rice importer is explained by the fact that West Africa’s rice 
production has not been able to match growth in demand. Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal 
are the main West African importers of rice representing respectively 6, 2.8 and 2.3 percent of 
the world rice imports (FAOSTAT, 2013). Nigeria, Guinea and Mali are the main producers 
of paddy rice in the region.  
Millet and sorghum are primarily produced within the Sudano-Sahelian belt. Nigeria 
contributes respectively to 47% and 62% of the regional production of millet and sorghum, 
followed by Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali.  
2.2.2. Main cross-border regional trade flows 
The regional cereal market is structured around two types of commodities: i) the locally 
grown grains – mainly millet, sorghum and maize - that flow internally from food surplus 
production zones to deficit consumption zones; ii) the cereals imported from the rest of the 
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world – mostly rice coming from Asia and South America - that ensure food security by 
supplying the whole region even during bad years.  
The region can be divided between at least four trade zones. Cross border trade is intense in 
the East basin with Nigeria being the main producer and consumer of cereals in the region. 
Locally grown grains such as maize and millet are regularly exported from Nigeria to Niger to 
balance the Nigerien deficit in domestic supply. In exceptional circumstances, when 
production is low and when prices in Nigeria are much higher than in Niger, part of Nigerien 
production of millet and sorghum can be sold in Nigeria, despite insufficient domestic supply. 
Maize flows from Nigeria to Niger take place all year round, but reaches its peak at the 
beginning of the hunger season. Maize coming from Burkina Faso and Mali is exported to 
Niger as well.  
Central zone is primarily a maize trading zone where Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso account 
for a large share of the regional flows (Josserand, 2013). Most of the maize from Côte 
d’Ivoire goes to Mali, although it may be ultimately destined for Burkina Faso, Mauritania, or 
even Senegal. Maize is also exported to the south, towards the densely populated coastal zone.  
Benin emerged as a major transit point for goods destined for Nigeria. Re-export trade in 
Benin consists in importing goods from all across the world and then export them to 
neighboring countries especially Nigeria. A major portion of imported rice is now being 
routed through Benin, driven by differences in official trade policies between the two 
countries. Benin’s re-export market is based on skirting the Nigerian protectionist policy and 
avoiding high import taxes. 
The Sahelian band is characterized by flows of millet and sorghum between Mali, Mauritania, 
Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Niger in response to the differences between crop calendars in 
each of these countries and to inter-annual changes in production levels.  
Finally, the Western zone which includes Mauritania, Senegal, western Mali, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea, Liberia and the Gambia, is characterized by important flows of rice. Almost all the 
rice traded across borders is of imported rice, both through formal transit shipments from the 
main ports and through informal trade (USAID, 2009). Most imported rice is consumed in the 
coastal regions in urban areas. Most of the local rice, on the other hand, remains within the 
country of production due to high transport costs and customs formalities. Informal exports of 
local rice are mostly from surplus areas located close to borders. For instance, local rice from 
the Senegal River Valley is occasionally exported to Mauritania, when rice prices are higher 
on the other side of the border. 
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2.2.3. Grains marketing channels 
Local grown grains and imported cereals use different marketing channels. Rice is the only 
commodity in our analysis that is widely imported from the rest of the world. Rice importers 
order large quantities of rice from traders, which arrive in bulk or in bags at the port. The 
frequency of such shipments is approximately once every 3 months at the port of Dakar 
(Hamilton, 2010). Bulk or bagged rice is usually moved from the port to warehouses, where 
wholesalers buy rice in smaller quantities, and generally transport it using their own trucks. 
When the shipment is intended to be sold abroad, the rice is directly loaded into trucks  
Local grown cereals are moved from the farm to the consumer using different marketing 
channels. Local cereals can first be found in rural retail markets where farmers, traders and 
consumers come together for commercial purposes: supplying, selling and buying goods. 
Rural markets may serve as assembly markets as well; assembly markets are places where 
farmer meet with middlemen and traders to sell their products. They may be occasional 
markets, such as weekly markets called lumo in Senegal, Gambia and Guinea (CILSS et al., 
2010). Rural markets are supplied either by farmers or collectors. During harvests periods, the 
main role of these markets is to collect cereals and other cash crops and to sell imported 
commodities. During the lean season, they serve primarily to supply household in grains. 
However, the markets located in grain surplus areas continue to supply both wholesale 
markets and rural markets located in food deficit zone, even during the hunger season. Short 
cross-borders flows of local cereals can be observed between rural assembly markets located 
near borders.  
Wholesale markets are the link between rural assembly markets and urban retail markets. 
Some assembly markets are specialized in a particular commodity such as the market of 
Richard Toll (Saint Louis in Senegal) with local rice (CILSS et al., 2010). A few wholesale 
markets take advantage of the fact that they are located near a border. Cross border markets 
such as Malainville (Benin), Diaobé (Sénégal), Illela and Jibyia (Nigeria) constitute major 
regional trade hub for cereals.  
Urban retail markets are usually supplied by wholesale markets. They gather retailers and 
wholesaler and provide a wide variety of commodities all year round.  
2.2.4. Major constraints to trade 
Poor road conditions are among the main trade constraints in Western and Central Africa. 
Regional trade in food staples is generally carried out by bulk transportation on roads in 
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trucks. Locally grown grains are collected by traders who transport them over greater 
distances to regional markets. Transportation costs can significantly influence grain prices and 
threaten food access of poor households. Road conditions remain deplorable in the region, 
with a proportion of paved roads of only 13% (UNECA et al., 2010). Road conditions get 
worse during the rainy season that coincides with the lean season when stocks are depleted 
and prices reach their peaks. For instance, it takes 32 hours to go from Conakry to Nzérékoré 
(Guinea) in the rainy season compared to 24 hours in dry season (CILSS et al., 2010). 
Rural areas deserve special attention as transport prices are disproportionately high on rural 
roads compared to national road (World Bank, 2009). A World Bank report (2009) studying 
the performance on grain markets in Eastern Africa concludes that “transport prices per ton-
km from farm-gate to primary markets are three to five times larger than those from 
secondary to wholesale markets located in the countries capitals”.  
In addition to costs induces by transport infrastructure, traders face delays at various stages 
including border crossings, road-checkpoint controls by police and delays at customs. 
Customs inefficiencies hinder the integration of West African countries. These inefficiencies 
include excessive documentation requirements, outdated procedures, insufficient automated 
systems, a lack of transparency in customs activities and a lack of cooperation among customs 
and other governmental agencies.  
Along with poor quality of infrastructure and delays and inefficiencies at border posts, major 
policy constraints still persist. Despite the elimination of tariffs within the region there are still 
many barriers to trade which hamper intraregional trade flows, such as seasonal trade bans, 
which are common throughout West Africa. Some countries continue to implement export 
bans especially when pre-harvest estimates suggest a lower crop than the year prior. For 
instance, in December 2011, the Burkina Faso Ministry of Agriculture, required that all 
“irregular” exports of cereals were prohibited, without defining what constituted irregular 
exports (RPCA, 2012). Trade policy restrictions can increase food price volatility and 
informal cross-border trade (World Bank, 2012). For instance, traders can be tempted to 
transfers grains from truck to bicycle and back on to trucks to avoid border controls.  
Trade barriers can take many forms and the following econometric analysis is an attempt to 
disentangle the contribution of inter-town distances and the contribution of border barriers on 
food price differences. 
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2.3. Empirical strategy 
2.3.1. The Law of One Price 
The absolute version of the Law of One Price (LOP) states that prices of identical 
commodities should be the same across efficient markets, once converted into the same 
currency: 
Pik,t =Eji,t P
d
jk,t= Pjk,t (1) 
where Pik,t is the price of good k in market i at time t expressed in i’s currency; Eji,t is the 
exchange rate of j’s currency per unit of i’s currency; Pdjk,t is the price of good k in market j at 
time t expressed in j’s currency and Pjk,t is the price of good k in market j at time t expressed 
in i’s currency. 
The existence of transaction costs is an obvious reason for the failure of the Law of One Price. 
Transactions costs include transport costs, as well as information costs, contracting costs, 
costs paid to the intermediary, etc. Transactions costs can be split between transports costs 
that increase with distance and additional fixed costs. When markets are not located in the 
same countries, transactions costs include additional costs associated with trade barriers at the 
border. 
In the presence of transaction costs, prices are not equal and spatial arbitrage should equalize 
supply and demand at different markets until price differences are reduced to the level of 
transaction costs: |Pik,t - Pjk,t|  Tijk, where Tijk are transaction costs of trading between market i 
and market j for the good k.  
The price of good k in market i (Pik,t) plus transaction costs have to be as large as the price of 
the same good k in market j. The rule of spatial arbitrage states that - Tijk  Pik,t - Pjk,t  Tijk. As 
long as the price difference between market i and j lies between the interval [- Tijk, Tijk], there 
will be no arbitrage. Arbitrage occurs only when the price differential exceeds the transaction 
costs between markets. 
It is rarely possible to compare prices of identical goods on both sides of a border. Most of the 
time, researchers measure deviation from the LOP by comparing goods of similar quality. By 
doing so, we can hardly assess whether the observed deviations in the LOP come from the 
presence of a border or from the comparison of goods that are non-identical (Broda and 
Weistein, 2008). To deal with this issue, we can estimate the relative version of the LOP 
(RLOP) that examines if price movements in market i and market j are the same over time.  
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The RLOP analyses the changes in prices over time rather than their level:  
pik,t = eji,t + p
d
jk,t (2) 
where lower case letters denotes the logs of upper case variables, that is pik,t = ln(Pik,t) and the 
’s refer to relative changes over time. The RLOP holds if price changes in market i and 
market j are the same over time.  
2.3.2. Estimation of the border effect on relative prices 
There are two ways of measuring the range of price dispersion. One can either measure price 
dispersion by the magnitude of the time-series fluctuations in relative prices or by the price 
differentials between two markets for a given time period. Most research following Engel and 
Roger (1996) uses the standard deviation of changes in relative prices as a measure of price 
dispersion. However, time-series volatility fails to reveal price differences if prices in two 
markets change in the same proportion over time (Baba, 2007). In that case, relative prices 
deviate from parity in a stable manner implying that the relative LOP holds but absolute LOP 
does not. Hence, we use monthly relative prices to measure deviations from absolute LOP. 
We use the log of relative prices and its first difference as variables of interest. In the first 
case, we assess the impact of trade impediments on deviation from absolute LOP while in the 
second case we assess the determinants behind deviations from the relative version of the 
LOP, or RLOP. The log of relative prices of good k between market i and market j is defined 
by:  
qijk,t = ln(Pik,t/Pjk,t) (3) 
If q is equal to zero, this means that the LOP hypothesis holds perfectly. When calculating 
relative prices, we can equally choose market i or j as the denominator. In order to avoid 
having two different values for each pair of markets, we use the absolute value of relative 
prices. 
Our empirical model is the following: 
Yijk,t = 0 + 1 ln(Distij) + 2 Borderij + Nij,t + kt  + mk + ijk,t (4) 
With Yijk,t is either the log of the relatives prices in absolute value, |qijk,t|, or the first difference 
of the log of the relative prices in the first difference, | qijk,t|.  
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Distij is the road distance between market i and market j; Borderij is a dummy variable equal to 
one when market i and market j are separated by a border and 0 otherwise; Nij,t measure the 
monthly nominal exchange rate variations9. Nij,t is equal to 0 when two towns of a market-pair 
share the same currency ; kt are the month-commodities dummy interactions controlling for 
month-products specific variations; mk are the market-commodities dummy interactions 
controlling for market-products specific characteristics. 
1 and 2 are expected to be positive. 2 provides an estimate of the effect borders exert on 
relative prices in absolute and relative terms. To evaluate the size of the border effect, we 
express 2 in terms of its distance equivalent, which is the distance between two cities in the 
same country that will lead to price dispersions similar to towns separated by an international 
border. The distance-equivalent of the estimated border effects is calculated as exp(2/ 1). 
This measure is unitless but is usually expressed in the same unit that the distance variable 
(here in kilometers). 2 can also be expressed as the increase in price differentials associated 
with the border. The impact of crossing a border on relative prices is calculated as: exp(2)-1 
Engel and Roger (2001) showed that most of the border effects come from local currency 
pricing with fluctuating nominal exchange rates. Local currency pricing refers to exporting 
firms setting prices in the currency of the consumer. Several authors, such as Feenstra and 
Kendall (1997) have shown that prices are rigid in the currency of the consumer. If producers 
selling abroad set their prices in foreign currency, exchange rate changes do not modify 
consumer prices leading to a zero pass-through of exchange rate changes. Although most 
countries in our sample adhere to a monetary union, five out of the fourteen countries 
included in our sample do not have CFA francs as a common currency. Hence, we include a 
measure of monthly nominal exchange rate variations in our regressions. 
2.3.3. Estimation of the border effect on the volatility and persistence in relative prices 
There is a large body of literature showing that relative prices of similar goods are more 
volatile and also more persistent across borders than within the same country (Engel and 
Roger, 1996; Parsley et Wei, 1996). Following Engel and Rogers (1996), several authors use 
the standard deviation of changes in relative prices as the dependent variable. By doing so, 
they keep only the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of the relative prices across 
markets and commodities. We follow their approach by first calculating indicators measuring 
                                                 
9 All prices are denominated in US dollars. Nij,t = ln((Ei$,t/ Ei$,t-1)/ (Ej$,t/ Ej$,t-1)) where Ei$,t is the exchange rate of 
i’s currency per unit of US$ and Ej$,t is the exchange rate of j’s currency per unit of US$. 
Chapter 2: Food markets and barriers to regional integration in West and Central Africa 
54 
 
the degree of market integration and then testing the border effect in a cross-sectional 
regression. 
First, we estimate the border effect on price volatility by using the standard deviation of 
relative prices. We denote the standard deviation of relative prices as (qijk) with                    
qijk,t = ln(Pik,t /ln Pjk,t).. Following Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2005), we make the hypothesis 
that qijk,t is uniformly distributed in the interval [- Tijk, Tijk] suggesting that the standard 
deviation of qijk,t is a linear function of the transactions cost.  
Secondly, we calculate a measure of shock persistence between markets to take into account 
the fact that shocks in one market may not be instantaneously transmitted to other markets due 
to high transport costs and poor communication networks that prevent agents from adjusting 
prices instantaneously. The measure of shock persistence between relative prices is the half-
life of shocks. Under the hypothesis that prices follow an AR(1) process, we estimate: 
qijk,t = qijk,t-1 +   M + t (5) 
The variables M are the monthly dummies introduced to control for seasonal variation. The 
parameter of interest is  that denotes the speed of convergence by which deviations from 
equilibrium are eliminated. Convergence implies a negative . This speed of convergence is 
often expressed in terms of the ‘‘half-life’’ of deviations, the period of time required for one-
half of the deviation to be eliminated. The half-life of shocks is given by ln(0.5)/ln(1+). 
Then we estimate the following regression to compare the differences in price dispersion 
between markets in opposite side of a border as compared to markets within the same country: 
Yijk = 0 + 1 ln(Distij) + 2 Borderij + Nij + mk + ijk    (6)
where Yijk is either the standard deviation of relative prices, (qijk) or hijk, the half-life of 
shocks; Distij is the road distance between market i and market j; Borderij is a dummy variable 
equal to one when market i and market j are separated by a border and 0 otherwise; Nij is the 
standard deviation of nominal exchange rate changes between location i and j; mk are the 
market-commodities dummy interactions controlling for market-products specific 
characteristics. Note that all regressions are cross-sectional. 
We expect 2 to be positive and significant, even after controlling for distance. As explained 
earlier, we expressed 2 in distance equivalent. 
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2.4. Data 
This article combines two datasets. The first includes the length in kilometers of the shortest 
road between any pairs of markets in our sample. These data have been compiled by the 
World Bank using detailed information on the road networks in West and Central Africa. 
The second dataset includes retail food prices on a monthly basis for 173 markets located in 
14 West and Central African countries. The monthly data cover the period January 2007 to 
January 2013 for 6 commodities (millet, sorghum, maize, cassava, local rice and imported 
rice). Data has been collected by the World Food Program10, FAO11 and Fews Net, but most 
of the data have been initially collected by national market information systems set in place in 
each country. Our dataset includes retail prices for every country except Ghana for which 
retail prices were not available. All prices have been converted in US$ per kilogram, using 
monthly exchange rates compiled by the IMF’s International Finance Statistics (IFS).  
The choice of commodities was constrained by data availability. Yet, commodities in our 
sample make up for a large share of food consumed in these countries, except in Mauritania12, 
as shown in Table B2 in appendix. Our analysis mainly focuses on cereals and cassava13, 
which represent on average 50% of dietary energy supply in our sample. Moreover cereals are 
storable and are heavily traded within West Africa.  
                                                 
10 See VAM Food and Commodity Prices Data Store : http://foodprices.vam.wfp.org/Default.aspx 
11 See Giews Food price Data and Analysis Tool : http://www.fao.org/giews/pricetool/ 
12 Mauritania is the only country in our sample where wheat makes up a significant part of the diet. 
13 As raw cassava roots are highly perishable, cassava is usually traded in some processed form, generally gari or 
chips/flour. Our price data labeled as cassava refers to gari that is the most commonly traded cassava product. 
Gari is a granulated and toasted cereal-like cassava food product. 
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Map 2.1: Markets studied and Economic and Monetary Union membership
 
Seven out of the fourteen countries included in our sample are both members of ECOWAS 
and WAEMU  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo  and two 
countries are members of the CEMAC, namely Cameroon and Chad (Map 2.1). Only five 
countries do not have CFA francs as a common currency: The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Mauritania and Nigeria. Among these five countries, Mauritania, which did not join 
WAEMU, withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000. By including countries not belonging to 
ECOWAS or to WAEMU, we can estimate the effect of regional blocs on food market 
integration. Indeed, larger border effects are expected between countries that either do not 
share the same currency or that are not members of the same economic union. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 compare the average price dispersion between markets located in a same 
country (within-country price dispersion) and markets located in opposite sides of a border 
(cross-country price dispersion). Clearly, international markets pairs have larger price 
dispersion that intra-national markets pairs for every commodity except local rice14, 
suggesting the existence of greater transaction costs between towns located in different 
countries than those located within the same country. Transactions costs may be due to higher 
                                                 
14 Figure not shown but available on request.  
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distance between markets located in different countries than markets within countries or to the 
cost associated with crossing borders.   
Figure 2.1: Average relatives prices in logarithm, millet, 2007.01-2013.01 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Average relatives prices in logarithm, maize, 2007.01-2013.01 
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Table B3 in appendix presents descriptive statistics of the log relative prices and of the first 
difference of the log relative prices. A zero value of the log relative prices (or of the first 
difference of the log relative prices) indicates that the LOP (RLOP) holds perfectly. 
The table confirms that the price differentials between markets is on average lower within 
countries than between countries; within-country relative prices are 17%15 higher than the 
LOP benchmark whereas between-country relative prices are 31% higher than the LOP 
benchmark. However, prices may vary substantially even within a country; the average 
within-country price differentials range from 9 percent for Gambia to 45 percent for Ghana. 
Average price differentials of all commodities hide important variations between 
commodities. Deviations in the relative prices are smaller for rice than other commodities 
especially cassava. The low price differentials among rice markets may reflect lower 
transactions costs of moving imported rice from the ports to consumption centers compared to 
locally grown crops. Conversely cassava presents large price dispersion within and between 
countries suggesting that cassava is mainly consumed near to the production areas.  
When we look at deviations from the RLOP, we notice a smaller discrepancy between within-
country market pairs and markets pairs from different countries. Indeed, within and between 
country price changes are respectively 7 and 9 percent higher than the RLOP benchmark. 
Notice that commodities included in our analysis vary country by country, as shown in Table 
B1 in appendix. 
2.5. Estimation of the border effect on relative prices 
2.5.1. Estimation of the average border effect  
As series often exhibit trending behaviour or non-stationarity in the mean, we first conduct 
unit root tests good-by-good by pooling all relative prices series. We use panel unit root tests 
by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and by Breitung (2000). The null hypothesis is that all groups 
have a common unit root. As shown by test results in Table B7 in appendix, the null-
hypothesis of a common unit-root is rejected, suggesting that our variables are stationary. 
When estimating an equation like equation (4), the time-varying dependent variables and 
nominal exchange rate series should be of similar orders of integration. In order to avoid 
spurious estimates, we check that our nominal exchange rate series are stationary. The 
hypothesis that the nominal exchange rate series are stationary is tested using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. ADF tests reject the null-hypothesis of a unit root for all the 
                                                 
15 (=exp(0.16)-1) (Table B3, column 3) 
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nominal exchange rate series (Table B8 in appendix). We can conclude that both the 
dependent variables and the nominal exchange rates are I(0). 
Table 2.1: Average border effect 
  |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| | ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| | ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Border dummy 
0.065*** 0.057*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(distance) 
0.032*** 0.034*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nominal exchange rate variations  
0.871*** 
 
0.273*** 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.014) 
    Distance equivalent of the border (kms) 7 5 16 5 
Price increase by distance (average dist = 1079) (%) 25 27 3 3 
Price increase by the border (%) 7 6 1 1 
Observations 595,598 586,845 573,896 573,707 
R-squared 0.406 0.408 0.171 0.172 
All regressions include market-product dummies and month-product dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
Table 2.1 reports estimates of the average border effect when estimating equation (4). In the 
first two regressions, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the log of relative prices 
whereas in the last two regressions, the dependent variable is the first difference of relative 
prices in absolute value. Specifications (2) and (4) include a measure of monthly nominal 
exchange rate changes to measure their impact on the relative prices.  
According to our estimates, distance and borders affect positively price differentials between 
markets (Table 2.1, columns 1 and 2). The border dummy coefficient reflects the average 
effect on prices of crossing a border across countries and commodities; crossing a border 
induces on average an increase of about 7 percent in relative prices for market pairs located in 
different countries (Table 2.1, column 1). The average distance between international market 
pairs in the sample is 1079 kilometers: on average, the distance is associated with an increase 
of 25 percent16 in price differentials for markets located on opposite side of a border. The 
coefficient of the nominal exchange rate variations is positive and significant (Table 2.1, 
columns 2 and 4). As expected, controlling for monthly fluctuations of the nominal exchange 
rate decreases the border coefficient suggesting that a substantial part of the border effect 
comes from variations in nominal exchange rates. However, even after controlling for 
nominal exchange rate changes, the border dummies remain positive and significant. 
                                                 
16 (=exp(0.032*ln(1079))-1) (Table 2.1, column 1) 
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Similar results are found when the explained variable is the first difference of relative prices, 
although with smaller coefficients (Table 2.1, columns 3 and 4). On average, distance 
between international market pairs increases the monthly variation of relative prices by 3% 
while the fact that the markets are separated by a border leads to an increase of 1%.  
In terms of distance equivalent, the specifications in column (2) and in column (4) display 
similar results: once controlling for nominal exchange rate changes, crossing the border is 
equivalent to traveling 5 kilometers between markets located in the same country. 
Our dataset covers 7 countries members of WAEMU and 7 countries not belonging to the 
union (Map 2.1). Estimates in Table 2.2 assess the effect of regional integration agreements 
by distinguishing between countries member of WAEMU and countries that are not. As 
shown in Table 2.2, the impact of crossing a border is smaller between countries belonging to 
WAEMU. The border effects, when at least one of the countries is not member of the union, 
decrease once controlling for nominal exchange rate variations (Table 2.2, columns 2 and 4). 
However, the coefficients remain positive and significant suggesting that countries within 
WAEMU benefit from being member of the union beyond the fact that they share a common 
currency. The smaller border coefficient for WAEMU members may reflect the positive effect 
of trade policies harmonization. 
Table 2.2: The effects of regional integration agreements 
  |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| | ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| | ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
Border dummy within WAEMU members 
0.049*** 0.049*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Border dummy when at least one country is not member 
of WEAMU 
0.093*** 0.079*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(distance) 
0.036*** 0.036*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Nominal exchange rate variations  
0.632*** 
 
0.214*** 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.015) 
Distance equivalent of the border within WAEMU (kms) 4 4 3 2 
Distance equivalent of the border outside WAEMU (kms) 13 9 59 16 
Price increase by the border within WAEMU (%) 5 5 0.4 0.4 
Price increase by the border outside WEAMU (%) 10 8 2 1 
Observations 595,598 586,845 573,896 573,707 
R-squared 0.408 0.409 0.172 0.173 
All regressions include market-product dummies and month-product dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
As pooling all observations may hide differences across commodities, we estimate equation 
(4) for each commodity. Estimates in Table 2.3 show that crossing a border has a similar 
impact on relative prices of millet, sorghum and local rice. In contrast, borders lead to higher 
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price differentials for imported rice (+13%) and cassava (+23%). As distance appears as a 
bigger trade impediment for cassava compared to the other commodities, when expressed in 
distance equivalent, the border effect is large only for imported rice (658km). A possible 
explanation is that imported rice is less subject to informal cross-border trade than other staple 
foods such as millet and sorghum. An alternative explanation is that rice is more subject to 
official and unofficial trade restrictions.  
Table 2.3: Average border effect by commodities 
  
Dependent variable: Log of the relative prices 
Millet Sorghum Maize Cassava Local rice Imported rice 
      
Border dummy 
0.02*** 0.027*** 0.078*** 0.206*** 0.023*** 0.122*** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.033) (0.007) (0.005) 
Log(distance) 
0.032*** 0.038*** 0.04*** 0.128*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.031) (0.005) (0.002) 
      Distance equivalent of the border 
(kms) 
2 2 7 5 5 658 
Price increase by the border (%) 2 3 8 23 2 13 
Price increase by distance (%) 25 31 32 119 11 14 
Observations 132,169 176,237 128,785 12,165 34,746 92,489 
R-squared 0.291 0.394 0.318 0.466 0.422 0.429 
All regressions include monthly nominal exchange rate variations, market-product dummies and month-product 
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
2.5.2. Estimation of bilateral border effects  
Table B4 in appendix measures the importance of each bilateral border in our sample by 
including 24 border dummies (e.g. Benin-Niger, Senegal-Mauritania, etc.). The first part of 
the table uses relative prices as dependent variable whereas the second part considers the first 
difference of relative prices as dependent variable. 
In the first part of the table, 18 out of 24 border coefficients are positive and significant. The 
largest are Ghana-Togo, Guinea-Senegal, Mali-Mauritania and Mauritania-Senegal. For 
instance, the borders Ghana-Togo and Mali-Mauritania lead respectively to an increase of 43 
and 48 percent in relative prices of markets located on both sides of the border.  
Every border coefficients are positive and significant when the first difference of relative 
prices is the dependent variable. Country-pairs such as Burkina Faso-Ghana, Gambia-Senegal 
and Mauritania-Mali show the largest deviations from the RLOP.  
In both cases, the country-pairs with the greatest border coefficients are the pairs including 
either a country that is not member of ECOWAS, WAEMU or of the CFA Francs zone. 
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Figure 2.3: Bilateral border coefficients in regressions studying deviations from the LOP and 
deviations from the RLOP 
 
The Y-axis presents the bilateral border coefficients of Table B4, column 1 while the X-axis presents the 
coefficients of Table B4, column 4. 
Figure 2.3 confronts border coefficients estimated in the regressions with the log of relative 
prices as dependent variable and the ones with monthly variation of relative prices as 
explained variable. A large proportion of country-pairs showing small deviations from the 
LOP also present small deviations from the RLOP. It suggests that both approaches provide 
similar results. However, several country-pairs do not have similar correlations between both 
estimations. Indeed, country-pairs including Mali-Mauritania, Ghana-Togo, Guinea-Senegal 
and Mauritania-Senegal show much larger deviations from the LOP than from the RLOP 
suggesting that those countries have very different prices but the monthly price variation on 
each side of the border is quite similar. 
2.5.3. Estimation of lower and upper bounds of bilateral border effects 
Until now, we have compared relative prices between markets in opposite side of a border to 
the average within-country relative prices. As pointed out by Gorodnichenko and Tesar 
(2009), our border estimates may be biased by the heterogeneity in relative prices across 
countries. When the distribution of relative prices in each country at both sides of a border is 
very different, estimated coefficients may reflect what the authors call the country 
heterogeneity effect. For example, in the context of the US-Canada border, they found that the 
US-Canada border effect is much bigger when including a dummy for US city pairs (and not 
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the dummy for Canadian city pairs) than when including a dummy for Canadian town-pairs 
(and removing the US city-pairs dummy). This difference is explained by a relatively lower 
variation of Canadian prices than US prices. Thus, when within-country price distributions are 
different, it is only possible to estimate a lower and an upper bound for the border effect by 
omitting alternatively the dummy of one of the countries, which becomes the benchmark for 
the border coefficient. When the dummy for Canadian city pairs is omitted, the between-
country price dispersion is compared with the low price dispersion of Canadian cities, and 
then the border effect is overestimated.  
To deal with this country heterogeneity effect, we follow Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) 
and control for within countries heterogeneity by introducing dummies for market pairs 
located in the same country. We estimate lower and upper bounds for bilateral border 
coefficients by omitting alternatively a country dummy. The omitted country dummy will 
serve as benchmark. We estimate 14 regressions that provide us with two border coefficients 
for each country-pair: the lower bound and the upper bound estimates of the border 
coefficient.  
To understand how bounds are calculated, take as example the estimation of the Burkina 
Faso-Ghana border. As shown in figure 2.4 below, Burkina Faso has a smaller dispersion of 
relative prices than Ghana so comparing the relative prices between Burkina and Ghana to the 
relative prices inside Burkina Faso gives us a high border coefficient (the upper bound). By 
contrast, if we compare the Burkina-Ghana relative prices to the within country relatives 
prices in Ghana, we obtain the lower bound of the border estimate.  
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Figure 2.4: Distance adjusted within-country relative prices 
 
Figure 2.4 displays residuals of the regression of the log of relative prices on log distance between markets. The 
regression includes market-product dummies and month-product dummies. The bottom and top of the boxes are 
the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the y-variable, and the band inside the boxes is the median. The ends of the 
whiskers represent the lower and the upper adjacent value. Adjacent values are calculated utilizing the 
interquartile range (IQR). The upper adjacent value is the largest data value that is less than or equal to the third 
quartile plus 1.5 x IQR and the lower adjacent value is the smallest data value that is greater than or equal to the 
first quartile minus 1.5 x IQR. 
Table 2.4: Estimated coefficients of the five largest bilateral borders - regressions explaining 
relative price dispersion  
Average estimation Lower Bound Upper bound 
  (1) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
  (2) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
  (3) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
                   
Log(distance) 
0.029*** 
 Log(distance) 
0.03*** 
  Log(distance) 
0.03*** 
  (0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
  Exchange rate 
variations 
0.489*** 
 
Exchange rate 
variations 
0.544*** 
  
Exchange rate 
variations 
0.544*** 
  (0.030) 
 
(0.032) 
  
(0.032) 
  
BF-GHA 
0.154*** 17 
BF-GHA 
0.131*** 14 
GHA BF-GHA 
0.169*** 18 
BF 
(0.029) 
 
(0.036) 

(0.029) 

MAU-SEN 
0.21*** 23 
CAM-NIGA 
0.131*** 14 
NIGA GUI-SEN 
0.282*** 33 
GUI 
(0.059) 
 
(0.017) 

(0.038) 

GUI-SEN 
0.258*** 29 
GUI-SEN 
0.23*** 26 
SEN MAU-SEN 
0.327*** 39 
SEN 
(0.024) 
 
(0.033) 

(0.028) 

GHA-TOG 
0.357*** 43 
MALI-MAU 
0.334*** 40 
MAU GHA-TOG 
0.355*** 43 
TOG 
(0.023) 
 
(0.094) 

(0.022) 

MALI-MAU 
0.394*** 48 
GHA-TOG 
0.347*** 41 
GHA MALI-MAU 
0.524*** 69 
MALI 
(0.057)   (0.029)  (0.027) 
All regressions include monthly nominal exchange rate variations, market-product dummies and month-product 
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
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For the sake of brevity, Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report only the five largest of the 24 bilateral 
border dummies. (The whole results are presented in Tables B5 and B6 in appendix). Each 
table is divided in three parts: the first part displays again the average bilateral border effects 
presented in Table B4; the second and the third parts report the lower and the upper bounds of 
the border effects.  
The largest estimated bilateral borders vary with the estimated specification. In column 1 
(Table 2.4), the benchmark is the average within-country relative prices whereas in columns 2 
and 3, the benchmark is the omitted country dummy. Large differences between within-
countries relative prices lead to imprecise estimates as observed for the Mauritania-Senegal 
and Mauritania-Mali borders (Table B5). As a consequence, the largest estimate of the border 
effect depends on whether we consider the lower or the upper bound.  
If we take a conservative approach (omitting the country with the largest intra-country 
relatives prices), the largest bilateral border is the Ghana-Togo border (Table 2.4, column 2). 
If we consider the upper bound, the largest border is Mali-Mauritania (Table 2.4, column 3). 
Apart from differences in the size of the coefficients, four out of the five largest bilateral 
border dummies remain unchanged in any of the three different specifications presented in 
Table 2.4. The borders Burkina-Ghana, Guinea-Senegal, Ghana-Togo and Mali-Mauritania 
are the borders leading to the largest deviations from the LOP.  
Table 2.5: Estimated coefficients of the five largest bilateral borders - regressions explaining 
monthly variations in relative prices 
Average estimation Lower Bound Upper bound 
  (1) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
  (2) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
  (3) 
Price 
increase 
(%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
      
 
  
 
  
Log(distance) 0.004***   Log(distance) 0.004***   Log(distance) 0.004***   
  (0.000)     (0.000)   
 
(0.000)   
Exchange rate 
variations 
0.196***   Exchange rate 
variations 
0.201***   Exchange rate 
variations 
0.201***   
(0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
BF-TOG 
0.013*** 1.3 
CHAD-NIGA 
0.004 0.4 
CHAD GAM-SEN 
0.03*** 3.1 
SEN 
(0.002)   (0.004) (0.001) 
BEN-BF 
0.014*** 1.5 
GAM-SEN 
0.005*** 0.5 
GAM BEN-TOG 
0.035*** 3.5 
BEN 
(0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
MALI-MAU 
0.015*** 1.5 
BEN-NIG 
0.007*** 0.7 
BEN MALI-MAU 
0.039*** 3.9 
MALI 
(0.001)   (0.003) (0.003) 
GAM-SEN 
0.018*** 1.8 
BEN-BF 
0.008*** 0.8 
BEN BF-TOG 
0.045*** 4.6 
BF 
(0.001)   (0.003) (0.002) 
BF-GHA 
0.041*** 4.2 
BF-GHA 
0.027*** 2.7 
GHA BF-GHA 
0.055*** 5.7 
BF 
(0.002)   (0.003)  (0.003) 
All regressions include monthly nominal exchange rate variations, market-product dummies and month-product 
dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
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We observe larger differences in estimated border coefficients between lower and upper 
bounds when the dependent variable is the first difference of relative prices. Out of the five 
largest bilateral borders, only two are consistent throughout the three specifications (Table 
2.5). The borders between Gambia-Senegal and Ghana-Burkina Faso are the borders leading 
to the largest deviations from the RLOP. 
2.6. Estimation of the border effect on the volatility and persistence in 
relative prices 
We examine the robustness of our results by using successively the standard deviation of the 
relative prices and the half-life of shocks as dependent variables. By using those indicators, 
we examine the effect of road distance and borders on the relative prices volatility and on the 
price convergence between markets located in different countries. The half-life indicates the 
time required for a divergence from LOP to dissipate by one half.  
Table B9 in appendix summarizes descriptive statistics. The average volatility and persistence 
is lower for within-country market pairs than between-country market pairs suggesting the 
existence of large transaction costs when crossing borders. Imported rice is the commodity 
with the lowest volatility within and between countries but differences between prices of 
imported rice are the most persistent. Indeed, the average estimated half-lives of imported rice 
prices are 2.9 months within-country and 4.6 months between countries. This high degree of 
persistence of price differentials between market pairs in the case of imported rice may reflect 
imperfect or asymmetric price transmission from international rice market to domestic 
markets in West Africa (Brunelin, 2013). 
Table 2.6: Average border effect 
  Standard deviation of relative prices Half-life of shocks 
    
Border dummy 
0.026*** 0.019*** 0.681*** 0.661*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) 
Log(distance) 
0.013*** 0.015*** 0.466*** 0.471*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.04) 
Standard deviation of the nominal 
exchange rate changes 
 
0.766*** 
 
2.308 
 
(0.07) 
 
(3.38) 
Distance equivalent of the border (kms) 7 4 4 4 
Observations 9,337 9,337 9,337 9,337 
R-squared 0.841 0.846 0.517 0.517 
All regressions include market-product dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-
pairs. 
Chapter 2: Food markets and barriers to regional integration in West and Central Africa 
67 
 
Table 2.6 reports the estimations of the average border effect. We compare the price volatility 
(persistence) of cross-country market pairs to the average within-country volatility 
(persistence). Both the distance and the border variables are positive and significant. We find 
similar distance equivalent of the border (four kilometers) on price volatility and on price 
persistence when we control for the variability of the nominal exchange rate.  
When we study the border effect by commodity (Table 2.7), we find similar results for all 
commodities except imported rice. Crossing a border has a greater effect on the price 
volatility of imported rice compared to the other commodities, which is consistent with our 
previous estimates. Indeed crossing the border is equivalent to 26 kilometers of distance 
between markets in the case of imported rice whereas the distance equivalent of the border is 
of 3 kilometers for the other commodities.  
Table 2.7: Average border effect by commodities - Dependent variable: Standard deviation of 
relative prices 
 Millet Sorghum Maize Local rice Imported rice 
  
Border dummy 
0.023*** 0.018*** 0.02*** 0.006*** 0.022*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log(distance) 
0.02*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance equivalent of the border (kms) 3 3 3 3 26 
Observations 1,945 2,855 2,249 620 1,465 
R-squared 0.743 0.798 0.751 0.915 0.862 
All regressions include the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate changes and market dummies. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-pairs.  
When we estimate specific bilateral borders (Table B10 in appendix), Mauritania-Senegal, 
Mali-Mauritania and Guinea-Senegal have the largest estimated borders when the price 
volatility is the dependent variable. Mauritania-Senegal, Mali-Senegal and Guinea-Senegal 
are the pairs showing the greatest persistence of shocks compared to the average within-
country persistence.  
The estimation of lower and upper bounds (Table B11 in appendix) confirm the bad ranking 
of the country-pairs mentioned above17. Conversely, the cost associated with crossing the 
border seems low for the following country-pairs: Benin-Nigeria, Burkina Faso-Niger and 
Burkina Faso-Mali, confirming the good ranking of few countries located in the Sahel region 
of West Africa (Araujo and Brunelin, 2013). In addition, border coefficients of country pairs 
such as Benin-Nigeria, Burkina Faso-Niger, and Cote d’Ivoire-Mali are measured accurately 
                                                 
17 For the sake of brevity we do not present the results with the half-lives as dependent variable. 
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as the within country price volatility of those pairs are quite similar. On the other hand, we 
observe large discrepancies in the lower and upper bounds estimations of the pairs Burkina 
Faso-Togo and Mali-Mauritania. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Our research based on monthly retail price data over the 2007-2012 sample period strongly 
indicates that borders matter in regional integration of food markets in West and Central 
Africa. On average, crossing a border is responsible for an increase of 7% in relative prices. 
However this average border effect hides large discrepancies by bilateral borders. 
Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso have the lowest estimated borders, 
and thus are found to be the most integrated reflecting the intense cross-border trade of grains 
between those countries. On the other hand, borders estimates are large for Mauritania, Ghana 
and Guinea as trading partners. Price dispersion may be large even within countries reflecting 
the poor degree of internal market integration. Countries such as Ghana, Mauritania, Chad 
and Togo show high price differentials between national markets that may reflect the 
important role played by road distance.  
Belonging to an economic union and sharing the same currency appear as major determinants 
of market integration; countries not members of WAEMU or ECOWAS have larger borders. 
Each of the country-pairs showing the greatest discrepancies from the LOP - Ghana-Togo, 
Guinea-Senegal and Mali-Mauritania - includes a country that is either not member of 
ECOWAS or of WAEMU.  
We observe differences between commodities as well. Borders do not lead to large increase in 
relative prices for millet, sorghum, maize and local rice. On the other hand, borders appear as 
a large impediment to trade of imported rice. This may reflect the fact that imported rice is 
less subject to informal cross-border trade than locally grown crops or the fact that imported 
rice is more subject to trade restrictions at the border.  
Our analysis shows that road distance is not the only factor explaining deviations from the 
Law of One Price in West Africa. Borders, especially between countries that are not members 
of the same economic union, matter. Efforts should be made to deepen regional integration 
and to apply rules when countries are already members of an economic union. Borders appear 
as a large trade impediment in the case of imported rice. As rice is a commodity of strategic 
significance across West Africa, efforts should be made to reduce transactions costs at the 
border. 
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The 2008 food crisis demonstrated the inability of governments to take concerted actions in 
response to the price increase. The decisions to impose sudden export restrictions or to engage 
in panic buying created substantial uncertainty in the markets. Price deviations and price 
instability are exacerbated by the lack of accurate information on the supply and demand 
situation. Efforts should be made by governments to cooperate and take concerted actions in 
order to increase transparency.  
Finally, our analysis underlines the importance of providing adequate hard infrastructure such 
as rural roads and rural telecommunications in order to reduce the role played by distance. 
Improving storage facilities and post-harvest processing facilities would also reduce the 
importance of distance between markets by increasing the tradability of food items. The lack 
of cereal processing facilities in rural areas decreases the market acceptability of certain food 
goods and then increase the role played by distance. 
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Appendix B: 
Figure B1: Distance adjusted within-country changes in relative prices 
 
Figure B1 presents residuals of the regression of variations in the relative prices on log distance between 
markets. The regression includes market-product dummies and month-product dummies. The bottom and top of 
the boxes are the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the y-variable, and the band inside the boxes is the median. The 
ends of the whiskers represent the lower and the upper adjacent value. Adjacent values are calculated utilizing 
the interquartile range (IQR). The upper adjacent value is the largest data value that is less than or equal to the 
third quartile plus 1.5 x IQR and the lower adjacent value is the smallest data value that is greater than or equal 
to the first quartile minus 1.5 x IQR. 
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Table B1: Countries and markets included in the sample 
 
Millet Sorghum Maize Cassava Local rice Imported rice 
Benin 0 3 6 6 0 4 
Burkina Faso 12 11 6 0 0 0 
Cameroon 0 0 5 0 0 5 
Chad 5 4 3 0 0 2 
Cote d’Ivoire 0 0 0 0 6 4 
Gambia 8 7 7 0 2 15 
Ghana 0 0 7 12 10 0 
Guinea 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Mali 10 24 18 0 18 16 
Mauritania 0 4 0 0 0 0 
Niger 23 21 18 0 4 24 
Nigeria 6 7 7 0 2 0 
Senegal 22 17 20 0 2 9 
Togo 0 5 6 6 0 6 
Number of markets 87 103 103 24 48 85 
Number of countries 7 10 11 3 8 9 
 
 
 
Table B2: Food Consumption Pattern of Main Food Items - Share in total Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
 Millet Sorghum Maize Cassava Rice Total 
Benin 1 6 21 16 11 55 
Burkina Faso 22 27 15 N/A 6 70 
Cameroon 1 9 14 12 9 45 
Chad 15 18 5 5 4 47 
Cote d’Ivoire N/A N/A 7 12 17 36 
Gambia 21 5 3 N/A 14 43 
Ghana 2 3 13 23 8 49 
Guinea N/A N/A 3 12 36 51 
Mali 20 14 10 N/A 20 64 
Mauritania N/A 4 N/A N/A 11 15 
Niger 41 12 2 1 9 65 
Nigeria 11 13 7 9 9 49 
Senegal 8 4 9 2 31 54 
Togo 2 7 24 15 11 59 
Mean 13 10 10 11 14  50 
This table includes the contribution in percent of the main food items in the total dietary energy consumption in 
14 West African countries. Those data are coming from the Statistic division of FAO and have been calculated 
on the period 2003-2005.  
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Table B3: Descriptive statistics 
 Average road 
distance in 
kms 
|Ln(Pikt/Pjkt)|   |Ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
  Obs Mean Std Max   Obs Mean Std Max 
WITHIN - COUNTRY 
BEN-BEN 382 2437 0.28 0.23 1.26 2324 0.1 0.12 0.94 
BF-BF 319 10389 0.17 0.14 2.65 10201 0.08 0.12 2.46 
CAM-CAM 466 1449 0.17 0.13 0.72 1428 0.05 0.06 0.44 
CHAD-CHAD 536 1420 0.3 0.23 1.13 1400 0.11 0.1 0.9 
CI-CI 319 1375 0.1 0.09 0.52 1326 0.08 0.08 0.55 
GAM-GAM 158 11360 0.09 0.12 1.32 10764 0.07 0.12 1.34 
GHA-GHA 301 7524 0.37 0.3 2.08 7260 0.13 0.15 1.51 
GUI-GUI 544 352 0.14 0.11 0.52 332 0.08 0.08 0.41 
MALI-MALI 490 46096 0.15 0.14 1.04 44646 0.05 0.05 0.65 
MAU-MAU 653 276 0.32 0.2 0.92 270 0.1 0.1 0.58 
NIGA-NIGA 544 4039 0.16 0.14 1.26 3935 0.1 0.1 0.82 
NIG-NIG 574 57357 0.16 0.14 0.98 54627 0.07 0.07 0.72 
SEN-SEN 270 39774 0.15 0.13 0.98 38360 0.08 0.08 0.7 
TOGO-TOGO 335 3945 0.27 0.24 1.63 3885 0.14 0.17 1.88 
Millet   45093 0.18 0.14 1.32   43932 0.08 0.08 0.89 
Sorghum 46988 0.2 0.16 2.65 45144 0.08 0.1 2.46 
Maize 39273 0.17 0.15 1.3 37597 0.08 0.09 1.34 
Cassava 5863 0.41 0.32 2.08 5671 0.14 0.17 1.51 
Local rice 13529 0.12 0.12 1.15 12934 0.06 0.07 0.91 
Imported rice   37047 0.08 0.08 0.82   35480 0.04 0.06 1.18 
Average values 430 187793 0.16 0.16 2.65   180758 0.07 0.09 2.46 
BETWEEN -COUNTRY 
BEN-BF 795 4459 0.35 0.3 3.2 4318 0.11 0.13 2.34 
BEN-NIG 958 15888 0.26 0.24 1.48 14892 0.09 0.1 0.83 
BEN-NIGA 638 4098 0.29 0.25 1.3 3953 0.12 0.12 0.88 
BEN-TOG 376 7305 0.27 0.23 1.85 7066 0.12 0.14 1.71 
BF-GHA 825 2296 0.38 0.24 1.18 2219 0.13 0.13 0.95 
BF-MALI 717 32596 0.19 0.16 2.66 31806 0.07 0.11 2.37 
BF-NIG 1090 41965 0.26 0.19 2.94 40726 0.09 0.11 2.69 
BF-TOG 660 6465 0.3 0.27 2.92 6359 0.14 0.19 2.72 
CAM-CHAD 1169 1725 0.26 0.18 1.33 1700 0.08 0.09 0.74 
CAM-NIGA 1087 2315 0.35 0.23 1.17 2260 0.1 0.09 0.77 
CHAD-NIG 1427 19832 0.25 0.2 1.4 19253 0.1 0.1 0.78 
CHAD-NIGA 1383 5503 0.29 0.24 1.35 5389 0.12 0.11 0.89 
CI-GHA 607 3140 0.19 0.15 0.93 2960 0.1 0.1 0.87 
CIGUI 905 1416 0.22 0.14 0.71 1328 0.09 0.08 0.46 
CI-MALI 907 10271 0.11 0.09 0.55 9772 0.06 0.07 0.48 
GAM-SEN 333 37167 0.23 0.18 1.81 35496 0.11 0.12 1.11 
GHA-TOG 492 6384 0.74 0.51 2.47 6156 0.15 0.16 1.68 
GUI-MALI 1003 4147 0.26 0.15 0.79 3882 0.08 0.07 0.51 
GUI-SEN 1075 416 0.42 0.17 0.89 392 0.08 0.08 0.48 
MALI-MAU 991 4315 0.72 0.4 2.23 4134 0.11 0.11 0.85 
MALI-NIG 1608 93235 0.26 0.18 1.14 90125 0.07 0.07 0.81 
MALI-SEN 1260 72576 0.26 0.2 1.47 69945 0.07 0.07 0.78 
MAU-SEN 634 3274 0.52 0.33 1.77 3138 0.11 0.11 0.92 
NIG-NIGA 693 27017 0.23 0.16 1.13  25869 0.1 0.1 0.82 
Millet 
 
89073 0.24 0.19 1.67 
 
86742 0.09 0.09 1 
Sorghum 131742 0.28 0.24 3.2 126973 0.09 0.11 2.72 
Maize 101757 0.29 0.21 1.81 97694 0.09 0.1 1.11 
Cassava .  6426 0.73 0.51 2.47 .  6204 0.15 0.15 1.68 
Local rice 21918 0.18 0.14 0.93 20667 0.07 0.08 0.87 
Imported rice   56889 0.2 0.13 0.82   54858 0.05 0.06 0.92 
Average values 1079 407805 0.27 0.22 3.2   393138 0.09 0.1 2.72 
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Table B4: Bilateral border effects on relative prices and on variations in relative prices 
  |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Distance 
equivalent 
(kms) 
Price increase 
(%) 
| ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Distance 
equivalent 
(kms) 
Price increase 
(%) 
Log(distance) 
0.029*** 
 
0.004*** 
 (0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
 Exchange rate 
variations 
0.489*** 
 
0.196*** 
 (0.030) 
 
(0.016) 
 
BEN-BF 
0.005 0 0 0.014*** 36 1 
(0.022) 
 
(0.002) 
 
BEN-NIG 
0.019 0 0 0.011*** 14 1 
(0.013) 
 
(0.001) 
 
BEN-NIGA 
-0.003 0 0 0.004*** 3 0 
(0.017) 
 
(0.002) 
 
BEN-TOG 
-0.004 0 0 0.009*** 9 1 
(0.018) 
 
(0.002) 
 
BF-GHA 
0.154*** 222 17 0.041*** 28979 4 
(0.029) 
 
(0.002) 
 
BF-MALI 
-0.01 0 0 0.004*** 3 0 
(0.009) 
 
(0.001) 
 
BF-NIG 
0.061*** 9 6 0.005*** 3 0 
(0.007) 
 
(0.001) 
 
BF-TOG 
0.05*** 6 5 0.013*** 25 1 
(0.015) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CAM-CHAD 
0.048*** 5 5 0.006*** 5 1 
(0.018) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CAM-NIGA 
0.134*** 110 14 0.006*** 4 1 
(0.019) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CHAD-NIG 
0 0 0 0.007*** 5 1 
(0.012) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CHAD-NIGA 
0.029* 3 3 0.007*** 5 1 
(0.016) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CI-GHA 
-0.024*** 0 -2 0.003* 2 0 
(0.008) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CI-GUI 
0.055*** 7 6 0.006*** 5 1 
(0.019) 
 
(0.002) 
 
CI-MALI 
-0.011** 1 -1 0.004*** 3 0 
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
GAM-SEN 
0.075*** 14 8 0.018*** 91 2 
(0.006) 
 
(0.001) 
 
GHA-TOG 
0.357*** 275493 43 0.008*** 7 1 
(0.023) 
 
(0.002) 
 
GUI-MALI 
0.117*** 61 12 0.01*** 12 1 
(0.017) 
 
(0.002) 
 
GUI-SEN 
0.258*** 8541 29 0.003 0 0 
(0.024) 
 
(0.002) 
 
MALI-MAU 
0.394*** 1009092 48 0.015*** 41 2 
(0.057) 
 
(0.001) 
 
MALI-NIG 
0.07*** 12 7 0.004*** 2 0 
(0.005) 
 
(0.000) 
 
MALI-SEN 
0.063*** 9 6 0.002*** 1 0 
(0.006) 
 
(0.000) 
 
MAU-SEN 
0.21*** 1585 23 0.01*** 11 1 
(0.059) 
 
(0.002) 
 
NIG-NIGA 
0.046*** 5 5 0.005*** 3 0 
(0.006) 
 
(0.001) 
 Observations 586,845 
 
573,707 
 R-squared 0.432     0.173     
All regressions include market-product dummies and month-product dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
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Table B5: Upper and lower bounds of the border effect on relative prices 
  Average estimation Lower Bound Upper bound 
  |ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price 
increase (%) 
|ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price 
increase (%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
|ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price 
increase (%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
  

  
 
        
Log(distance) 
0.029***   0.03*** 
 
  0.03*** 

  
(0.002)   (0.002) 
 
  (0.002) 

  
Exchange rate 
variations 
0.489***   0.544*** 

  0.544*** 

  
(0.030)   (0.032) 

  (0.032) 

  
BEN-BF 
0.005 0 -0.010 0 BEN 0.015 0 BF 
(0.022)   (0.027) 

  (0.023) 

  
BEN-NIG 
0.019 0 -0.016 0 BEN 0.039*** 4 NIG 
(0.013)   (0.021) 

  (0.011) 

  
BEN-NIGA 
-0.003 0 -0.039* -4 BEN 0.027 0 NIGA 
(0.017)   (0.023) 

  (0.018) 

  
BEN-TOG 
-0.004 0 -0.004 0 BEN -0.01 0 TOG 
(0.018)   (0.023) 

  (0.018) 

  
BF-GHA 
0.154*** 17 0.131*** 14 GHA 0.169*** 18 BF 
(0.029)   (0.036) 

  (0.029) 

  
BF-MALI 
-0.01 0 -0.03** -3 BF 0.008 0 MALI 
(0.009)   (0.013) 

  (0.009) 

  
BF-NIG 
0.061*** 6 0.046*** 5 BF 0.075*** 8 NIG 
(0.007)   (0.012) 

  (0.007) 

  
BF-TOG 
0.05*** 5 0.032* 3 TOG 0.063*** 6 BF 
(0.015)   (0.017) 

  (0.018) 

  
CAM-CHAD 
0.048*** 5 -0.008 0 CHAD 0.123*** 13 CAM 
(0.018)   (0.022) 

  (0.021) 

  
CAM-NIGA 
0.134*** 14 0.131*** 14 NIGA 0.139*** 15 CAM 
(0.019)   (0.017) 

  (0.025) 

  
CHAD-NIG 
0.00 0 -0.054*** -5 CHAD 0.057*** 6 NIG 
(0.012)   (0.020) 

  (0.008) 

  
CHAD-NIGA 
0.029* 3 -0.037* -4 CHAD 0.086*** 9 NIGA 
(0.016)   (0.022) 

  (0.015) 

  
CI-GHA 
-0.024*** -2 -0.077*** -7 GHA 0.023* 2 CI 
(0.008)   (0.014) 

  (0.013) 

  
CI-GUI 
0.055*** 6 0.045*** 5 CI 0.058** 6 GUI 
(0.019)   (0.013) 

  (0.024) 

  
CI-MALI 
-0.011** -1 -0.023*** -2 MALI 0.000 0 CI 
(0.004)   (0.008) 

  (0.010) 

  
GAM-SEN 
0.075*** 8 0.065*** 7 SEN 0.078*** 8 GAM 
(0.006)   (0.006) 

  (0.008) 

  
GHA-TOG 
0.357*** 43 0.347*** 41 GHA 0.355*** 43 TOG 
(0.023)   (0.029) 

  (0.022) 

  
GUI-MALI 
0.117*** 12 0.097*** 10 MALI 0.132*** 14 GUI 
(0.017)   (0.014) 

  (0.025) 

  
GUI-SEN 
0.258*** 29 0.23*** 26 SEN 0.282*** 33 GUI 
(0.024)   (0.033) 

  (0.038) 

  
MALI-MAU 
0.394*** 48 0.334*** 40 MAU 0.524*** 69 MALI 
(0.057)   (0.094) 

  (0.027) 

  
MALI-NIG 
0.07*** 7 0.064*** 7 NIG 0.073*** 8 MALI 
(0.005)   (0.006) 

  (0.006) 

  
MALI-SEN 
0.063*** 6 0.053*** 5 SEN 0.069*** 7 MALI 
(0.006)   (0.007) 

  (0.007) 

  
MAU-SEN 
0.21*** 23 0.154 0 MAU 0.327*** 39 SEN 
(0.059)   (0.095) 

  (0.028) 

  
NIG-NIGA 
0.046*** 5 0.039*** 4 NIG 0.05*** 5 NIGA 
(0.006)   (0.006)     (0.011)     
All regressions include market-product dummies and month-product dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
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Table B6: Upper and lower bounds of the border effect on variations in relative prices 
  Average estimation Lower Bound Upper bound 
  | ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price increase 
(%) 
| ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price increase 
(%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
| ln(Pikt/Pjkt)| 
Price 
increase (%) 
Omitted 
dummy 
    
 
    
Log(distance) 0.004***   0.004***   0.004***   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
Exchange rate 
variations 
0.196***   0.201***   0.201***   
(0.016)   (0.016)   (0.016)   
BEN-BF 
0.014*** 1.5 0.008*** 0.8 BEN 0.021*** 2.1 BF 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
BEN-NIG 
0.011*** 1.1 0.007*** 0.7 BEN 0.012*** 1.2 NIG 
(0.001)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
BEN-NIGA 
0.004** 0.4 -0.004 -0.4 NIGA 0.012*** 1.2 BEN 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
BEN-TOG 
0.009*** 0.9 -0.018*** -1.8 TOG 0.035*** 3.5 BEN 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
BF-GHA 
0.041*** 4.2 0.027*** 2.7 GHA 0.055*** 5.7 BF 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)   
BF-MALI 
0.004*** 0.4 -0.004*** -0.4 BF 0.012*** 1.2 MALI 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
BF-NIG 
0.005*** 0.5 0.001 0.1 NIG 0.008*** 0.8 BF 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
BF-TOG 
0.013*** 1.3 -0.021*** -2.0 TOG 0.045*** 4.6 BF 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
CAM-CHAD 
0.006*** 0.6 -0.015*** -1.5 CHAD 0.025*** 2.5 CAM 
(0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)   
CAM-NIGA 
0.006*** 0.6 -0.012*** -1.2 NIGA 0.022*** 2.2 CAM 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
CHAD-NIG 
0.007*** 0.7 -0.007** -0.7 CHAD 0.02*** 2.0 NIG 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.001)   
CHAD-NIGA 
0.007*** 0.7 0.004 0.4 CHAD 0.01*** 1.0 NIGA 
(0.002)   (0.004)   (0.003)   
CI-GHA 
0.003* 0.3 0.000 0.0 CI 0.007*** 0.7 GHA 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
CI-GUI 
0.006*** 0.6 -0.008*** -0.8 CI 0.021*** 2.2 GUI 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.004)   
CI-MALI 
0.004*** 0.4 -0.022*** -2.2 CI 0.03*** 3.0 MALI 
(0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
GAM-SEN 
0.018*** 1.8 0.005*** 0.5 GAM 0.03*** 3.1 SEN 
(0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   
GHA-TOG 
0.008*** 0.8 -0.012*** -1.2 TOG 0.025*** 2.5 GHA 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
GUI-MALI 
0.01*** 1.0 -0.002 -0.2 GUI 0.021*** 2.1 MALI 
(0.002)   (0.005)   (0.003)   
GUI-SEN 
0.003 0.3 0.002 0.2 SEN 0.004 0.4 GUI 
(0.002)   (0.005)   (0.006)   
MALI-MAU 
0.015*** 1.5 (0.004) -0.4 MAU 0.039*** 3.9 MALI 
(0.001)   (0.005)   (0.003)   
MALI-NIG 
0.004*** 0.4 -0.008*** -0.8 NIG 0.015*** 1.5 MALI 
0.000   (0.001)   (0.001)   
MALI-SEN 
0.002*** 0.2 -0.011*** -1.1 SEN 0.014*** 1.5 MALI 
0.000   (0.001)   (0.001)   
MAU-SEN 
0.01*** 1.0 0.003 0.3 MAU 0.02*** 2.0 SEN 
(0.002)   (0.006)   (0.004)   
NIG-NIGA 
0.005*** 0.5 -0.006** -0.6 NIGA 0.015*** 1.5 NIG 
(0.001)   (0.002)     (0.001)     
All regressions include market-product dummies and month-product dummies. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by market-pairs. 
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Table B7: Panel unit root tests on relative prices 
Commodities Method Statistic Prob. 
Cross-
sections 
Obs 
            
Millet 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -111.88 0.00 1997 130162 
Breitung t-stat -73.60 0.00 1997 128165 
Sorghum 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -110.55 0.00 2879 170877 
Breitung t-stat -70.02 0.00 2879 167998 
Maize 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -110.31 0.00 2250 134203 
Breitung t-stat -66.18 0.00 2250 131953 
Cassava 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -30.04 0.00 205 11846 
Breitung t-stat -14.08 0.00 205 11641 
Local rice 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -46.73 0.00 620 33257 
Breitung t-stat -29.46 0.00 620 32637 
Imported rice 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -60.35 0.00 1480 89764 
Breitung t-stat -45.94 0.00 1480 88284 
H0: Common unit root. We include a constant and a trend in the tests. The choice of lag order was based on 
Schwartz criteria.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table B8: ADF unit root tests on nominal exchange rate variations 
Model ADF Prob 
CFA/Nigerian Naira Level [2] -5.30 0.00 
CFA/Guinean Franc Level [3] -5.59 0.00 
CFA/Ghanaian Cedi Level [2] -8.55 0.00 
CFA/ Mauritanian Ouguiya Level [2] -5.30 0.00 
CFA/ Gambian Dalasi Level [2] -5.43 0.00 
[1]: Model without constant nor determinist trend, critical value = -1.95 ; [2]: Model 
with constant without determinist trend, critical value = -2.89 ; [3]: Model with constant 
and determinist trend, critical value = -3.45. The choice of lag order was based on 
Schwartz criteria.  
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Table B9: Descriptive statistics 
WITHIN-
COUNTRY 
Average road 
distance (kms) 
Standard deviation of relative prices   Half-live of shocks 
Obs Mean Std Max   Obs Mean Std Max 
BEN-BEN 382 39 0.19 0.06 0.34 
 
39 2.7 1.9 8.7 
BF-BF 328 135 0.14 0.05 0.31 
 
135 2.1 1.2 6.1 
CAM-CAM 466 21 0.13 0.07 0.24 
 
20 2.6 1.4 6.3 
CHAD-CHAD 536 20 0.19 0.05 0.29 
 
20 2.4 1.1 4.7 
CI-CI 319 21 0.12 0.02 0.17 
 
21 1.6 1.1 4.5 
GAM-GAM 158 170 0.11 0.07 0.31 
 
170 0.8 0.5 2.5 
GHA-GHA 301 132 0.24 0.11 0.63 
 
132 2.4 2.3 14.6 
GUI-GUI 544 6 0.11 0.02 0.14 
 
6 1.6 0.9 3.4 
MALI-MALI 490 746 0.10 0.04 0.25 
 
746 2.8 2.5 19.2 
MAU-MAU 653 6 0.17 0.03 0.20 
 
6 1.7 0.8 3.3 
NIGA-NIGA 544 58 0.17 0.05 0.28 
 
58 1.9 1.4 6.6 
NIG-NIG 570 895 0.12 0.05 0.28 
 
895 2.4 1.8 19.3 
SEN-SEN 270 593 0.12 0.03 0.20 
 
593 1.4 0.7 5.5 
TOG-TOG 335 54 0.25 0.08 0.41 
 
54 2.1 1.9 11.5 
Millet   646 0.12 0.03 0.26   646 1.7 1.1 7.9 
Sorghum 
 
739 0.14 0.05 0.41 
 
739 2.2 1.6 14.4 
Maize 
 
617 0.14 0.05 0.30 
 
617 1.9 1.2 7.6 
Cassava 
 
97 0.29 0.11 0.63 
 
97 2.8 2.8 14.6 
Local rice 
 
228 0.10 0.06 0.30 
 
228 1.9 1.0 6.0 
Imported rice   569 0.07 0.03 0.31   569 2.9 3.0 19.3 
Average values 429 2896 0.13 0.06 0.63   2896 2.2 1.9 19.3 
           
BETWEEN -
COUNTRY 
Average road 
distance (kms) 
Standard deviation of relative prices 
 
Half-live of shocks 
Obs Mean Std Max  Obs Mean Std Max 
BEN-BF 795 69 0.22 0.05 0.36 
 
69 2.8 1.2 6.0 
BEN-NIG 962 264 0.18 0.07 0.31 
 
264 3.1 1.9 12.3 
BEN-NIGA 638 63 0.22 0.05 0.34 
 
63 2.0 1.3 6.0 
BEN-TOG 376 111 0.22 0.07 0.35 
 
111 2.1 1.3 6.9 
BF-GHA 825 42 0.20 0.03 0.27 
 
42 1.4 0.9 4.9 
BF-MALI 719 488 0.14 0.05 0.35 
 
488 2.3 1.3 8.3 
BF-NIG 1090 614 0.16 0.04 0.38 
 
614 2.5 1.5 14.1 
BF-TOG 660 91 0.27 0.06 0.41 
 
91 2.5 1.4 5.8 
CAM-CHAD 1169 25 0.17 0.07 0.27 
 
25 2.2 1.3 6.7 
CAM-NIGA 1087 35 0.27 0.03 0.34 
 
35 5.0 2.0 9.1 
CHAD-NIG 1422 301 0.18 0.05 0.30 
 
301 2.4 1.3 7.6 
CHAD-NIGA 1383 79 0.22 0.04 0.28 
 
79 2.6 1.0 5.5 
CI-GHA 607 60 0.17 0.04 0.26 
 
60 2.0 0.9 4.6 
CI-GUI 905 24 0.17 0.02 0.22 
 
24 2.5 1.0 3.9 
CI-MALI 907 172 0.11 0.02 0.16 
 
172 2.1 1.6 10.6 
GAM-SEN 333 574 0.20 0.04 0.33 
 
574 2.7 2.1 19.5 
GHA-TOG 492 112 0.29 0.08 0.58 
 
112 2.9 2.8 19.4 
GUI-MALI 1003 72 0.14 0.02 0.20 
 
72 3.6 2.2 9.0 
GUI-SEN 1075 8 0.15 0.02 0.20 
 
8 3.2 1.5 5.2 
MALI-MAU 991 94 0.22 0.07 0.37 
 
94 3.9 2.4 17.3 
MALI-NIG 1617 1500 0.14 0.05 0.29 
 
1500 3.7 2.6 19.3 
MALI-SEN 1260 1161 0.17 0.04 0.29 
 
1161 4.8 3.1 19.8 
MAU-SEN 634 65 0.23 0.04 0.30 
 
65 3.8 1.9 11.0 
NIG-NIGA 693 417 0.18 0.05 0.31 
 
417 2.2 1.5 8.5 
Millet   1299 0.16 0.04 0.31   1299 3.2 2.8 19.8 
Sorghum 
 
2116 0.18 0.05 0.41 
 
2116 3.0 2.2 19.3 
Maize 
 
1632 0.19 0.05 0.35 
 
1632 3.0 1.9 17.9 
Cassava 
 
106 0.29 0.08 0.58 
 
106 3.0 2.9 19.4 
Local rice 
 
392 0.13 0.04 0.26 
 
392 2.4 1.5 9.0 
Imported rice   896 0.12 0.04 0.26   896 4.6 3.0 19.5 
Average values 1082 6441 0.17 0.06 0.58   6441 3.2 2.4 19.8 
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Table B10: Bilateral border effects 
 Standard deviation of real exchange rate Half-life of price deviations 
  Coeff. 
Dist. equivalent 
(kms) 
Coeff. 
Dist. equivalent 
(kms) 
    Log(distance) 
0.012*** 

0.296*** 
(0.001) 

(0.036) 

BEN-BF 
0.026*** 9 0.106 0 
(0.005) 

(0.180) 

BEN-NIG 
0.022*** 6 -0.034 0 
(0.004) 

(0.179) 

BEN-NIGA 
0.012* 3 -0.506** 0 
(0.007) 

(0.222) 

BEN-TOG 
0.007 0 -0.422** 0 
(0.005) 

(0.187) 

BF-GHA 
0.034*** 17 -1.074*** 0 
(0.005) 

(0.167) 

BF-MALI 
0.000 0 -0.398*** 0 
(0.002) 

(0.084) 

BF-NIG 
0.011*** 3 0.129* 2 
(0.002) 

(0.072) 

BF-TOG 
0.047*** 53 0.421*** 4 
(0.004) 

(0.126) 

CAM-CHAD 
0.015** 4 0.405 0 
(0.007) 

(0.274) 

CAM-NIGA 
0.061*** 167 1.822*** 471 
(0.009) 

(0.336) 

CHAD-NIG 
0.012* 3 0.020 0 
(0.006) 

(0.197) 

CHAD-NIGA 
0.029*** 12 0.301 0 
(0.008) 

(0.218) 

CI-GHA 
0.007* 2 -0.347** 0 
(0.004) 

(0.163) 

CI-GUI 
0.042*** 35 0.492 0 
(0.005) 

(0.403) 

CI-MALI 
0.006** 2 -0.346*** 0 
(0.002) 

(0.130) 

GAM-SEN 
0.063*** 194 1.58*** 208 
(0.002) 

(0.130) 

GHA-TOG 
0.027*** 9 0.231 0 
(0.006) 

(0.246) 

GUI-MALI 
0.045*** 44 1.624*** 241 
(0.004) 

(0.290) 

GUI-SEN 
0.068*** 298 2.988*** 24212 
(0.006) 

(0.343) 

MALI-MAU 
0.065*** 236 1.506*** 162 
(0.008) 

(0.315) 

MALI-NIG 
0.017*** 4 0.504*** 5 
(0.001) 

(0.091) 

MALI-SEN 
0.043*** 37 2.235*** 1902 
(0.001) 

(0.103) 

MAU-SEN 
0.078*** 702 2.4*** 3321 
(0.009) 

(0.279) 

NIG-NIGA 
0.018*** 5 0.132 0 
(0.004) 

(0.109) 
Observations 9,337 

9,337 
R-squared 0.865   0.56 
All regressions include market-product dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-
pairs. 
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Table B11: Upper and lower bounds. Dependent variable: standard deviation of relative prices 
  Average estimation Lower bound Upper bound 
  Coeff. 
Dist. 
equivalent 
(kms) 
Coeff. 
Dist. 
equivalent 
(kms) 
Ommitted 
dummy 
Coeff. 
Dist. 
equivalent 
(kms) 
Ommitted 
dummy 
      
 
    
Log(distance) 
0.012***   0.012***   0.012***   
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   
BEN-BF 
0.026*** 9 0.003 0 BEN 0.048*** 53 BF 
(0.005)   (0.006)   (0.004)   
BEN-NIG 
0.022*** 6 -0.018*** 0 BEN 0.047*** 49 NIG 
(0.004)   (0.006)   (0.003)   
BEN-NIGA 
0.012* 3 0.004 0 BEN 0.02** 5 NIGA 
(0.007)   (0.007)   (0.009)   
BEN-TOG 
0.007 0 -0.028*** 0 TOG 0.037*** 21 BEN 
(0.005)   (0.006)   (0.006)   
BF-GHA 
0.034*** 17 -0.013** 0 GHA 0.082*** 842 BF 
(0.005)   (0.006)   (0.005)   
BF-MALI 
0.000 0 -0.025*** 0 BF 0.026*** 8 MALI 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.002)   
BF-NIG 
0.011*** 3 0.00 0 BF 0.021*** 6 NIG 
(0.002)   (0.003)   (0.001)   
BF-TOG 
0.047*** 53 -0.008 0 TOGO 0.102*** 4581 BF 
(0.004)   (0.005)   (0.004)   
CAM-CHAD 
0.015** 4 -0.029** 0 CHAD 0.029*** 11 CAM 
(0.007)   (0.014)   (0.009)   
CAM-NIGA 
0.061*** 167 0.035*** 18 NIGA 0.082*** 842 CAM 
(0.009)   (0.011)   (0.010)   
CHAD-NIG 
0.012* 3 -0.024** 0 CHAD 0.037*** 21 NIG 
(0.006)   (0.012)   (0.002)   
CHAD-NIGA 
0.029*** 12 0.025** 8 CHAD 0.037*** 21 NIGA 
(0.008)   (0.012)   (0.008)   
CI-GHA 
0.007* 2 -0.048*** 0 GHA 0.061*** 150 CI 
(0.004)   (0.004)   (0.005)   
CI-GUI 
0.042*** 35 0.032*** 14 CI 0.053*** 80 GUI 
(0.005)   (0.006)   (0.009)   
CI-MALI 
0.006** 2 -0.013*** 0 CI 0.023*** 6 MALI 
(0.002)   (0.004)   (0.001)   
GAM-SEN 
0.063*** 194 0.051*** 68 GAM 0.074*** 468 SEN 
(0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)   
GHA-TOG 
0.027*** 9 0.017** 4 TOGO 0.033*** 15 GHA 
(0.006)   (0.007)   (0.006)   
GUI-MALI 
0.045*** 44 0.038*** 23 GUI 0.052*** 74 MALI 
(0.004)   (0.008)   (0.003)   
GUI-SEN 
0.068*** 298 0.059*** 132 SEN 0.076*** 539 GUI 
(0.006)   (0.008)   (0.010)   
MALI-MAU 
0.065*** 236 0.027** 9 MAU 0.104*** 5405 MALI 
(0.008)   (0.011)   (0.006)   
MALI-NIG 
0.017*** 4 0.001 0 NIG 0.031*** 13 MALI 
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.002)   
MALI-SEN 
0.043*** 37 0.027*** 9 SEN 0.058*** 122 MALI 
(0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   
MAU-SEN 
0.078*** 702 0.056*** 99 MAU 0.102*** 4581 SEN 
(0.009)   (0.010)   (0.004)   
NIG-NIGA 
0.018*** 5 -0.007 0 NIGA 0.042*** 31 NIG 
(0.004)   (0.007)     (0.002)     
All regressions include market-product dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by market-
pairs. Dependent variable: Standard deviation of relative prices 
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† This chapter has been published under the reference: Araujo, C., Araujo-Bonjean, C., & Brunelin, S. (2012). 
Alert at Maradi: Preventing Food Crises by using Price Signals. World Development, 40(9), 1882-1894. The 
indicators defined in this chapter are currently being used by the World Food Program to detect abnormally high 
food prices. 
Chapter 3: Alert at Maradi: Preventing food crises by using price signals 
3.1. Introduction 
Countries located in the Sahel region of Africa are repeatedly confronted by episodes of rapid 
increase in grain prices resulting in food crises, sometimes acute, as in Niger in 2005. This 
crisis highlighted the weaknesses of the early warning system which failed to anticipate the 
crisis, and under-estimated its extent. In Niger, as in the other countries of the Sahel region, 
the food crisis prevention systems remain primarily oriented towards the detection of food 
production deficits. In these countries, food insecurity is above all the consequence of 
insufficient food production, which results from adverse weather conditions. As a 
consequence, the present early warning systems focus on monitoring the conditions of food 
crops and estimating food availability. 
However, in spite of the significant resources used at the national and international level to 
assess future food availability (e.g. yearly agricultural surveys, monitoring of the crop season, 
weather forecasting models and agro-climatic models based on satellite data, etc), the exercise 
remains difficult, politically sensitive, and prone to controversy. For example, marketing year 
2004/05, initially considered as one of the best years ever known in the Sahel, finally proved 
to be a deficit year (Egg and al., 2006). Also regional dialogue within the framework of the 
food crisis prevention network in Sahel and West Africa regularly exhibits large 
inconsistencies between the forecasts established by bordering countries.  
Furthermore, production forecasts provided in the Cereal Balance Sheet, which also integrates 
stocks and trade estimates are generally published in late October after the beginning of the 
harvest. These figures are then adjusted between January and March when yield data collected 
through the agricultural survey become available. As a consequence, production forecasts do 
not really provide early information about the state of future food availability. Assessing the 
level of stocks and trade flows constitutes another major difficulty when estimating food 
availability. Grain storage is handled by private agents who are reluctant to give such strategic 
information, while grain trade with neighboring countries usually takes place in the informal 
sector and is mostly unregistered. As a consequence the information on production forecasts, 
initial stocks and trade provided in the Cereal Balance Sheet, is generally considered to be of 
poor quality. 
Paradoxically, little attention is paid to the information conveyed by market prices. In some 
countries such as Niger, occasional vulnerability analyses aimed at identifying the populations 
at risk, and targeting interventions, are conducted when production forecasts are alarming. In 
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these analyses, food price information is considered as an indicator of the ability of the 
households to ensure access to markets to compensate for food deficit. 
But the information provided by market prices could also be used to forecast future crises. 
Indeed, if markets are efficient, prices at any given time fully reflect all available information 
not only on current food availability but also on agents’ expectations about future scarcity 
(see for instance Ravallion, 1985; Deaton and Laroque, 1992). Price changes are driven by the 
arrival of new information in the market, and any new information on future market 
conditions is immediately reflected in prices. Thus, it is expected that prices reflect the 
available information on the future harvest very early in the crop season. Of course, if markets 
are not efficient due to agents’ irrational behaviour, or informational failures, market prices 
may not reflect the actual state of food availability. In that case the information provided by 
market prices will not be exploitable by an early warning system.   
In this paper, it is argued that the information provided by market prices can usefully 
complement existing early warning systems which tend to privilege biophysical models. The 
objective is to use price data to consolidate food security forecasts, and build indicators to 
alert policymakers as to when a future crisis can be expected. In other words, the aim of this 
research is to exploit the statistical properties of grain price data to detect the warning signs of 
a looming crisis, early in the crop marketing year. 
The analysis focuses on three countries – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – and a local crop – 
millet – which plays an essential role in the diets of Sahelian populations. Price data come 
from the national Systèmes d’Information sur les Marchés of each country. The paper is 
organized in the following manner. Section two stresses the important role of millet in food 
security and sets out the main characteristics of the sample markets. Section three is devoted 
to identifying the markets that play a leading role in influencing prices at the national and 
regional level. Section four presents an analysis of millet price dynamics aimed at identifying 
the price crises during the sample period, and characterizing the price behaviour during the 
period preceding a crisis. Section five is dedicated to the identification of warning indicators. 
These indicators are based on the difference between the current price and its long run value 
measured at the beginning of the harvest season. The relevance of these indicators is tested in 
section six. The final section presents conclusions. 
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3.2. Context and sample description 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger belong to the same regional integration area (ECOWAS) and to 
a common monetary union (UEMOA). These countries share many other common 
characteristics that call for a regional approach to food crisis prevention. We first stress the 
role of millet in food security, and then present the markets under study and the data set. 
3.2.1. The critical role of millet in food security 
The Sahel is one of the poorest regions of the world and millet is the main grain crop. Nigeria 
is the largest producer, with 54% of West African millet production.  Niger is the second 
producing country with 21% of West African production, ahead of Mali and Burkina Faso 
(Table 3.1). Northern Nigeria and South Niger belong to the same production basin, which is 
the largest in West Africa, while Burkina Faso and Mali belong to the second production 
basin of the region (Soulé and Gansari, 2010).  
Table 3.1: Millet production and supply 
  Burkina Faso Mali Niger 
Millet production in 2008 (tons) 1 255 190 1 413 910 3 489 390 
Millet production in  % of West Africa production (2008) 8 8 21 
Millet production in  % of total cereal production (2008) 29 29 72 
Millet supply (kg/capita/year) in 2007 70.3 65.8 137.8 
Total food supply (kcal/capita/day)  (2007) 2677 2614 2376 
Millet supply in % total food supply (2007) 21 21 39 
Source: FAOSTAT. Millet supply = Production + Imports + ΔStocks – Exports – Seed – other utilizations 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are closely tied through millet trade flows.  Niger is structurally 
an importer of millet. Its main source of imports is Nigeria, but imports from Burkina Faso 
and Mali have been expanding during the last decade. While millet is the subject of intensive 
cross-border trade in West Africa it is not traded internationally. As a consequence millet 
price variations in the sub-region mainly reflect changes in local supply conditions, demand 
being less volatile. 
The millet growing season varies from year to year according to the start of the rains, but 
generally begins in April and ends in October. Usually, sowing takes place from May to 
August. Harvest starts in October and lasts until December. Part of millet production is sold at 
harvest by farmers to meet their financial needs. The other part, intended for family 
consumption and seed production, is stored on the farm until the next season or beyond; 
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indeed millet can be stored without damage for more than a year. The wholesalers hold grain 
stocks for generally short periods, not more than two or three months (Aker, 2010). The 
public authorities also manage food stocks that are built up at the beginning of the year 
(February-March), and which are intended to be sold on the market in the following months. 
Millet prices are characterized by large seasonal fluctuations especially in Niger, due to the 
seasonal pattern of the production cycle. Prices are lowest during the harvest and post-harvest 
period (October to February). Then they gradually rise to reach their maximum level at the 
end of the lean season (May to August in Niger; June to October in Mali and Burkina Faso) 
which precedes the new harvest and during which farmers’ stocks are depleted.  
Millet and sorghum are the staple diet, especially in rural areas. According to the latest 
available data, millet supply represents more than 20% of total food supply in Mali and 
Burkina Faso, and almost 40% in Niger (Table 3.1). In that context, a millet price increase 
may have dramatic consequences on food security by directly affecting the entitlement set of 
poor people (Sen, 1981).  
Sharp rises in grain prices generally follow a crop failure due to bad weather conditions. 
Indeed, rain fed farming is the dominant production system and is highly vulnerable to 
climatic shocks, especially to drought. It should be stressed that the price increase does not 
necessarily reflect the severity of the food deficit. As shown by Sen (1981) the food price 
increase may be exacerbated by market failures – excessive hoarding or inadequate spatial 
arbitrage – so that a modest decline in food availability may generate large price variations.  
The impact of a food price increase on food security is biggest when the exogenous shock 
also affects other sources of entitlement, such as wages, assets and transfers (Ravallion, 1997; 
O’Grada, 2007). This is typically the case during drought periods in Mali, Niger and Burkina 
Faso. The millet price is positively correlated with other local grain prices, and negatively 
correlated with the price of livestock, an asset which is typically held as a buffer stock in this 
region. As a consequence, the possibilities for substitution in consumption are limited, while 
livestock sales do not compensate for losses in income. More generally, the literature shows 
that insurance mechanisms against income shocks are weak, and only allow for partial 
consumption smoothing in African developing countries (see for instance, Kazianga and 
Udry, 2006).  
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3.2.2. The sample markets 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger share a harmonized system for collecting price information on 
grain markets. In each country a market information system (MIS) was started in the early 
90s. The implementation of these devices was part of the measures accompanying the 
liberalization of the agricultural sector within the framework of structural adjustment 
programs. The aim was to increase market efficiency after the withdrawal of the State from 
the production and marketing of agricultural products. 
MISs collect market prices for major agricultural products (but also livestock) and 
disseminate this information to producers, consumers and traders through the media. They 
have now accumulated a large amount of information and can trace the evolution of food 
prices in a wide geographical area and for a wide range of commodities. 
Map 3.1: Millet markets studied 
 
Source: the authors 
We selected a sample of 44 millet markets from the markets covered by the MISs: l5 markets 
in Niger, 12 in Burkina Faso, and 17 in Mali (see Table C1 in the appendix). Market selection 
was based on the quality of available information: markets for which too much data is missing 
were dropped. As can be seen in table D1 and map 3.1, the selected sample includes a variety 
of markets that differ according to their location: remote area, border proximity, production 
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area or urban area. The observation period starts in January 1990 in Niger, January 1992 in 
Burkina Faso and February 1993 in Mali.18 
3.3. The leading markets 
The main objective of this part of the analysis is to identify markets whose prices can help in 
forecasting the future value of prices in other domestic and regional markets. These “leading 
markets” are identified using Granger causality tests that are conducted in a multivariate 
vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. 
3.3.1. The VAR model 
 The main advantage of the VAR model is that it takes into account the fact that prices 
are determined simultaneously on a set of markets, as well as the dynamic nature of price 
adjustments. Each price is considered as endogenous and is expressed as a function of the 
lagged values of all of the endogenous variables in the system. The estimated model is given 
by:          

=
− ++=
p
i
titit PA
1
ξγP  (1) 
Pt is a k vector of real prices, Ai is a matrix of coefficients to be estimated and ξt is a vector of 
innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are uncorrelated with their own 
lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables.  
E(ξt) = 0 ; E(ξtξt’) = Σ (an m × m positive semi definite matrix) ; E(ξt ξt’’) = 0 for all t ≠ t’. 
t = 1, …, T. T = 201 for Burkina Faso, T = 226 for Niger and T = 191 for Mali. 
The lag order p is selected using the Schwarz information criterion. Prices are deflated by the 
domestic consumer price index (base 2000 = 100).  
3.3.2. The Granger causality test 
The Granger causality tests indicate whether there is a statistically significant relationship 
between current prices on market i and lagged prices on market j. They consist of standard F-
test, equation by equation, for the joint hypothesis of nullity of some of the coefficients of the 
                                                 
18 The MIS of Niger also covers five markets located in northern Nigeria and one market in northern Benin. 
Unfortunately the observation period is quite short for these markets (2000-2008) so they cannot be incorporated 
in the following econometric analysis despite their importance in regional trade. 
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VAR system. In the null hypothesis (Pj does not cause Pi), the coefficients of the lagged 
prices in market j in the Pi equation, are null. 
The Granger causality tests do not reveal the structural nature of the relationship between 
prices (the parameters are not readily interpretable), and do not provide information about the 
causal factors that lead to dynamic adjustments between prices. According to the Granger 
approach, Pi is said to be Granger caused by Pj if Pj helps in the prediction of Pi. The Granger 
causality test does not by itself indicate causality, but identifies precedence between two 
variables and measures the information content of lagged variables. This test can therefore be 
used to identify markets whose prices can help in forecasting future prices in other markets. 
We consider as leading markets, those markets that Granger cause a large number of other 
markets, but are themselves Granger caused by only a few markets. In other words, lagged 
prices in leading markets play a significant role in influencing current prices in other markets 
and can help to predict the latter. In addition, prices in leading markets are weakly exogenous 
(i.e. they do not depend on the lagged prices of the other markets in the sample). 
The Granger causality tests are first performed using a VAR model specific to each country, 
incorporating all the markets of that country. This approach allows identification of the 
leading markets in each country. Secondly, causality tests are performed on a regional VAR 
model limited to 25 markets of the sub-region.19  
3.3.3. Results 
To identify the leading markets, markets are ranked according to two criteria: the number of 
markets that are Granger caused by each market, and the number of markets that each market 
Granger causes. We consider as a leading market at the domestic level, a market that causes 
more than half of the sample markets (i.e. at least seven markets in Burkina Faso, nine 
markets in Mali, and eight markets in Niger). It appears that these markets are also caused by 
a small number of markets (less than 30%). As can be seen in figure 3.1, these criteria are 
highly discriminating. Only a few markets are classified as “leading markets” (Table 3.2): 
Gaya and Maradi in Niger; Dori, Tenkodogo and Banfora in Burkina Faso; Nara and 
Koulikoro in Mali. Nara and Dori are on the limit for consideration as leading markets; they 
could have been considered as non leading markets. Indeed, the subsequent analysis shows 
that the pertinence of alert indicators based on Nara prices is doubtful. 
                                                 
19 The regional sample includes:  8 markets in Niger, 7 in Burkina Faso, and 10 in Mali. 
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Figure 3.1: Granger causality test results 
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These results are not surprising for Maradi and Gaya. Maradi is one of the most important 
markets of Southern Niger, the main producing region. Gaya is located on the border with 
Benin and is one of the main gateways for grain imports. In Mali, Koulikoro is an important 
wholesale market located in the same region as Nara. In Burkina Faso, Dori is an important 
wholesale market for millet in the Sahel region, and is close to the border with Niger. Banfora 
is located at the intersection of major roads, close to the borders of both Mali and Ivory Coast, 
and is also close to Bobo Dioulasso the second city in Burkina Faso. Tenkodogo is located in 
a major production area.  
Table 3.2: Leading markets 
    
Number of markets that are Granger caused 
by market X 
Number of markets that Granger cause 
market X 
  Market X National levela Regional levelb National levela Regional levelb 
Niger  Gaya  10 3 1 3 
 
Maradi 9 8 2 3 
Burkina 
Faso  
Banfora 9 7 1 3 
 
Dori 7 9 3 2 
 
Tenkodogo 8 9 3 2 
Mali  Koulikoro 10 3 3 5 
  Nara  10 0 5 4 
a: results from the VAR model estimated on a  market sample restricted to domestic markets.  
b: results from the VAR model estimated on the regional market sample (25 markets). Only markets belonging to 
foreign countries are accounted for in these calculations.  
At the regional level, the analysis confirms the leading role of Maradi: prices in this market 
Granger cause those of 8 markets in Burkina Faso and Mali (Table 3.2). The leading role of 
Maradi probably reflects the influence of Nigeria on millet prices within the whole sub 
region. The markets of Dori and Tenkodogo also confirm their leading market status at the 
regional level. In contrast, Gaya (Niger), Nara (Mali) and Banfora (Burkina Faso) which 
appeared to be leading markets at the national level, do not play a significant role at the 
regional level.  
In summary, the causality tests highlight the important role of a small number of markets at 
the national and regional level, namely: Maradi, Dori and Tenkodogo, and to a lesser extent, 
Gaya, Nara and Koulikoro. Priority should be given to the monitoring of these markets whose 
lagged prices can help to predict the prices of other markets, in the framework of an early 
warning system. 
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3.4. Price crisis characteristics 
The approach consists of firstly identifying price crises, and then characterizing the price 
behaviour during periods that precede crises. 
3.4.1. Identifying price crises 
The stationarity tests (Table C1 in the Appendix) reject the presence of a unit root, and lead to 
the consideration of all the price series as trend stationary. The price trend (2) is estimated for 
each market’s price over the whole period. The seasonal dummies Ms, catch the monthly price 
fluctuations related to the production cycle, and the trend T, captures long term movements 
(e.g. related to population growth): 
t
s
ststt MbaTP ζ++= 
=
12
1  
(2) 
with: 
Pt the current millet price at time t and ζt an iid random variable with: ( )2,0~ ζσζ Nt . 
The coefficient’s stability is tested using the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test20 for 158 
possible breakpoint dates in the period 1990-2008 in Niger, 131 for Mali and 139 for Burkina 
Faso21. The tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks. 
In the following we consider that there is a crisis at time t on the market under consideration if 
the spread between the observed price, Pt, and its trend value, tP

, is greater than one standard 
deviation, i.e. if:  
It = Itt PP σ≥− ˆ   (3) 
                                                 
20 Test for one or more unknown structural breakpoints in the sample. 
21 According to a 15% trimming procedure that excludes the first and last 7.5% of the observations. 
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Figure 3.2: Millet prices in the capital cities (Fcfa/kg) 
 
Gray: crises common to the three countries 
Source: MIS’s and authors' calculations 
According to our definition of crisis, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger experienced three 
common price crises in 1998, 2002 and 2005 (Figure 3.2). In addition to these shared major 
crises the three countries were affected by crises of smaller magnitude: 1997 in Niger, 1996 in 
Mali and Burkina Faso, 2001 in Niger and Burkina Faso, 2003 in Mali. Most of these price 
crises resulted from a drop in production, but the correlation between price and supply shocks 
is fairly weak (Araujo and Brunelin, 2010). In 2008, a few episodes of short-term crises were 
recorded, limited to a small number of millet markets in Niger and Burkina Faso. These crises 
were of lesser importance, and 2008 cannot be considered as a crisis year in the millet 
markets. 
 3.4.2. Dating price crises 
A deeper analysis shows that crises break out during the lean period and are preceded by a 
period of high prices that can be regarded as an alert phase. This phenomenon is most obvious 
in Niger where crises erupt in April, and end in September. They are preceded by a period 
running from September/October to March during which prices are above their trend value. 
For example in Maradi, millet prices were above their trend value from September 1996 to 
March 1997, and the crisis broke out in April 1998 (Figure 3.3). At Gaya, prices were above 
their trend value from September 1996 to January 1997, and the crisis broke out in January 
1997. 
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Figure 3.3: Maradi (Niger). Alert and crisis phases over the period 01/1990 to 10/2008 
 
Crisis phase: 1/ ≥ItI σ  ;  alert phase: 0/ >ItI σ  
In Mali, crises occur later in the year, erupting in May/June and ending in October/November. 
This lag follows the harvest calendar that starts later in Mali. These crises are preceded by a 
period of high prices running from October to May. Thus, for example, the 1996 crisis that 
broke out in May/June on the 17 markets of the sample was preceded by a period running 
from October 1995 to April 1996 during which prices in almost all the markets were above 
their trend value (see Figure 3.4 as an illustration). The 1999 crisis was preceded in all 
markets, except Koulikoro, by a phase of high prices that began in December 1998. The 2002 
crisis, the most severe, was preceded by particularly high prices starting in September 2001. 
In contrast, the 2002 crisis started very early in the year, in October or November for most 
markets. 
Figure 3.4: Nara (Mali). Alert and crisis phases over the period 02/1993 to 12/2008 
 
Crisis phase: 1/ ≥ItI σ  ;  alert phase: 0/ >ItI σ  
In Burkina Faso, as in Mali, crises occur generally in May or June, and are preceded by 
positive shocks, but of lower magnitude, from November or December. For instance, the 1996 
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crisis was preceded by a period of high prices starting from November 1995 in Banfora, and 
Tenkodogo, and from January 1996 in Dori (Figure 3.5). 
Figure 3.5: Dori (Burkina Faso). Alert and crisis phases over the period 01/1992 to 10/2008 
 
Crisis phase: 1/ ≥ItI σ  ;  alert phase: 0/ >ItI σ  
In short, over the period studied, crises break out at the beginning of the lean season, and 
reach their climax at the end of the lean season. They are usually preceded by a warning 
phase, characterized by prices higher than their trend value during the harvest period. 
3.5. Warning indicators 
The above observations lead to the proposition of warning indicators based on the gap 
between prices and their trend value during the harvest and post-harvest period. Different 
indicators are proposed, whose relevance is tested using nonlinear panel models.  
These indicators aim at capturing as soon as possible the price movements which herald a 
price crisis. Special attention is paid to the markets previously identified as leading markets. 
Three types of indicators are proposed being designed to capture the intensity and the spatial 
extent of the price distortions during the alert phase. 
First, for each leading market (l), we define a binary warning indicator (Alr) equal to 1 if the 
market registers a positive shock during the month r of the harvest period that runs from 
October to March: 
Alr = 1 if 0ˆ >−= lrlrlr PPI  ; = 0 otherwise  (4) 
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Second, vigilance should increase with the magnitude of the price disequilibrium that is 
captured by an indicator of the intensity of the alert (AIlr): 
Ilrlr IAI σ/=   (5) 
This indicator is calculated for each leading market (l) and each month (r) of the alert period. 
Third, the alert should go up if many markets are simultaneously on alert. An indicator of the 
spatial extent of the alert (AEnr) is therefore given by the number of markets on alert during 
the month r in the country n:  

=
=
m
i
irnr AAE
1
 ; m = number of markets in country n. (6) 
Four limitations of these warning indicators must be underlined. First, while most of the price 
crises are preceded by an alert phase, not all phases of alert lead to a crisis. Thus, in 1990, 
1991 and 2003 in Niger, prices were above their trend value over the period September to 
December, but the bubble burst in March or April of the next year (Figure 3.3). In general, 
after an alert phase, it is observed that either the crisis occurs, or the bubble bursts in March or 
April. In the latter case, the alert can be lifted by the end of April. 
Second, the alert phase can sometimes be short, and so the crisis not anticipated. This is the 
case for Niger in 2001 - the crisis occurred suddenly in Gaya and N’Guigmi in April 2001, 
without being preceded by an alert phase. In this case, however, the alert could have been 
given in September at Maradi. In Burkina Faso also, the 2001 crisis broke out suddenly in 
March/April 2001 without a generalized warning phase. We note however, that Dori, 
identified as a leading market in the above analysis, had been on alert since November 2001. 
Third, after a crisis prices return to the normal level, but the process may take time so that 
predicting prices for the following year can be difficult. Prices tend to return slowly to their 
trend value after a crisis, so that the alert holds, sometimes unnecessarily, until May/June of 
the next year. This is the case, for example, in Mali after the 1996 crisis (Figure 3.4). Malian 
prices in all the markets of the sample were above their trend value until spring 1997, 
inferring that the warning indicators would have been activated until April/May 1997. 
Finally, some markets, such as Kayes and N'Guimi, exhibit atypical behaviour. In Kayes, 
crises tend to erupt a few months later (July/August) than in other Malian markets, and prices 
revert more slowly to their long-run equilibrium. This phenomenon can be explained by the 
relative isolation of these two markets, and delays in price shocks transmission.  
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3.6. Predictive power of early warning indicators 
The predictive power of the early warning indicators defined above is tested econometrically 
using three types of nonlinear panel models: a probit model, a count data model, and a Tobit 
model22. Each model allows for time specific random effects.23 The sample set consists of the 
three countries and a 19 year period of annual observations (1990 – 2008). 
1. The first model (probit) seeks to explain the likelihood of a price crisis in country n at 
year t. The outcome, ynt, is a binary variable that takes 1 if the country is in crisis at year t, and 
0 otherwise. We consider that the country n is in crisis at year t if the mean crisis indicator, 
E(I), calculated on the sample of the m markets of the country during the lean period (S) of 
year t, is greater than one (Table 3.3). Let:



−=
=
)1yprobabilitwith (0
)yprobabilitwith (1
py
py
nt
nt  
A regression model is created by parametrizing the probability p to depend on a regressor 
vector of warning indicator (x), a parameter vector β and time-specific effects. The 
conditional probability is given by: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]0Pr0Pr,,1Pr >+′=>== ∗ ntntnttntnt uxyxy βαβ  with, nttntu εα +=  
y*: latent variable. n denotes the n-th country, t the t-th time period; αt captures the time-
specific unobserved effects assumed to be constant over individuals, ( )2,0~ ασα iidt ; εnt, is an 
idiosyncratic error satisfying the usual assumptions: ( )2,0~ εσε iidnt , E(xnt, εnt) = 0 and Cov 
(εnt , εn’t’) = V(εnt) = 1, if n = n’ and t = t’ , or 0 otherwise. The unobservable time-specific 
effects are correlated neither with errors nor each explanatory variable.   
The proportion of the total variance contributed by the time-level variance component is 
given by:
12
2
+
=
α
α
σ
σ
ρ . When ρ is zero, the time-level variance component is unimportant and 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator.  
                                                 
22 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Wooldridge (2010) for a review of these models. 
23 A qualitative response model with fixed effects is confronted by the incidental parameters problem. In a fixed 
effects model the specific effects may be correlated with the regressors, generally leading to inconsistent 
estimation of all parameters (Lancaster, 2000).   
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2. The second estimated model is a count data model that seeks to explain the extent of 
the crisis. The dependent variable, ynt, is a count of the number of markets across country n 
which experienced at least one episode of crisis during the lean season of the year t (Table 
3.3).   
ynt, takes on non-negative integer values, including zero: {0, 1, 2, …}. 
The basic Poisson probability specification is: ( ) ( )
!
Prob
y
e
xyfxy
y
λ
λ−
== , where y! is y 
factorial ; ( ) ( )xyVxyE =≡λ . 
Following Hausman et al. (1984), we consider the random effects panel Poisson specification 
where the Poisson parameter is specified as: 0
~
,
~
>== +
′
nt
x
tntnt
tnte λαλλ µβ ; tet
µα = are the 
time-specific effects (unobserved); xnt is a vector of warning indicators. It is assumed that αt is 
distributed as a gamma random variable: αt ~ Γ(η,η), with E(αt) = 1,V(αt) = δ. Note that 
when δ is zero the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. 
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Table 3.3: Price crises in millet markets 
  Country in crisisa 
No. of markets affected by  a 
crisisb 
Crisis intensityc 
 
Burkina Faso  Niger  Mali  
Burkina 
Niger  Mali  
Burkina 
Niger  Mali  
Faso Faso 
1990 - 0 - - 0 - - 0 - 
1991 - 0 - - 1 - - 0 - 
1992 0 0 
 
0 0 - 0 0 - 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 1 0 1 11 1 17 2 0.1 4 
1997 0 1 0 2 14 0 0.1 1.5 0 
1998 1 1 1 12 15 15 3.3 3.9 2.6 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 1 0 11 14 6 1.6 1.8 0.5 
2002 1 1 1 12 15 17 1.7 1.8 4.4 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 13 0 0 0.9 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 1 12 15 17 4.3 3 4.6 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 3 3 0 0.3 0.1 0 
a Variable equal to one if the mean crisis indicator, E(I), calculated on the sample of the m markets of the country 
in question during the lean period (S) of year t is greater than one; = 0 otherwise, with : 
( ) 
= =
=
m
i
S
s I
isI
Sm
IE
1 1
11
σ
 and isisis PPI ˆ−=  
b Number of markets that have experienced at least one episode of crisis during the lean season.  
c Intensity of the crisis = E(I) if E(I) > 0; =0 otherwise 
Number of markets in the sample: Burkina Faso 12; Niger 15; Mali 17. 
Lean season in Mali and Burkina Faso: June to October. Lean season in Niger: May to August. 
3. The third model to be estimated is a limited dependent variable model (standard 
censored Tobit) that seeks to explain the intensity of the crisis (Table 3.3) where 
ynt ∈ [0 ; +∞[ 
The censored regression Tobit model expresses the observed response, ynt, in terms of an 
underlying latent variable ntntnt uxy +
′= β*  
with 



=
>=
therwiseoy
yifyy
nt
ntntnt
0
0**
  ; t = 1990, …, T ; n = 1, …, N . 
xnt is a vector of warning indicators; β is a vector of parameters to be estimated; unt is a 
random variable, nttntu εα += , defined as above. 
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The independent variables in the probit, Tobit and count models are the warning indicators 
defined above: a binary warning indicator for each leading market (Alr), an indicator of the 
alert intensity for each leading market (AIlr), and the number of markets on alert (AEnr).  
The test strategy consists in successively introducing the monthly warning indicators into the 
regressions, starting with the earliest indicator (October) and ending with the last one 
(March). The testing procedure stops when the alert indicator enters significantly in the 
regression. This procedure allows both for testing the adequacy of warning indicators, and 
identifying those which detect a looming crisis earliest. 
Table 3.4 gives the marginal effects of the exogenous variables derived from the probit 
model. The share of the specific component (ρ) is quite high and significant, which means 
that the panel estimation is more relevant than the pooling estimation (see the likelihood ratio 
test). 
The warning indicator for Maradi is significant from November; its marginal effect on the 
probability of crisis is 56% (Table 3.4, column 1). According to these results, if the millet 
price in Maradi is above its trend value during November, the likelihood of a widespread 
crisis arising six to seven months later is 56%. The probability of crisis also increases by, 
respectively, 33%, 50% and 34%, if the markets of Gaya, Dori, and Tenkodogo are on alert in 
November. However, an alert at Nara cannot be considered as a significant harbinger of a 
crisis until December. 
The marginal effect of an alert in Maradi during the month of November is high, both in 
absolute terms, and relative to the marginal effect of an alert in any of the other leading 
markets considered. These results confirm the importance of monitoring price movements in 
Maradi. 
The variable "number of markets on alert" is also significant from November (Table 3.4, 
columns 6-10). The marginal effect of the number of markets on alert in November on the 
probability of crisis is 7%, and this effect increases over time - it increases to 10% in 
December, 11% in January, 13% in February, and 17% in March. 
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Table 3.4: Probit model - Marginal effects. Dependent variable = 1 if the country is in crisis; = 0 otherwise 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
A
le
rt
 a
t l
ea
di
ng
 m
ar
ke
t 
Maradi November 
(Niger) 
0.558 
[0.043] 
          
Gaya November 
(Niger) 
 0.326 
[0.077] 
         
Dori November 
(Mali) 
  0.500 
[0.043] 
        
Tenkodogo Nov. 
(Burkina Faso) 
   0.340 
[0.061] 
       
Nara December 
(Mali) 
    0.498 
[0.118] 
      
N
um
be
r 
of
 m
ar
ke
ts
 o
n 
al
er
t 
November 
     0.067 
[0.097] 
     
December 
      0.104 
[0.020] 
    
January 
       0.106 
[0.012] 
   
February 
        0.128 
[0.007] 
  
March 
         0.172 
[0.042] 
 
A
I Maradi November 
          0.736 
[0.060] 
            
Log-likelihood - 17.476 -19.446 - 17.677 - 18.439 - 18.479 - 19.340 - 17.474 - 17.505 - 15.382 - 12.885 - 15.954 
 0.80 0.89 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.80 0.78 
LR ( = 0) 8.43 
[0.002] 
13.73 
[0.000] 
11.68 
[0.000] 
13.42 
[0.000] 
13.87 
[0.000] 
13.93 
[0.000] 
12.32 
[0.000] 
12.89 
[0.000] 
9.75 
[0.001] 
5.47 
[0.010] 
7.42 
[0.003] 
Number of observations 51 51 48 48 45 49 49 52 52 52 51 
Intercept not reported. AI: intensity of the alert on the leading market. 
P-values are in brackets. Approximation method of the log-likelihood: adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Naylor – Smith, 1982). 
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The alert intensity, which is measured as the price deviation from its trend value relative to its 
standard deviation, appears to be a good indicator of the occurrence of a crisis. This indicator 
is more relevant than the scope of the alert, which is caught by the number of markets on 
alert. Indeed, the marginal effect of the alert intensity at Maradi on the probability of crisis is 
as high as 74% for the month of November (Table 3.4). In other words, the higher the price 
increases in Maradi at the beginning of the season relatively to its trend value, the greater the 
likelihood of a widespread crisis. 
Table 3.5: Probit model - Goodness-of-fit 
  Alert at the leading market: Number of markets on alert in: Alert intensity 
 
Maradi Gaya  Dori Tenkodogo Nara  
Nov Dec. Jan. Feb Mar. 
at Maradi 
Nov Nov. Nov. Nov. Dec. Nov 
1. % of observations 
correctly predicted 
0.78 0.71 0.71 0.65 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.92 0.76 
2. % of crises 
correctly predicted 
0.86 0.71 0.86 0.86 0.64 0.07 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.93 0.50 
3. % of false alarms 
in total alarms 
0.43 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.19 0.42 
4. % prob. of crisis 
given no alarm 
0.07 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.03 0.18 
Cut-off probability of 30 % 
1. (correct prediction of no crisis + correct prediction of crises) / total observations; 2. Correct prediction of 
crises / all true crises; 3. False alarms / total alarms; 4. Missing alarms / all predicted non-crises 
 
Any early warning system (EWS) is confronted by two drawbacks: the number of false alarms 
(Type 2 errors), and the number of missing alarms (Type 1 errors). Table 3.5 presents some 
indicators of the predictive quality of the probit model based on the percentage of Type 1 and 
Type 2 errors, using a cut-off probability equal to 0.324. Choosing a low cut-off means 
considering that missing a crisis is more costly than a false alarm (i.e. an alarm not followed 
by a crisis). Given the potential cost of a food crisis this assumption seems reasonable, even if 
the cost of preventive measures should not be ignored in case of a false alarm. Table 3.5 
highlights once again the higher performance of an EWS based on Maradi price signals. This 
model correctly predicts 86% of price crises, with a probability of crisis given no alarm of 
only 7%, but at the expense of a 43% rate of false alarms.  
The results from the count data model (Table 3.6) confirm the previous ones. They show that 
the warning indicator for Maradi significantly explains, from November onwards, the extent 
                                                 
24 The cut-off is the threshold probability above which the predicted probability is interpreted as a signal of a 
coming crisis. The lower (higher) the threshold, the more (less) signals the model will send at the expense of 
raising the number of false alarms (missing crisis) (see for instance Berg and Patillo, 1999). 
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of the crisis to come, although only at the 10% significance level in November. The same 
applies for Dori’s warning indicator from December onwards. Specifically, the incidence rate 
ratio (IRR)25 shows that when Maradi (Dori) goes on alert in November (December) the 
predicted number of markets in crisis increases by a factor of 6.725 (6.786). An alert in Gaya 
in February is a significant predictor of an impending and generalized crisis. We note that an 
alert in Nara or Tenkodogo does not significantly predict the extent of the future crisis. 
Table 3.6: Estimation results for the count data model: Incidence rate ratio. 
Dependent variable: Number of markets that have experienced at least one episode of crisis 
during the lean season 
Alert at leading market Obs Number of markets on alert Obs Alert intensity in Maradi Obs 
Maradi November 6.725 
[0.083] 
51 November n.s. 49 November n.s. 51 
Nara  n.s. 45 December 1.068 
[0.030] 
49 December 13.214 
[0.086] 
51 
Dori December 6.786 
[0.071] 
48 January 1.091 
[0.043] 
52 January 4.807 
[0.023] 
52 
Tenkodogo  n.s. 48 February 1.130 
[0.001] 
52 February 11.593 
[0.027] 
52 
Gaya February 3.187 
[0.082] 
52 March 1.173 
[0.002] 
52 March 5.493 
[0.056] 
52 
Cluster-robust standard errors obtained from a cluster bootstrap with 1000 replications. P-values are in brackets. 
n.s.: non significant. 
Approximation of the log-likelihood by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Naylor – Smith, 1982). 
The number of markets on alert (Table 3.6) enters significantly in the Poisson regression 
model, but its ability to predict the extent of the crisis is fairly low, with an IRR close to one 
in November. However the IRR for the number of markets on alert in March is slightly higher 
- the expected number of markets in crisis increases by 17% when one more market is on alert 
during March. 
The intensity of the alert at Maradi is significant from December, and can be considered as a 
good predictor of the extent of the crisis (Table 3.6). The number of markets affected by the 
crisis increases sharply - by a factor of 13.2 - when the price shock in Maradi at the beginning 
of the season increases by one standard deviation. Lastly, for all regressions, the LR test 
confirms that the panel estimator is more relevant than the pooling estimator. 
The results from the Tobit model (Table 3.7) corroborate these results. The warning indicator 
for Maradi in November is positively related to the intensity of the coming crisis. The same 
applies for the Gaya warning indicator in November, as well as Dori and Tenkodogo in 
                                                 
25 The incidence rate ratio is given by eβ. It measures the variation in the dependant variable for a one unit change 
in the independent variable, xnt, with all other variables held constant.  
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December. The marginal effects show that when Maradi goes on alert in November, the crisis 
intensity rises by 2.8. The marginal effect of Dori’s warning indicator (November) and 
Tenkodogo (December) is of the same order of magnitude; it is lower for Gaya (November). 
Table 3.7: Estimation results for the Tobit model: Marginal effects. 
Dependent variable: Crisis intensity 
Independent variables Marginal effect  
Log 
likelihood 
Sample 
size 
A
le
rt
 a
t l
ea
di
ng
 
m
ar
ke
t 
Maradi November (Niger) 2.812 
[0.004] 
0.72 - 52.87 51 
Gaya November (Niger) 1.792 
[0.056] 
0.78 - 55.18 51 
Dori December (Mali) 2.792 
[0.008] 
0.74 - 50.88 48 
Tenkodogo December (Burkina Faso) 3.151 
[0.007] 
0.74 - 50.45 48 
N
um
be
r o
f m
ar
ke
ts
 o
n 
al
er
t November 0.117 
[0.030] 
0.81 - 54.47 49 
December 0.170 
[0.001] 
0.82 - 52.06 49 
January 0.192 
[0.000] 
0.85 - 51.43 52 
February 0.214 
[0.000] 
0.85 - 48.10 52 
March 0.253 
[0.000] 
0.79 - 44.49 52 
A
le
rt
 in
te
ns
ity
 
Maradi November 3.096 
[0.001] 
0.68 - 52.05 51 
Maradi December 2.906 
[0.003] 
0.71 - 53.03 51 
Maradi January 2.812 
[0.000] 
0.64 - 51.80 52 
Maradi February 3.169 
[0.000] 
0.63 - 51.10 52 
P-values are in brackets. 
Approximation of the log-likelihood by adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Naylor – Smith, 1982). 
As in the probit model case, the marginal effect of the number of markets on alert increases 
with time (Table 3.7). Finally, the intensity of the alert at Maradi at the beginning of the 
season (November) significantly explains the intensity of the future price crises. However, the 
marginal effect of this variable on the intensity of the crisis is not higher than the effect of the 
binary warning indicator. 
In summary, the results show that the three types of warning indicators identified above are 
relevant, as they significantly explain the scope and the intensity of future price crises. It is of 
most importance to monitor millet price movements in Maradi during the harvest period. 
Indeed, the probability of a widespread crisis breaking out six or seven months later sharply 
increases when prices in Maradi are above their trend value in November. The results also 
show that monitoring all markets during the harvest period does not add significant extra 
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information. Nevertheless, it may be useful to monitor the markets of Dori, Gaya and 
Tenkogogo in addition to Maradi. If these markets are also on alert during the last months of 
the year, the probability of crisis increases significantly. 
3.7. Conclusion 
Whatever the explanatory factors of the price crisis, our analysis shows that it is possible to 
anticipate crises from the observation of past price movements. The crises that erupt usually 
during April or May, may in fact be anticipated as early as November by monitoring the price 
movements in some key markets – most importantly Maradi, but also Dori, and to a lesser 
extent Gaya and Tenkodogo.  
Therefore the warning indicators defined in this paper should usefully complement the early 
warning systems currently focused on crop monitoring. They have the advantage of being 
based on objective information, which is easy to collect, and quick to collate. These indicators 
could be calculated in each country and integrated into the national early warning system. The 
high inter-country correlation of price crises should encourage the construction of a regional 
warning system, incorporating indicators from all the three countries. Irregularities detected 
early, at the beginning of the harvest, on the border markets of Nigeria and Benin must lead to 
alerts for not only the authorities of Niger, but also of Burkina Faso and Mali. 
Of course, our calculations face a number of limitations. The main one is the quality of the 
estimated price trend value. We used a very simple form for the trend equation. The 
advantage of this specification is ease of calculation and updating of indicators, on the other 
hand, the goodness of fit may be poor. The introduction of the consumer price index instead 
of the trend variable generally improves the accuracy of the estimates. However, the 
consumer price index is published with a delay of several months, so an early warning system 
based on this index would be ineffective. 
With hindsight, the adequacy of the warning indicators, based on the deviation of prices from 
their trend value seems to be good. However it is difficult to assess the ability of these 
indicators to prevent crises in advance. Out-of-sample simulations were made for the period 
2000-2008 which were satisfactory. They show, however, the need to periodically update the 
price trend. In that regard, we suggest a conservative approach that consists in updating the 
trend estimates only if the predicted trend values are lower than previous forecasts. This 
method, which tends to underestimate the trend value, is expected to lead to better detection 
of coming crises, although at the expense of an increase in the number of false alarms.  
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Appendix C:  
Table C1: Market characteristics and unit root tests 
Region Market 
Type of 
market 
Millet 
production 
in the region: 
% of total 
Min 
price 
Max 
price 
Mean 
price 
No 
Obs 
ADF  
P.value 
KPSS  
LM-
Stat 
Niger Sample period: January 1990 – October 2008 
Agadez Agadez bulk 0.04 52 337 134 226 0.00 0.12 
Diffa Diffa bulk 1.6 41 328 138 221 0.00 0.09 
Diffa  Goudoumaria consumption  45 371 131 215 0.02 0.08 
Diffa Nguimi consumption  55 333 148 218 0.01 0.06 
Dosso Dogondoutchi collect 18.6 48 270 114 217 0.00 0.08 
Dosso Dosso bulk  58 329 139 226 0.00 0.11 
Dosso Gaya cross-border  42 315 124 226 0.00 0.10 
Dosso Loga consumption  50 279 123 216 0.00 0.07 
Maradi Maradi bulk 21.2 39 261 104 226 0.00 0.12 
Tahoua Tahoua bulk 18.4 54 369 144 226 0.00 0.11 
Tillaberi Filingue collect 20.9 51 326 129 210 0.00 0.09 
Tillaberi Tillaberi collect  58 306 145 226 0.00 0.11 
Zinder Goure consumption 18.4 52 319 118 226 0.00 0.08 
Zinder Zinder bulk  40 312 109 226 0.00 0.12 
Niamey Katako consumption 0.3 71 324 141 226 0.00 0.09 
Burkina Faso        Sample period: January 1992–September 2008 
Cascades Banfora retail 0.9 51 267 129 201 0.01 0.16 
Centre est Tenkodogo retail 8.5 42 228 113 201 0.03 0.10 
Centre nord Kongoussi retail 7.9 52 229 114 201 0.00 0.17 
Centre ouest Koudougou retail 0.1 51 260 117 201 0.00 0.13 
Est Fada N'Gourma retail 10.5 40 241 106 197 0.01 0.10 
Mouhoun Tougan retail 18 33 220 105 194 0.01 0.12 
Sahel Djibo retail 0.1 58 243 120 201 0.01 0.16 
Sahel Dori retail  56 299 142 201 0.12 0.13 
Sahel Gorom-Gorom retail  60 263 141 201 0.01 0.17 
Sud Ouest Diébougou retail 5.4 36 265 120 201 0.02 0.14 
Ouagadougou Gounghin consumption  69 236 126 201 0.04 0.08 
Ouagadougou Sankaryaré consumption  70 271 137 201 0.05 0.10 
Mali    Sample period: February 1993 – December 2008 
Kayes Kayes consumption 14 89 325 186 189 0.05 0.18 
Kayes Nioro   52 305 152 186 0.16 0.11 
Koulikoro Fana production 16 45 227 112 185 0.02 0.09 
Koulikoro Koulikoro Gare wholesale  55 249 127 190 0.01 0.10 
Koulikoro Nara   51 240 128 187 0.05 0.10 
Sikasso Sirakrola production 18.2 34 212 100 188 0.00 0.13 
Sikasso Koutiala bulk  46 218 118 188 0.02 0.15 
Sikasso Sikasso Centre bulk  64 246 136 190 0.00 0.14 
Segou Dioro production 17.1 35 205 89 192 0.02 0.07 
Segou Niono bulk  46 228 111 192 0.01 0.06 
Segou Ségou centre bulk  44 225 109 192 0.02 0.08 
Mopti Bankass production 15.1 41 183 98 190 0.01 0.11 
Mopti Djenne production  38 203 102 188 0.02 0.08 
Mopti Mopti Gangal bulk  55 230 129 190 0.02 0.08 
Tombouctou Tombouctou consumption 4.9 77 248 154 184 0.09 0.09 
Gao Gao consumption 4 72 232 139 190 0.03 0.06 
Bamako Médine consumption 10.3 69 263 142 191 0.05 0.09 
Source: MISs and authors' calculations. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Burkina Faso is a low income and a landlocked country located in the Sahel part of West 
Africa. Agriculture is the major source of growth, accounting for about a third of GDP 
growth. About 70% of the poor live in rural areas. They depend on rainfed agriculture for 
subsistence and face large income fluctuations originating from climate variability. In the 
absence of formal insurance households can hardly protect themselves against weather related 
income shocks. As evidenced by a large literature, risk mitigating strategies, self-insurance 
and informal risk sharing mechanisms set up by low-income farmers only afford a partial 
protection against income risk (Deaton, 1992; Morduch, 1995; Townsend, 1995).  
Uninsured risk may have dramatic consequences on household welfare in the short and long 
run. Households experiencing an adverse shock may be forced to reduce their consumption, 
including health and schooling expenditures, as well as investment in their farm. In the most 
severe cases, agricultural households are forced to sell productive assets such as cattle to 
compensate for an income loss. By reducing the productive capacity of the household, a 
temporary income shock may have a persistent impact on future income (Rosenzweig and 
Binswanger, 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Morduch 1995, 1999). Therefore, 
uninsured risk is widely considered as a cause of chronic poverty (Dercon and Christiaenen, 
2011; Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; Dercon, 2004; Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000).  
The empirical literature has paid particular attention to the consequences of transitory income 
shocks on investment in human capital when insurance and credit markets are imperfect. 
Foster (1995) showed that fluctuations in the growth pattern for children exposed to the 
severe flood of 1988 in rural Bangladesh, reflect variation in access to credit. Jacoby and 
Skoufias (1997) explored the links between the structure of financial markets in rural India 
and child school attendance.  According to their results, schooling can be considered as part of 
the self-insurance strategy of poor households in particular in villages with less developed 
financial markets. Households adjust child school attendance to unanticipated income changes 
originating from rainfall deviation from long-run mean. A related and growing literature 
exploits naturally random events such as severe droughts, pandemics or violent conflicts, to 
highlight the sensitivity of human capital formation in childhood to extreme events (see for 
instance Jensen, 2000; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Akresh et al., 2009, 2011)26.  
                                                 
26 See also Alderman (2011) for a more complete review of case studies. 
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Another strand of literature drawing on Barker (1998) has shown that deprivation experienced 
in infancy and early childhood has long-run consequences on adult future welfare. According 
to Barker’s “foetal origin hypothesis”, individuals who have suffered from nutritional 
deprivation in utero or from stunting and underweight during their first couple of years have 
poorer performance at school, a lower income level, a lower social status and a lower life 
expectancy. For instance, Maccini and Yang (2009) working on Indonesia, evidenced a strong 
relationship between birth year rainfall and adult height and education, suggesting that 
nutrition in infancy varies with agricultural output and household income.  Among the natural 
experiment literature, Almond (2006), Banerjee et al. (2007) and Gorgens et al. (2012) 
examined the long-term effects of an economic shock experienced during early childhood on 
adult health and education outcomes. They showed that children exposed to a dramatic event 
during early-life had lower investment in education and health which consequences are 
measurable many years later on adults’ outcome27. 
Most authors agree to recognize that consumption smoothing in developing countries is far 
from being complete especially among poor households, exposing young children to episodes 
of undernutrition. But empirical studies diverge as to the critical period of life during which a 
shock has irreversible effects. This critical period can be the foetal period (Barker, 1998), the 
first six months of life (Dobbing, 1976), the 6 to 24 months period (Martorell and Habicht, 
1986; Martorell et al., 1994) or more generally the post weaning period until age 24-36 
months (e.g. Alderman et al., 2001; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001; Alderman et al., 2006). As a 
general rule, nutritionists consider that stunting in the first two years of life cannot be offset 
later so that the size at three years is a good indicator of the size in adulthood (Martorell, 
1995).  
Drawing on this literature, the main objective of this paper is to assess the ability of rural 
households in Burkina Faso to smooth investment in child health over agricultural income 
fluctuations. Like Maccini and Yang (2009) and Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) we do not focus 
on the impact of extreme events but we consider the impact of the “ordinary” income 
fluctuations that are regularly faced by farmers in relation with weather conditions. The 
effectiveness of risk-coping strategy is tested by estimating the short run impact of weather 
shocks on the nutritional status of children aged 0 to 5 years.  
The analysis is original in many respects. First, the study covers the whole Burkina Faso. 
Health data are drawn from a national survey representative at the regional level, conducted in 
                                                 
27 See Strauss and Thomas (2008) and Alderman (2011) for a detailed review of empirical literature on child 
health and adult prosperity. 
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June, 2008. They are combined with rainfall data collected by the meteorological office of 
Burkina Faso to define rainfall shocks at the child level. Second, a special attention is paid to 
the shock pattern which is generally not clearly taken into account in the empirical literature. 
Weather shocks translate into an income and a nutritional shock with a delay that depends on 
the crop calendar. Thanks to the high precision of the data, we are able to accurately 
characterize the economic conditions prevailing during the first months of the child’s life and 
to identify the critical period in child early life during which children are more vulnerable to 
deprivations. Third, the role of livestock as buffer assets is examined by stratifying the sample 
by livestock holdings. Fourth, the relative impact of weather shocks and other factors 
according to the severity of malnutrition is examined by using quintile regression model. 
Results show the importance of weather conditions in prenatal period on the future nutritional 
status of the child. The period in utero to twelve months is a critical period during which 
exposure to nutritional shortfall has long lasting effects. Results evidence the asymmetric 
impact of positive and negative rainfall shocks: large negative shocks have a bigger impact on 
the child nutritional status than large positive shocks. Results also show that even wealthy 
households are not able to preserve the child human capital from external shocks. Last, the 
analysis indicates that weather insurance mechanisms would help reducing moderate 
malnutrition but would be ineffective in fighting against acute malnutrition. Acute 
malnutrition is above all the consequence of the poor education and poor health status of 
mothers. Results are robust to different specifications of test equations, in particular to the 
introduction of household effects that control for unobserved socioeconomic factors.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The second part provides information on 
the relationships between climate and nutrition in Burkina Faso. The third part presents the 
datasets and provides descriptive statistics for child health and rainfall. Part 4 describes the 
conceptual and empirical framework. Part 5 exposes the main econometric results and part 6 
discusses the results validity. Part 7 concludes. 
4.2. The relationships between climate and nutrition in Burkina Faso 
In this tropical country, weather conditions are a key determinant of food production and farm 
income, with lagged impact on health conditions. 
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4.2.1. Weather shocks and food access 
In Burkina Faso, water resources for agriculture depend on weather conditions28. The 
productivity of rainfed agriculture which is the dominant production system depends mainly 
on the precipitation level. Crop yields are also sensitive to the occurrence of dry spells during 
the rainy season and a delayed onset of the monsoon. Water storage for irrigation systems and 
livestock also varies with the annual surface water flow and dam capacity which is rather low.  
Beyond the crop output, weather shocks impact the nutritional status of rural households and 
more specifically of children. Firstly, rainfall has a direct impact on the “production-based 
entitlement” of households who cultivate food crops (Sen, 1981). A rainfall deficit entails a 
shortage in food production and food intake of the household’s members. In turn, babies 
whose mothers suffered from malnutrition during pregnancy or lactation period will exhibit 
poor growth rate and lower weight. Poor nutrition provided during early childhood has also 
adverse health effects on weaned children. 
Secondly, a rainfall shock translates into an income shock which in turns affects the living 
standards of the household and health conditions. However, the relationship between rainfall 
and income may be ambiguous. Farmers’ income is generally assumed to be positively related 
to the rainfall level. This is obviously the case for producers of tradable goods which price is 
given by foreign markets. In Burkina Faso, a negative (positive) rainfall shock will result in a 
decrease (increase) in production and income of cotton and rice which are respectively the 
main exported and imported crop. 
The correlation between rainfall and income may be weaker for domestic or regionally traded 
goods such as millet and sorghum, the main staple diet of rural populations. In case of bad 
weather conditions the price increase may partly compensate for the production loss. 
However, this offsetting effect should be of little importance when rainfall shocks are 
spatially limited. Studies have shown that grain markets within the sub-region are spatially 
integrated (Araujo et al., 2012). Trade flows should therefore prevent large local price 
variations in response to local production shocks. In case of a widespread drought, the vast 
majority of farmers are expected to become net buyers of food. High domestic prices will then 
prevent deficit farmers from easy access to food. Access to food will be even more difficult 
for rural households than for urban dwellers who can more easily access to imported food 
products. 
                                                 
28 The exploitation of groundwater is limited and perennial rivers are few (Sally et al., 2011). 
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Thus it is expected that a rainfall deficit (surplus) has a negative (positive) impact on 
households’ income which in turn conditions access to food and health care. The weather 
information being limited, we consider in the following that agricultural outcome depends 
above all of the cumulated precipitation level recorded during the rainy season. 
4.2.2. The shocks calendar 
The impact of a climate shock on food availability, income and nutrition occurs with delay 
and last over several months in relation with the agricultural calendar (Figure 4.1). The inter-
tropical climate of Burkina Faso defines two seasons which determine the crop calendar and 
the agricultural year. The wet season usually runs from May to October and the dry season 
runs from November to May. The agricultural year starts in September and ends in August. 
Planting typically takes place from May to July at the beginning of the rainy season. The main 
harvest occurs from September to December. A second harvest of lesser importance, the “off-
season harvest”, takes place from January to March (Figure 4.1).  
Generally, farmers sell part of their grain at the time of the harvest to meet their financial 
needs. The rest of the harvest, intended for family consumption and seed production, is stored 
on the farm until the next harvest or beyond. The amount of grain stored depends on the 
production level which itself depends on rainfall conditions during the rainy season. 
Insufficient precipitations result in a poor harvest, low stocks and a food shortage during the 
months preceding the next harvest which occurs 12 months later. The length of the hunger 
season29 varies across years, regions and households according to the importance of stocks 
and non-agricultural income but generally runs from June to August.  
Figure 4.1: The crop calendar 
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Source: The authors  
Therefore, a rainfall shock translates into an income and a nutrition shock with a delay 
varying from 1 to 12 months. As a consequence, a rainfall shock not only affects children 
alive during the shock but also children born within the year that follows the shock. In case of 
a deficit rainy season, children are at risk of under nutrition during the following twelve 
months. In other words, a rainfall deficit occurring during the rainy season of year t will affect 
                                                 
29 The hunger season is the period that precedes the new harvest, during which farmers’ stocks are depleted. 
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the nutritional status of children alive during the shock period as well as children born in the 
following crop year, from September t to August t+1. 
4.3. Data 
4.3.1. Child heath  
Data on children’s nutritional status are drawn from the ENIAM survey30 conducted in June 
and July 2008. This survey covers the whole country and is representative at the regional 
level. Most analyses that follow are restricted to children living in rural areas as the impact of 
rainfall shocks is likely to be felt by households involved in rural activities. The sample 
includes 12,572 children living in 273 rural municipalities located in the 45 provinces of 
Burkina Faso. 
To assess the health status of children, the height-for-age indicator is preferred to the weight-
for-age indicator. The latter mainly reflects short-term scarcities or recent illness episodes 
experienced by children while the former is a stock variable reflecting current and past health 
investments (Linnemayr et al., 2008; Martorell and Habicht, 1986). The height-for-age 
indicator is expressed as z-scores31 (HAZ). 
Table 4.1: Percentage of children aged 0-5 years with height-for-age z-scores below –2 or -3 
 HAZ < -2 HAZ < -3 
By age group    
0-12 months 18.72 6.42 
13-24 months 44.50 19.14 
25-36 months 47.29 20.33 
37-48 months 44.88 18.90 
49-60 months 41.95 17.82 
0-60 months 38.60 16.10 
By mother education   
None 39.22 16.52 
Literate 37.83 14.74 
Primary education 32.58 13.31 
Secondary education 27.68 9.04 
By quartile of wealth index  
< -0.672 38.92 17.38 
[-0.672, -0.163[ 40.00 17.81 
[-0.163, 0.485[ 39.34 15.00 
≥0.485 36.16 14.21 
   Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENIAM database. 
                                                 
30 The household database has been provided by WFP. 
31 Z-scores are given by the difference between the child’s height-for-age and the median height-for-age for the 
same aged reference population divided by the standard deviation of the reference population. They have been 
calculated using the ANTHRO 2005 software program and the 2005 World Health Organization reference. 
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38.6% of children aged 0 to 5 years suffer from moderate malnutrition or stunting (with HAZ 
below -2) and 16.1% from acute malnutrition (with HAZ below - 3) (Table 4.1). The 
prevalence of moderate stunting increases rapidly from 18.7% during the first 12 months to 
about 45% in the second year of life and 47% in the third year. Prevalence of stunting remains 
at a high level, above 40%, in the two following years. The prevalence of severe stunting 
follows the same pattern. 
Interestingly, the prevalence of malnutrition decreases with the education level of the mother. 
39% of children whose mother has no education are moderately stunted and 16.5% are 
severely stunted. By contrast, only 28% of children whose mother has completed secondary 
education are moderately stunted and 9% are severely stunted. 
A negative relationship between household’s wealth and the prevalence of stunting can also 
be observed. The prevalence of moderate (severe) stunting decreases in the third and fourth 
wealth quintile, from 40% (18%) to 36% (14%). The wealth index measures the household’s 
living standards. It is based on housing characteristics such as materials used for construction, 
the type of water access, sanitation facilities and assets ownership32.  
Map 4.1: Average height-for-age z-score by province and quartiles 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on the ENIAM database. 
The number of provinces is in parenthesis. 
Contrary to what might be expected, the prevalence of malnutrition is not confined to the dry 
northern region but exhibits great regional heterogeneity (Map 4.1). Malnutrition appears to 
be more severe in the East part and the South West part of Burkina Faso which benefit from 
the most favourable climatic conditions. These regions are also the main producing areas of 
                                                 
32 The calculation of the wealth index is detailed in the appendix. 
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cotton, the leading cash crop. Regions with the highest rate of stunting are the Cascades 
(46.5%) and the East (42.5%) whereas the rate of chronic malnutrition is about 31% in the 
Centre region. 
4.3.2. Rainfall data 
Rainfall shocks at the child level are calculated using decadal data originating from 138 
weather stations distributed throughout the country and covering the 1995-2008 period. A 
four-step approach is followed. 
 First, a decadal rainfall index is calculated for all municipalities. Each municipality is 
matched to the closest weather station. In case of missing observations, the rainfall data of the 
second closest station are used. As a consequence, the rainfall index for a given municipality 
may come from varying weather stations. The average distance between the municipality 
centroid and the closest informed weather station is 15.6 km33 (Table 4.2). Only 5% of the 
municipalities are more than 40 km away from the closest informed weather station. 
For 40.5 % of the municipalities, the rainfall indicator has been computed using data from 
only one station; for 48.5% of the municipalities, data come from two stations and for 10.1% 
of the municipalities data come from three stations. Only one municipality (Bagré) uses 
rainfall data originating from 5 different stations34. On average, slightly less than two weather 
stations (1.92) are used to compute the municipality rainfall indicator. Therefore, we can 
confidently say that the municipality rainfall index mostly reflects the precipitation level 
measured at the closest weather station. 
Table 4.2: Distance between the municipality centroid and reference weather stations (km) 
 1st  2nd  3rd  4th 5th  Total  
 Station Station Station Station Station Mean Min Max 
Mean 14.3 33.4 37.1 37.8 41.39 15.6 0.4 60.1 
Max 59.1 96.2 64.1 37.8 41.39 35.2 0.5 96.2 
Min 0 1.5 21.9 37.8 41.39 13.4 0 59.8 
 
Second, an annual rainfall index is calculated by municipality as the cumulated rainfall level 
during the crop growing season that runs from June 1st to September 30th. Map 4.2 shows the 
mean rainfall index aggregated at the province level calculated over the period 2003-200835. 
                                                 
33 Two municipalities whose distance to the closest informed weather station was greater than 100 km have been 
dropped from the sample 
34 The 4th and 5th stations are respectively 37.8 and 41km away from this municipality. Estimations have been 
conducted with and without the Bagre municipality which includes only 37 children. Results are not significantly 
affected.  
35 This period corresponds to the date of birth of the children in the sample. 
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This map illustrates the important discrepancies in the average rainfall that ranges from 
400mm in the North to 1200mm in the south of Comoé. The annual rainfall level is higher in 
the South West region. The North-East provinces (Oudalan, Seno, Yagha) features a low level 
and a large variability of precipitations, two phenomena that are common to Sahelian areas. 
Third, annual rainfall shocks are calculated as the cumulated rainfall deviation from the norm 
of the municipality. The norm for year t is given by the mean rainfall over the 1995-2008 
period excluding year t. Shocks are expressed in percentage of the norm36.  
Map 4.2: Mean annual rainfall by province 
 
Source: The authors 
 
Fourth, a rainfall shock variable is defined at the child level using the date and place of birth 
of the child. Shocks are calculated at different ages. For instance, the rainfall shock in the 
prenatal period is given by the rainfall shock registered during the rainy season of year t in the 
municipality of birth of a child born between September t and August t+1. This variable 
captures the child’s exposure to a nutritional deficiency while in utero and in the months prior 
to her birth.  
Map 4.3 displays the rainfall shocks aggregated at the province level for the birth year of 
children aged 0 to 5 years in 2008. Blue areas correspond to positive shocks (positive rainfall 
                                                 
36 Rainfall shock at year t is given by:     with  

 

  for i ≠ t  
Legend  
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deviation over the long term mean), while red areas represent negative shocks. 2003 was a 
good year in terms of rainfall while 2004 was marked by widespread drought. Except these 
two years, shocks are fairly well distributed across the territory. On the period, extreme events 
are infrequent and circumscribed to two regions of the Sahel region in the northern part of the 
country. 
Map 4.3: Rainfall Shocks by province and year37 
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2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The authors 
4.4. Conceptual and empirical framework 
According to the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH) when insurance markets 
are missing but credit markets are well-functioning, households consumption should not 
                                                 
37 Data by province are calculated as the average value of the municipality shocks.  
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respond to short run fluctuations in current income. Consumption adjusts to unexpected 
changes in permanent income but does not correct for transitory income shocks (Hall, 1978; 
Deaton, 1992). In the empirical literature detection of excess sensitivity of consumption to 
current income is generally taken as evidence of liquidity constraints (Zeldes, 1989) although 
it can also be the consequence of precautionary saving behaviour (Caroll and Kimball, 2001). 
Considering child health as a kind of durable good the standard result of the LC/PIH can be 
extended to investment in child health. Assuming that households maximize an inter-temporal 
expected utility function with instantaneous utility defined over consumption and child health, 
subject to an inter-temporal budget constraint and a health production function, the child’s 
growth should be unaffected by current income fluctuations in the absence of credit market 
imperfections (Foster, 1995; Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001).  
Considering that the height-for-age indicator keeps the record of past investments in child 
health, we assess the ability of households to smooth out income fluctuations resulting from 
rainfall shocks by estimating a reduced form of a health demand equation given by: 
 
Hjc =  γTjc + βXjc + αc + εjc         (1) 
 
 Hjc is the height-for-age z-score for the jth child in the cth sample cluster.  
 
Tjc is the rainfall shock variable. We consider successively rainfall shocks in the prenatal 
period (T0), in the first year (T1) and in the second year of the child life (T2). Children are aged 
[in utero – 12 months], [2 to 24 months] and [14 to 36 months] during the economic shock 
that follows respectively, a rainfall shock in the prenatal period, in the first year and in the 
second year of life. 
γ measures the impact of rainfall shocks on the nutritional status of the birth cohort 
[September, 1st  Year t -  August, 31
th Year t+1].   
X is a vector of child, mother and household characteristics. Child characteristics include year 
of birth, month of birth, sex and being a twin. Maternal characteristics include age, education 
and mother’s body mass index. Household characteristics include the household size, a 
household wealth index, the age and education level of the head of household.  
αc are the cluster-specific effects??εjc is an idiosyncratic stochastic term.  
 
One of the main issues in estimating (1) relates to potential measurement error in the rainfall 
shock variable. Rainfall is measured at the weather station closest to the municipality’s 
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centroid and may not fit perfectly with the rainfall actually experimented by each household 
in the municipality. Assuming that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the true 
unobserved value of shocks, we correct for the resulting attenuation bias by instrumenting the 
rainfall shock variable. Following Maccini and Yang (2009) we consider as potential 
instruments the rainfall shock measured at the second to fifth closest weather station. 
Another difficult issue with survey data is the choice of the clustering unit. We consider that 
the appropriate clustering unit is the municipality and test the robustness of results 
considering alternatively the household as the clustering unit.   
Equation (1) is estimated using the within estimator for fixed effects and the GLS estimator 
for random effects. The standard F test for fixed effects, the Breusch Pagan test for cluster-
specific random effects and the Hausman test for correlated random effects are implemented 
to select the best fit model.  
4.5. Econometric results  
4.5.1. Impact of rainfall shocks in early life 
We first estimate the impact of a rainfall shock occurring in the prenatal period. The results of 
the first stage regression are reported in Table D3 in the appendix. The instrumental variables 
are positively correlated with the rainfall measured at the nearest station. The F-statistic for 
the test of joint significance of the rainfall variables is 126, suggesting that the instruments are 
jointly strong. The over-identifying restrictions are not rejected suggesting that the 
instruments are not correlated with the error term. 
Table 4.3 reports the estimation results of the health demand equation for the municipality 
fixed effect model. They evidence a positive impact of rainfall shocks in the rainy season 
preceding the child birth on her nutritional status. The height-for-age z-score of children 
under five increases by 0.333 when rainfall in the prenatal period is one percent higher than 
normal. These children are in utero to 12 months old during the economic shock that follows 
the rainfall shock.  
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Table 4.3: IV regression results with Municipality Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable :  Height for age z-score  
Rainfall shock in prenatal period  0.333***  
 (0.129) 
 
Sex (1 = male) -0.256***  
 (0.027) 
 
Twin (1 = twin)  -0.559***  
 (0.126) 
 
Mother's age 0.046***  
 (0.013) 
 
Mother's age² -0.001***  
 (0.000) 
 
Body Mass Index of the mother 0.037***  
 (0.006) 
 
Mother literacy 0.085  
 (0.057) 
 
Mother primary education 0.158**  
 (0.070) 
 
Mother secondary/higher education 0.231*  
 (0.137) 
 
Age of the household head  0.001  
 (0.001) 
 
Household head literacy 0.031  
 (0.055) 
 
Household head primary education 0.002  
 (0.054) 
 
Household head secondary/higher education 0.208**  
 (0.096) 
 
Household head other education -0.089  
 (0.095) 
 
Household size -0.004  
 (0.003)  
Wealth index 0.039**  
 (0.019) 
 
Year of birth dummies Yes  
Month of birth dummies Yes  
Observations 12,572  
Adjusted R²  0.147  
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 
5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence. List of exogenous instruments: 
rainfall shock in prenatal period measured at the second to fifth closest weather station.  
 
Results also give several interesting insights on the determinants of malnutrition. Consistent 
with other studies conducted in Africa (e.g. Wamani et al., 2007; Marcoux, 2002; Svedberg, 
1990), boys have worse nutritional status than girls and twins have worse nutritional status 
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than only children. As expected, the relationship between the child nutritional status and her 
mother’s age is nonlinear: the nutritional status of the child improves with the age of the 
mother until she is 46 years old. Above that age, the risk of malnutrition increases. The Body 
Mass Index (BMI) of the mother which offers a simple measure of short-run health is a 
significant determinant of children’s nutritional status. Finally, the education (both primary 
and secondary) of the mother has a positive impact on the child’s nutritional status. In 
contrast, only secondary schooling of the household head (98.7% of household heads are 
male) is positively and significantly associated with height-for-age. Regarding the households 
characteristics, the household size is negatively correlated with height-for-age z-scores but 
non-significant, while the wealth index enters positively and significantly.  
The positive impact of rainfall shocks in prenatal period on child health is robust to 
controlling for the introduction of various time trend specifications: a municipality-year of 
birth specific time trend as well as a municipality-month of birth specific time trend.38 These 
cross variables capture the temporal variation in the outcome variable that is specific to each 
municipality and date of birth. 
The introduction of multiplicative variables shows that the impact of rainfall shocks in the 
prenatal period is not significantly different for boys and girls. This result (not reported here) 
supports the idea that there is no intra-household discrimination between young boys and girls 
in health and nutrition access in Burkina Faso. 
Results are also robust to clustering at the household level (Table 4.4, columns 3 and 4). The 
coefficient of the rainfall shock variable is positive and significant. According to the Hausman 
test, the GLS estimator is more efficient when clustering at the household level while the 
within estimator is more efficient when clustering at the municipality level.  
 
  
                                                 
38 Results not presented here. 
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Table 4.4: Impact of rainfall shocks in prenatal period on HAZ - TSLS on panel data 
 
Cluster unit 
Municipality Household 
Estimator 
GLS 
for RE 
(1) 
Within 
for FE 
(2) 
GLS 
for RE 
(3) 
Within 
for FE 
(4) 
Rainfall shock in prenatal period  0.282** 0.333*** 0.235*** 0.484*** 
 (0.126) (0.129) (0.112) (0.224)  
Child characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Mother characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Household characteristics yes yes yes no 
Adjusted R² 0.120 0.147 0.125 0.268 
Observations 12,572 12,572 12,572 12,572 
Hausman  χ²d.f. 32  26  
Prob. [0.001]  [0.387]  
F-stat for fixed effects  2.54**  1.401** 
BP χ²(1) 338.301  281.296  
Panel structure   
Number of cross sections 273 6481 
Minimum  number of children 2 1 
Maximum number of children 213 14 
Average number of  children 47 1.95 
Median children 39 2 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses and p-value are in square brackets. * indicates 
significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence. List of 
exogenous instruments: rainfall shock in prenatal period measured at the second to fifth closest 
weather station.  
To identify the critical period of life during which an economic shock has the most severe 
impact on the child’s health, we estimate the impact of a rainfall shock occurring in the first 
and second year of life. The children are, respectively, two to 24 months old and 14 to 36 
months old, during the economic shock’s period that follows the rainfall shock. Estimation 
results are given in Table 4.5. They show that a rainfall shock occurring in the first or second 
year of life does not have any significant impact on the child long term nutritional status.  
  
Chapter 4: Impact of climate related shocks on child’s health in Burkina Faso 
126 
 
Table 4.5: Impact of a rainfall shock at first and second year of life (2SLS) 
Dependent variable : HAZ 
Municipality 
FE 
Household 
RE 
Municipality 
FE 
Household 
RE 
 (1) (2) (4) (5) 
Rainfall shock in 1st year 0.027 -0.161 
  
[ 2 - 24 months] (0.163) (0.154) 
  
Rainfall shock in 2nd year 
 
 -0.042 -0.231 
[ 14 - 36 months] 
 
 (0.220) (0.202) 
Observations 10,164 10,164 7,370 7,370 
Adjusted R² 0.070 0.035 0.068 0.026 
In brackets the children age at the time of the economic shock that follows the rainfall shock. All 
regressions include child, mother and household’s characteristics. Cluster robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis  
 
According to estimation results, children are more vulnerable to a weather shock during their 
in utero life and the first months of their early life. During this period the vast majority of 
children are breastfed - 91% of the mothers in the sample declare to have breastfed their 
children - weaning usually occurring between 18 and 24 months. We thus conclude that 
weather shocks affect mothers’ nutrition, maternal feeding, intake of supplementary foods as 
well as access to health care.  
These results are in line with a large medical and economic literature showing a strong 
relationship between maternal nutrition, fetal growth and after birth weight and size (see for 
instance Gajigo and Schwab, 2012). They confirm that the nutrition of mothers during 
pregnancy and breastfeeding plays a critical role as well as adequate complementary feeding 
practices. Indeed, late weaning do not protect against under nutrition. The WHO recommends 
to supplement the alimentation of children more than 6 months old by nutritionally adequate 
complementary foods, maternal breast being insufficient to achieve optimal growth and 
health.  
Robustness test 
 
As a robustness test, the impact of rainfall shocks is estimated on the sample of children living 
in urban areas (Table 4.6). As expected the coefficient of the rainfall shock variable is not 
significantly different from zero. This result indicates that urban households are able to 
compensate for food price fluctuations following a shock in domestic production. Compared 
to rural households, urban households have an easier access to imported food and their 
income is left unaffected by weather conditions. 
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Table 4.6: Impact of a rainfall shock in prenatal period on urban children. TSLS estimates 
Dependent variable:  
Height for age z-score 
Muncipality 
FE 
Household 
RE 
 (1) (2) 
Rainfall shock in prenatal period  -0.015 -0.100 
 
(0.254) (0.296) 
Child characteristics yes yes 
Mother characteristics yes yes 
Household characteristics yes no 
Observations 1,974 1,974 
Adjusted R²  0.154 0.136 
 Cluster robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
4.5.2. The failure of risk coping strategies 
Previous results lead to the rejection of the permanent income hypothesis. Households do not 
smooth investment in human capital over “ordinary” income fluctuations. However 
distinguishing between positive and negative shocks and taking into account the role of 
livestock assets highlight interesting features of the risk coping strategies set up by farmers. 
An asymmetric impact of positive and negative rainfall shocks  
 
The household ability to manage weather related shock may differ according to the sign of the 
shock. Households may be prone to smooth large positive shock through the constitution of 
food stocks or savings. But households may be unable to smooth large negative rainfall 
shocks when stocks are depleted and credit access is restricted. We thus distinguish between 
large positive shocks (above the mean plus one standard deviation) from large negative 
shocks (below the mean less one standard deviation) when estimating the impact of rainfall 
shocks on the child’s nutritional status. 
Results are line with previous ones. Large positive and large negative shocks have a 
significant impact on the child’s health indicating that shocks are not dampened (Table 4.7, 
column 1). Children benefit from an increase in food supply and income following a good 
harvest but they suffer from a deterioration of their nutritional status after a bad harvest. Large 
negative shocks have a bigger impact than large positive shocks indicating that children 
benefit less from large positive shocks than they suffer from large negative shocks. This 
asymmetry in the shocks impact on the child nutritional status may reflect a biological 
phenomenon. It may also indicate that large positive shocks are partly saved.  
Chapter 4: Impact of climate related shocks on child’s health in Burkina Faso 
128 
 
Table 4.7: Impact of rainfall shocks in prenatal period according to livestock assets  
Dependent variable: 
Height for age z-score 
 Tropical Livestock Units are 
All sample Below the median Above the median 
Rainfall shock in 
prenatal period 
0.333*** 0.447*** 0.344* 
(0.129) (0.162) (0.189) 
Observations 12572 6119 6045 
    
Large positive shocks 0.266** 0.330** 0.293* 
 (0.108) (0.130) (0.159) 
Observations 12572 6119 6045 
 
   
Large negative shocks -0.339** -0.457*** -0.353* 
 (0.136) (0.169) (0.207) 
Observations 12572 6119 6045 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include child, 
mother and household’s characteristics; * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 
5% level and *** significance at 1% level of confidence.  
Livestock as a buffer asset 
 
In rural Burkina Faso livestock are the main assets used for risk-coping with jewelries or 
consumer durables (Kazianga and Udry, 2006). Households can also resort to grain storage 
and transfers to protect consumption from income fluctuations. Unfortunately data on stocks, 
transfers and other assets are not available. We thus focus on the role of livestock in 
consumption smoothing. 
Small livestock (mainly sheep and goats) are considered as a buffer asset. Most rural 
households, but also households living in urban area, grow small cattle to be sold with profit 
for celebrations, to finance extraordinary expenses such as sending a child to school in the 
capital city, or to offset unexpected economic shocks (health disease, bad harvest…). Large 
livestock are considered as a productive asset (Zimmerman and Carter, 2003). Relatively 
wealthy farmers hold oxen, donkeys, cows or camel for animal traction. Sedentary and 
extensive transhumant pastoralism is also an important activity in Burkina Faso, contributing 
to about 25% to GDP and export earnings. When livestock are productive assets, selling 
animals to compensate for an income shock is a last resort strategy that compromises future 
farm productivity and household’s welfare. 
To evaluate the ability of rural households to cope with weather-related income risk the 
sample is stratified according to the number of Tropical Livestock Units held by households. 
The number of Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) is calculated as the weighted sum of the 
number of cattle, horses, asses, goats and sheep hold by the household. The vast majority of 
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households hold at least one livestock unit, goats being the more widespread animals (Table 
4.8). But the median number of livestock is rather low: 2 cattle, 5 goats and 3 sheep. The 
sample includes 15% of households who declared breeding to be their main activity39. The 
mean number of livestock units by breeder is 20.22 and the median is 10.95  
Table 4.8: Composition of household livestock assets 
 
TLU Cattle Goat Sheep Donkey Pork Horse Camel 
Mean 9.87 5.98 7.21 6.30 1.12 1.56 0.04 0.05 
Median  5.29 2 5 3 1 0 0 0 
Maximum  210 200 100 450 15 75 4 15 
HH with no livestock 3% 37% 20% 39% 42% 73% 96% 97% 
Number of animals (or units) per household 
 
Partitioning the sample at the median LTU (Table 4.7, columns 2 and 3) shows that children 
living in poor households are more vulnerable to weather-related income shocks than children 
living in wealthier households (LTU above the median). They are especially sensitive to large 
negative rainfall shocks in prenatal period. However, even wealthy households are not able to 
preserve the child human capital from external shocks. These results are in line with those of 
Kazianga and Udry (2006) for a sample of rural households in Burkina Faso. They found little 
responsiveness of livestock sales to the severe drought that marked the 1981-1985 period. 
Neither rich nor poor households were able to smooth consumption in that period of severe 
drought.  
4.5.3. Impact of rainfall shocks on moderate to acute malnutrition 
According to previous result, children are at risk of malnutrition in case of an adverse rainfall 
shock during the prenatal period. We go further in the analysis by examining the impact of 
weather shocks on moderate and severe malnutrition. Moderate malnutrition (corresponding 
to height-for-age z-score below -2) is associated with an increased risk of nutrition-related 
deaths. Children suffering from acute malnutrition (height-for-age z-score below -3) are 
exposed to life-threatening conditions.  
Estimation results (Table 4.9, columns 1 and 2) evidence a negative causality between having 
experienced a rainfall shock in prenatal period and the likelihood of a being stunted during the 
first year of life. The results are robust to the inclusion of time trends. According to these 
results, uninsured weather-related income shocks are cause of moderate malnutrition but not 
                                                 
39 This percentage is underestimated as some farmers holding more than 100 cattle did not declare themselves as 
breeders. 
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of severe malnutrition. The impact of rainfall shocks on severe stunting is not significantly 
different from zero (Table 4.9, columns 3 and 4). 
Table 4.9: Impact of rainfall shocks on stunting  
Dependent variable Moderate stunting Severe stunting 
 
Municipality 
FE 
Household 
RE 
Municipality 
FE 
Household 
RE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rainfall shock in prenatal period  -0.081* -0.065* -0.011 -0.019 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.030) (0.027) 
Observations 12,572 12,572 12,572 12,572 
Adjusted R² 0.090 0.076 0.059 0.042 
Dependant variable = 1 if HAZ < -2 ; 0 otherwise (columns 1 and 2).  
Dependant variable = 1 if HAZ < -3 ; 0 otherwise (columns 3 and 4). 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include child, mother and household’s 
characteristics.  
 
These results suggest that households set up survival strategies to protect children against 
serious nutritional deficiencies and related health disease that would threaten child survival. 
These results suggest also that the implementation of weather insurance mechanisms would 
be useful to fight against moderate malnutrition but would be ineffective in eradicating severe 
malnutrition. The relative impact of weather shocks and other factors according to the severity 
of malnutrition are explored below.   
Quantile Regression Estimations 
 
To look for a different impact of rainfall shocks according to the position of the health 
variable in its distribution, we implement the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions 
(IVQR) procedure developed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008). 
The estimated coefficients for the 10th to 80th quantiles are reported in Table 4.10. At the 
lowest quantile, (Table 4.10, column 1) rainfall conditions in prenatal period do not have any 
impact on the child nutritional status. The impact of rainfall shocks becomes significant from 
the 0.4 quantile and is increasing in size until the last one. According to these results, rainfall 
shocks have no impact on the most severely malnourished children. 
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Table 4.10 : Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions40. Dependent variable: HAZ 
 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
 ]-6 ;-3.47] ]-3.47;-2.76] ]-2.76;-2.33] ]-2.33;-1.96] ]-1.96;-1.61]   ]-1.61;-1.27] ]-1.27;-0.86] 
]-0.86;-
0.36] 
Rainfall shock 
in prenatal period  
0.288 0.249 0.218 0.322** 0.290** 0.332*** 0.433*** 0.407*** 
(0.180) (0.154) (0.145) (0.133) (0.129) (0.122) (0.122) (0.139) 
Sex (1 = male) -0.434*** -0.333*** -0.303*** -0.274*** -0.251*** -0.203*** -0.168*** -0.126*** 
 
(0.043) (0.034) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.037) 
Twin (1 = twin)  -0.722*** -0.549*** -0.546*** -0.633*** -0.582*** -0.567*** -0.525*** -0.371** 
 (0.170) (0.112) (0.091) (0.093) (0.105) (0.102) (0.139) (0.146) 
BMI of mother 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.0057) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Mother’s age 0.0426** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.012 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Mother’s age² -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mother primary 
education 
0.092 0.172** 0.160** 0.009 0.108 0.196*** 0.184** 0.185*** 
(0.125) (0.076) (0.065) (0.066) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Mother 
secondary/ 
higher education 
0.481*** 0.346** 0.345*** 0.150 0.113 0.004 0.064 0.178 
(0.173) (0.142) (0.108) (0.101) (0.093) (0.112) (0.149) (0.174) 
Hh head 
secondary/ 
higher education 
0.116 0.189* 0.093 0.249*** 0.191** 0.155* 0.287*** 0.1336 
(0.135) (0.111) (0.099) (0.093) (0.083) (0.094) (0.096) (0.095) 
Hh head other 
education 
-0.445*** -0.259** -0.166 -0.142 -0.128 -0.126 -0.024 -0.024 
(0.149) (0.129) (0.123) (0.093) (0.087) (0.096) (0.114) (0.114) 
Household size -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Wealth index 0.049 0.067*** 0.081*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.059*** 0.036* 0.019 
 (0.034) (0.024) (0.021) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) 
Regressions include exogenous variables given in Table 4.3 as well as municipality dummies. Cluster robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level and *** significance at 
1% level of confidence.  
 
These results can be interpreted in two different but non mutually exclusive ways. First, as 
part of survival strategies, households manage to protect children from weather related 
income shocks when life expectancy is threatened. Another interpretation is that severe 
malnutrition results from structurally poor health environment rather than from transitory 
income shocks. Mother’s age and mother’s health are highly significant determinants of the 
child’s nutritional status whatever the position of HAZ in the distribution. Most of all, poor 
maternal education appears to be a key factor of severe malnutrition: mother’s secondary 
education has a positive and significant impact on the first quantiles but is not significant from 
the 40th quantile to the last one. Therefore, providing women with secondary education is of 
the utmost importance in the fight against severe malnutrition. These results are in line with a 
                                                 
40 IVQR estimations for the 90th quantile do no to converge 
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large literature showing that mother’s education is one of the most important factor of child 
malnutrition if not the most important one (e.g. Smith and Haddad, 2000; Frost et al., 2005),  
Table 4.11 : Instrumental Quantile Regression Estimations. Dependent variable: HAZ 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Large negative rainfall 
shock in prenatal period  
-0.235 -0.386** -0.444*** -0.442*** 
(0.214) (0.185) (0.169) (0.159) 
Large positive rainfall 
shock in prenatal period  
0.223** 0.195** 0.197** 0.301*** 
(0.104) (0.092) (0.083) (0.102) 
Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include child, mother and household’s 
characteristics as well as municipality dummy variables. * indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 5% level 
and *** significance at 1% level of confidence.  
 
Table 4.11 distinguishes between large positive and large negative rainfall shocks. For the 
sake of brevity, only the 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 quantiles are presented. Negative rainfall shocks 
do not have any impact on children in the 0.2 quantile whereas large positive rainfall shocks 
have a significant impact in all regressions. These results tend to support the hypothesis of the 
survival strategy: more vulnerable children are protected from deprivation in the case of a 
negative weather shock. As previously observed, large negative rainfall shocks have a greater 
impact on children nutritional status than large positive ones, indicating that large positive 
shocks are partly saved. 
4.6. Discussion 
Rainfall shocks and diseases 
 
Rainy season precipitations are a key determinant of crop yield which conditions food 
availability, income and nutrition over the following year. But weather has also a direct and 
immediate impact on health by fostering the development and spread of vector borne and 
waterborne diseases (e.g. McMichael et al., 2006; Githeko, 2007). For instance, the 
prevalence of parasitic and infectious diseases such as such as malaria and cholera expands 
during the rainy season. In turn, diseases affect the body’s ability to absorb nutrients, leading 
to under-nutrition.  
These direct and indirect impacts of rainfall on child’s health run in two opposite directions. 
A high level of precipitations favours the expansion of vector-borne diseases but offers good 
harvest prospects so that the expected impact of precipitations on child health may be 
ambiguous. Our results clearly show that rainfall shocks have a significant impact on children 
in utero at the time of the shock. Therefore, we can conclude that they mainly capture the 
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indirect impact of rainfall conditions on the child health that passes through the level of food 
supply and household’s income. In this respect, results should be regarded as overestimating 
the global impact of rainfall on health.  
Potential Selection bias  
 
As in other studies of this type, we are confronted with a potential attrition bias due to 
migration, selective mortality and conception rate in relation to rainfall shocks. 
Migration is a potential source of attrition bias the direction of which is undetermined. More 
vulnerable households may have migrated from rural to urban areas in reaction to a negative 
rainfall shock. They may also send out children to relatives living in areas away from food 
shortage. Whether wealthier or poorer households migrate is unknown. In the same way, a 
fostered child may be more or less healthy (Akresh, 2009). Unfortunately, the survey does not 
provide any information that could shed light on this issue. 
The estimated impact of a rainfall deficit on child health is also likely to be underestimated if 
shocks result in selective mortality. The impact of shocks is indeed estimated on surviving 
children. Large negative shocks are likely to result in increased mortality so that surviving 
children may be genetically more resistant to deprivation. The survey does not provide 
information on child mortality nor on miscarriage and still birth.  
Weather conditions may also determine parental choice regarding the timing of birth. Some 
parents may decide to delay birth after a negative rainfall shock (and conversely), generating a 
selection bias. However, the magnitude of this phenomenon should not be overstated since 
birth control and contraceptive means are not widespread in rural areas of Burkina Faso. 
Moreover, clustering at the household level should control for this potential source of bias.  
These potential sources of selection biases may be important when studying the impact of 
extreme events such as droughts, wars, pandemics, but should be of less importance when 
examining as we do the impact of “ordinary” rainfall deviations from the mean.  
4.7. Concluding remarks  
This paper contributes to the economics of risk and insurance and to health economics by 
providing new insights on households’ behaviour in a risky environment as well as on the 
determinant of child’s heath. Four important points emerge from the analysis with policy 
implications. 
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First, the significant impact of rainfall shocks in prenatal period on child health shows that 
households are not able to smooth income shocks related to weather conditions. This result 
extend that of Kazianga and Udry (2006) who estimated the impact of the most severe 
drought of the last 30 years on a sample of rural households in Burkina Faso. One would have 
thought that the failure of risk-coping strategies was due to the exceptional severity of the 
1984-85 drought in terms of rainfall deficit and spatial extent. Our results show that 
households dot no cope with income shocks related to ordinary weather fluctuations. 
Second, rainfall shocks translate into nutritional shocks with a delay. In this respect, a drought 
has an adverse effect on the nutritional status of children born within eleven months after the 
shock. This is a consequence of the lack of diversification of rural household income. Farm 
income which is concentrated over a short period of the year determines access to food and 
health care during the rest of the year.  
Third, young children below twelve months are more vulnerable to economic shocks than 
older children. The in utero period and the first months of life appear to be a critical period. 
Negative shocks occurring under the age of twelve months should be considered as having a 
permanent effect. These results are consistent with those of Akresh et al. (2012). Based on a 
sample of children living in the Nahouri region of Burkina Faso, these authors found that 
children exposed to a negative rainfall shock while in utero or in their first year of life have 
lower cognitive abilities.  
Fourth, large negative shocks have a bigger impact on the child nutritional status than large 
positive shocks. Children do not benefit as much from large positive shocks as they are 
negatively affected by large negative shocks, suggesting that large positive shocks are partly 
saved. Children living in poor households are more vulnerable to weather-related income 
shocks than children living in wealthier households. They are especially sensitive to large 
negative rainfall shocks in prenatal period. However, neither rich nor poor households 
manage to smooth consumption in case of large negative rainfall shocks.  
Fifth, rainfall conditions in the prenatal period do not have any impact on the nutritional status 
of the most severely malnourished children. Two hypotheses about household behaviour seem 
particularly worth exploring. First, households may set up survival strategies to protect 
children suffering from acute malnutrition who faced the greatest risk of death. Second, food 
supply and income are not the main determinants of child malnutrition. As documented by 
Smith and Haddad (2000), women’s education may have the strongest impact on child 
malnutrition. 
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These results have important policy implications. They provide additional support for public 
interventions aiming at protecting rural households from climate shocks. In this respect, 
promoting the development of weather–based insurance tools appears to be highly desirable. 
However, weather insurance mechanisms may be unable to protect children suffering from 
acute malnutrition. The results call for an improvement in women’s education and in 
women’s relative status as maternal education emerges as a key determinant on child 
malnutrition. 
These results have also implications for the targeting and timing of assistance in the case of a 
negative rainfall shock. Assistance should be more specifically targeted at pregnant women 
and young children who are the most vulnerable. Distribution of dietary supplements to rural 
women in case of drought may have a positive impact on the health outcomes of the unborn 
child. Assistance should be provided as earlier as possible in the crop year and not only during 
the so-called “hunger season”.  
Last, these results call for further research on intra-household resource allocation. The poor 
nutritional status of children may reflect gender inequality in food access within the 
household between men and women. 
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Appendix D: 
The wealth index is based on a principal component analysis including 17 variables. Table 1 
provides the scoring factors of the five principal components. The five factors with an 
eigenvalue larger than 1 have been kept. The first component accounts for 22 percent of the 
total variation across the 17 indicators. 
 
Table D1: Composition of the wealth index 
 
Variable 
Component 
1 
Component 
2 
Component 
3 
Component 
4 
Component 
5 
Mean S.d 
Radio 0.220 0.002 -0.259 -0.369 0.238 0.742 0.438 
Table 0.274 0.175 -0.255 -0.158 0.242 0.380 0.485 
Chair 0.350 -0.495 0.123 0.100 -0.019 0.653 0.476 
Bed 0.236 0.232 -0.279 -0.087 0.242 0.434 0.496 
Cart 0.302 -0.200 0.067 -0.013 -0.137 0.513 0.500 
Plough 0.350 -0.495 0.123 0.100 -0.019 0.653 0.476 
Phone 0.286 0.178 -0.042 -0.211 -0.091 0.303 0.460 
Television 0.235 0.249 0.195 -0.172 -0.214 0.066 0.248 
Bicycle 0.173 -0.221 -0.098 -0.138 0.231 0.933 0.250 
Motorbike 0.327 0.094 -0.019 -0.157 -0.174 0.333 0.471 
Car 0.071 0.135 0.596 -0.153 0.236 0.003 0.053 
Walls in cement or 
stones 
0.137 0.266 0.188 0.305 -0.157 0.036 0.187 
Improved roof (cement, 
tiles or cogurrated iron) 
0.285 0.178 0.023 0.377 -0.079 0.392 0.488 
Improved floor (cement 
or tiles) 
0.261 0.248 0.023 0.412 -0.040 0.226 0.418 
Electricity 0.010 0.093 0.545 -0.182 0.424 0.004 0.064 
Improved water access 
(tap water, drinking 
fontain, piped water) 
0.035 0.007 -0.128 0.482 0.627 0.653 0.476 
Improved toilet 
facilities (private toilet 
or flush toilets) 
0.191 0.206 -0.027 -0.032 -0.087 0.156 0.363 
Eigenvalue 3.744 1.755 1.148 1.112 1.025     
Share of variance 
associated  
0.220 0.103 0.068 0.065 0.060     
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Table D2: Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Weight-for-height (WHZ) 12403 -0.62 1.26 -5 4.94 
Height-for-age (HAZ) 12572 -1.53 1.64 -6 5.94 
Weight-for age (WAZ) 12497 -1.31 1.26 -5.95 5 
WHZ<2 12403 0.12 0.33 0 1 
HAZ<2 12572 0.39 0.49 0 1 
WAZ<2 12497 0.27 0.45 0 1 
WHZ<3 12403 0.04 0.19 0 1 
HAZ<3 12572 0.16 0.37 0 1 
WAZ<3 12497 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Child age (in months) 12572 27.14 16.57 0 60 
Child sex (male=1) 12572 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Twin (=1 if a child has a twin) 12572 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Household size 12572 12.05 6.69 2 61 
Mother's age (in years) 12572 29.93 7.57 15 60 
Household head age 12572 47.88 13.56 17 100 
Mother's literacy 12572 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Mother's primary education 12572 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Mother's secondary education 12572 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Mother's other education 12572 0.00 0.05 0 1 
Household head literacy 12572 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Household head primary education 12572 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Household head secondary 
education 12572 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Household head other education 12572 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Wealth index 12572 0.01 0.90 -1.41 7.42 
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Table D3: Estimation results of the first stage IV regression 
Dependent variable : Rainfall in birth year measured at the 1st-closest station (T0) 
  
Rainfall in birth year at 2nd-closest station 
0.247*** 
(0.04) 
Rainfall in birth year at 3rd-closest station 
0.153*** 
(0.03) 
Rainfall in birth year at 4th-closest station 
0.234*** 
(0.03) 
Rainfall in birth year at 5th-closest station 
0.166*** 
(0.03) 
 
Observations 12570 
R-squared 0.55 
F-statistic: Joint significance of all four rainfall 
variables 
126.256  
P-value 0.0000 
Overidentification test - Sargan Chi2 1.382 
P-value 0.71 
The regression includes child, mother and household’s characteristics as well as municipality 
dummies. Cluster robust standard errors are in parentheses.* indicates significance at 10% level; ** at 
5% level and *** significant at 1% level of confidence. 
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General conclusion 
Main results 
This dissertation is an attempt to provide responses to some of the issues raised by the 2008 
global food crisis. Between November 2007 and May 2008, the world price of rice tripled. As 
rice is a major staple food in many African countries, the thesis begins with an analysis of the 
price transmission of changes from the world price of rice to domestic prices of local and 
imported rice in three West African countries, namely Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso. The 
results of the econometric estimations reveal that the domestic price of local rice in Dakar 
depends primarily on local supply and demand shocks rather than global market conditions. 
This may reflect the low degree of substitutability between imported and local rice due to the 
fact that that local rice is considered as inferior in quality and is available in small quantity in 
urban markets. Conversely, the price of imported rice in Dakar is integrated with the 
international market. Results suggest that decreases in the world price are slowly passed-
through to the domestic market, as compared to increases. This asymmetric adjustment may 
be due to market power in the distribution chain or high fixed costs in the distribution 
industry. The price of local rice in Bamako responds faster to a world price decrease than to a 
world price increase. This negative asymmetric adjustment may be due to governmental 
interventions intended to protect consumers such as tax exemptions and food security stock 
management. 
The second chapter analyses by how much trade barriers at the border, transport costs and 
nominal exchange rate variations impede the market integration between 24 pairs of 
contiguous countries in the West and Central African region. To do this we assess the extent 
to which road distances, borders and exchange rate changes explain deviations from the 
absolute Law of One Price (LOP) as well as the volatility and persistence in relative prices 
between 173 markets of the region and for six key agricultural commodities (millet, sorghum, 
cassava, maize, imported and local rice). Results strongly indicate that both borders and road 
distance matter in regional integration of food markets in the region. On average crossing a 
border is responsible for an increase of seven percent in relative prices. However this average 
border effect hides large discrepancies by bilateral borders. Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cote 
d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso have the lowest estimated borders, and thus are found to be the 
most integrated countries reflecting the intense cross-border trade of grains between those 
countries. On the other hand, our results evidence the high cost of crossing the Mauritanian, 
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Guinean and Ghanaian borders. Lastly, belonging to an economic union and sharing the same 
currency appear as major determinants of market integration.  
Until recently, the food crisis prevention systems relied almost solely on production forecasts 
forgetting the demand side of the food security equation. However, production forecasts are 
rarely accurate and do not really provide early information about the state of future food 
availability. The purpose of the third chapter is thus to strengthen the existing early warning 
systems by analysing market food prices collected by the national market information systems 
of three Sahelian countries, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Firstly, we identified few leading 
markets –Maradi, Dori, Gaya and Tenkodogo – that play a significant role in influencing 
current prices in other markets. Then, we analysed price behaviour of millet in the different 
countries. Finally, we defined three types of early warning indicators whose predictive power 
has been tested using three types of nonlinear panel models. This chapter provides new 
indicators able to detect the warning signs of a looming price crisis about six months in 
advance. Our results show that crises that start usually in April or May can be anticipated as 
early as November by monitoring the price movements in few markets, especially in Maradi. 
The indicators defined in this chapter have the advantage to rely on existing data that are easy 
to collect. They are proved to be relevant and could usefully be added to the existing early 
warning systems. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the vulnerability literature by studying the impact of weather related 
shocks on the health of children under five years. We consider that a rainfall deficit has a 
negative impact on households’ income which in turn conditions access to food and health 
care. Results show that households dot no cope with income shocks related to ordinary 
weather fluctuations. This can be taken as an evidence of the lack of diversification of rural 
household income. Given that most farmers depend almost exclusively on income from their 
harvest which is concentrated over a short period of the year, a drought has an adverse effect 
on the nutritional status of children born within eleven months after the shock. The in utero 
period and the first months of life appear to be a critical period during which exposure to 
nutritional shortfall have long-lasting effects. Results also show that large negative shocks 
have a bigger impact on the child nutritional status than large positive shocks. Lastly, rainfall 
conditions in prenatal period do not have any impact on the nutritional status of the most 
severely malnourished children. Acute malnutrition is above all the consequence of the poor 
education and poor health status of mothers. 
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Policy implications  
The proportion of undernourished people remains the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. Until 
now, efforts made by national governments and by the international community failed to 
prevent food crisis and to reduce significantly year-to-year food insecurity. This thesis 
suggests some policy implications to achieve this objective.  
Given the role played by borders in explaining price deviations between markets in West and 
Central Africa, attention should be focused on removing transactions costs and reducing 
delays at the border. Trade barriers undermine Africa’s enormous potential for trade between 
food surplus and food deficit areas. Measures to actively facilitate trade are among the main 
urgent actions to assist African countries in expanding trade and benefiting from 
globalization. Examples of trade facilitation actions include the implementation of policy 
reforms, the development of new border management systems and the reduction of excessive 
documentation requirements. 
Massive investments in physical infrastructure such as roads, ports and telecommunications 
networks are needed to improve physical access to food markets. Investments aimed at 
reducing the costs of trade, are central to stimulating smallholders’ market participation and 
escape from semi-subsistence poverty traps. Investments should be focused primarily on 
reducing transport cost in rural areas and to improve cross-border routes in order to link 
smallholders to regional networks. 
Teravaninthorn and Raballand (2009) found that road conditions are not the main determinant 
of the transport prices in West and Central Africa. They show that investing in road 
infrastructure is not a sufficient condition for lowering transports prices as long as the market 
is strongly regulated. In West and Central Africa, the trucking industry is characterized by 
cartels offering high prices and low service quality. Deregulating the trucking industry and 
reforming cartels could certainly help reducing the transport costs.  
Efficiency gains can be made from enhancing regional integration in the continent. As shown 
in chapter two, regional integration helps to decrease food price differentials between markets 
located in opposite sides of a border. Promoting regional integration and harmonizing policies 
among trading partners can enhance strongly the capacity for trade of African countries.  
Besides, strengthening international policy coordination can contribute to improve the food 
trade system towards a more stable and predictable system. In 2008, unilateral actions like 
exports restrictions have proved to be harmful and have exacerbated the initial shock, 
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especially in the case of rice. The regional dimension should be taken into account in the 
formulation of food security policies as well. Given the high inter-country correlation of price 
crisis, African countries must work together to build a regional system for food crisis 
prevention.  
The dissemination of market information including information on prices both within and 
across countries is likely to reduce differences in the relative price of agricultural products in 
different markets. Better market information and increased transparency are expected to help 
farmers by improving the transmission of market signals. Farmers are expected to be able to 
make more informed decisions and in this way maximize their profits and minimize post-
harvest losses due to overproduction of certain crops. 
The slow and asymmetric price transmission between the world price and the domestic prices 
in developing countries is likely to reflect imperfect competition or high fixed costs in the 
distribution chain. It may be also due to political interventions in the form of price support or 
marketing quotas. One important challenge to agricultural development in Africa is to 
improve market access for rural smallholder farmers and to increase the share of the value 
added captured by farmers along the value chain by raising the bargaining power of 
smallholder farmers. The main constraints to value chain development are related to market 
access, market orientation, hard infrastructures and institutions (Trienekens, 2011). 
Modernizing value chain in developing countries requires among other things to increase 
farmers’ knowledge of market demand, farmers’ access to input materials for production and 
to improving the business environment through clear policy directions. 
The thesis provides additional support for public interventions aiming at protecting rural 
households from climate shocks. Promoting the development of weather–based insurance 
could provide an effective solution to promote agricultural development and to protect 
households and particularly children from income variations. However, weather insurance 
mechanisms may be unable to protect children suffering from acute malnutrition. Results call 
for an improvement in women’s education and in women’s relative status as maternal 
education emerges as a key determinant on child malnutrition. 
Scaling up safety net programs should also be among the priorities of policy makers in 
developing countries. The groups most vulnerable to malnutrition (infants, children under 12 
months, pregnant women and lactating mothers) requires special attention and should be 
targeted adequately in social protection programs. There needs to be a much stronger focus on 
the critical period during which deprivation has the most severe consequences on children. 
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Such an approach requires services like prenatal care, breastfeeding promotion, parenting 
education and early intervention for at-risk children less than one year of age. 
Suggestions for future research 
Household food insecurity is a complex and multifaceted problem. To provide accurate policy 
strategies to policy makers, there is need for more research about fundamental questions 
related to food and agriculture in development. 
One direction would be to explore the linkages between smallholder farmers and consumer 
markets, especially the determinants of the marketing behaviour of food crop producers. We 
know for instance that only 30 percent of the domestic rice production is commercialized in 
urban markets in Senegal. An interesting research question would be to assess whether the 
constraints to commercialization are related to production factors - lack of credit to finance 
key inputs and low food crop productivity - or to markets factors including transport costs 
between the farmer’s village and the nearest market, non-competitive behaviour among local 
traders, poor access to price information or lack of demand.  
Another possibility would be to investigate how households adjust their consumption in 
response to changes in prices and income. Although the effect of soaring world food prices 
largely depends on the extent to which world prices are transmitted to domestic markets, the 
demand pattern of households’ responsiveness to price change must be taken into account. 
Better knowledge of the patterns of substitution between and within food groups can help to 
design policies and programs that aim to improve the nutritional status of poor households. 
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Summary of the thesis: 
 
This doctoral thesis is in line with the renewed interest in research on agriculture and food 
security, following the 2008 global food crisis. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a 
better understanding of the complex issues surrounding food security. The first chapter 
investigates whether the changes in the international price of rice are transmitted to the 
domestic prices of rice in Senegal, Mali and Chad. Results indicate that the domestic prices of 
imported rice in Dakar and of local rice in Bamako react differently to changes in the world 
price depending on whether the world price is rising or falling. Chapter 2 analyses by how 
much trade barriers at the border and transport costs impede the integration of agricultural 
markets in West and Central Africa. Results highlight the role played by borders in explaining 
price deviations between markets. Additionally, belonging to an economic union and sharing 
the same currency appear as major determinants of market integration. The third chapter aims 
at providing new early warning indicators based on food prices in Mali, Niger and Burkina 
Faso. Our analysis reveals that price crisis can be predicted about 6 months in advance 
through the observation of past price movements. Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of 
children’s vulnerability to climate shocks in Burkina Faso. By combining health data 
originating from a 2008 household survey with meteorological data, we show the importance 
of weather conditions in prenatal period and in the first year of life on the future nutritional 
status of the children. 
 
Keywords: Food security, food prices, households’ vulnerability, early warning system, TAR 
model, border effect, weather shocks, food price transmission, asymmetric adjustment, child 
health, agricultural trade. 
 
Résumé de la thèse: 
 
La crise alimentaire de 2008 a suscité un regain d’intérêt pour les questions agricoles et de 
sécurité alimentaire dans les pays en développement. Partant du constat que près de 27% de la 
population d’Afrique Sub-saharienne souffre de malnutrition, cette thèse a pour objectif de 
contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des causes complexes de l’insécurité alimentaire. 
Le premier chapitre étudie les mécanismes de transmission des variations du prix mondial du 
riz aux prix domestiques dans trois pays ouest-africain: le Sénégal, le Tchad et le Mali. Les 
résultats indiquent que le prix du riz importé à Dakar et le prix du riz local à Bamako 
répondent de façon asymétrique aux variations du prix mondial. Le chapitre 2 teste la 
présence d’obstacles aux échanges agricoles entre pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest et du Centre. Il 
ressort de l’analyse que le passage des frontières est coûteux. Toutefois, le coût associé au 
passage de la frontière est plus faible entre pays membre d’une même union économique et 
monétaire. Le chapitre 3 a pour objectif le renforcement des systèmes d’alertes précoces des 
crises alimentaires existants au Sahel. Il montre qu’il est possible d’anticiper les crises de prix 
avec six mois d’avance en analysant les mouvements passés des prix des céréales. Enfin, le 
chapitre 4 s’intéresse à la vulnérabilité des ménages face aux chocs pluviométriques. Il révèle 
que les ménages ruraux au Burkina Faso n’ont pas la capacité d’assurer ou d’absorber ces 
chocs climatiques. 
 
Mots clés : Sécurité alimentaire, vulnérabilité des ménages, systèmes d’alerte précoce, choc 
climatique, santé des enfants, modèle TAR, marchés alimentaires, commerce agricole, 
intégration des marchés, effet frontière, transmission des prix.  
 
